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SUMMARY
This research was conducted over a two and one-half year period to 
study and compare four aspects of the British and American unemployment 
benefits systems: legislative philosophies, administrative procedures, 
fraud control, and employer-claimant attitudes. As part of the larger 
field of industrial relations, this study focuses primarily on British 
and American employers and claimants. In an adjunctive role are 
governments of both nations as legislators of the governance and 
procedural structure under which each system operates.
The legislative philosophy of "liberalisation" is pre-eminent among 
the others in both countries, as reflected by steady increases in 
benefit amounts and extension of coverage to more segments of the 
workforce. From comparisons made in seven key procedural areas, the 
British centralised system of authority and decision-making at the 
national level emerged as more efficient and equitable in application 
than is possible under the decentralised American federal-state system.
Comparison of fraud investigation methods, incidence and control 
measures underscores again the advantages which accrue to Britain 
through centralised administration. British and American employers 
reflect similar attitudes in their questionnaire responses, differing 
sharply only in two areas; American employers are evenly split on 
whether a benefit system is needed, while British employers are almost 
unanimous in supporting that need; British employers are divided on 
whether unions pressure employers to support the work-shy, while 
American employers agree overwhelmingly that this is so. British and 
American claimants reflect similar attitudes, varying only in the degree 
of congruence.
ill
Consistent with the purpose of this study - to extend the boundaries 
of knowledge and propose solutions to common problems - recommendations 
are made to improve both systems. Principally among these: "experience 
rating" is recommended for the British system as an incentive-reward 
to employers who succeed in stabilising their workforce; nationalised 
benefits procedures and shared employer-employee contributions are 
recommended for the American system.
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The present strong, interdependent social and economic ties which 
characterise the relationship between Britain and the United States 
have matured over the past 200 years. These ties have been forged 
through exchanges of ideas and mutual co-operation in successful 
efforts to solve a variety of common problems many times during 
that long period. One contemporary common problem, of acute 
importance, is that of unemployment. This is an increasingly visible 
issue which plays host to a number of component elements, each of 
which contributes to the overall severity of the whole problem.
Among these components is the system of unemployment benefits by 
which both nations provide income maintenance to regular members 
of the workforce, temporarily unemployed through no fault of their 
own, while they seek new work.
Early in the literature search phase of this study, certain of 
Professor Beynon's precepts were adopted as a sort of platform on 
which to base the remaining effort. In his inaugural address as 
Royal Research Professor, University College of Swansea, he made 
the point that "Research may conveniently be divided into two kinds, 
one in which the only motive is to extend the boundaries of knowledge, 
the other where the purpose is to solve problems of common concern." 
This study seeks to harness both "kinds". First, to extend the 
boundaries of knowledge through examination and comparison of the 
British and American unemployment benefit systems; and second, from 
that base to draw conclusions and recommendations which may be 
useful in addressing these "problems of common concern."
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In accordance with the provisions of the approved research proposal, 
this study portrays and compares four aspects of the British and 
American systems of unemployment insurance: legislative philosophies, 
administrative procedures, fraud incidence and control measures, 
and employer-claimant attitudes. The chapters on legislative philosophies 
and attitudes represent new areas of research in this field for which 
no evidence of previous exploration has been found. In discussing 
these two topics, certain labels have been devised and applied for 
ease of reference. During the conduct of this study, effort has been 
made to remain objective and politically neutral is assessing the 
efficacy and character of each nation's system. The conclusions and 
recommendations chapter bring out the net yield of the research and 
areas for practical application and improvement.
As used within the text, the following terms should be construed as 
interchangeable: for the United Kingdom, Britain, British, UK; for 
the United States: American, America, USA, U.S. With respect to 
the system of referencing, document citations are complete in each 
footnote, except in the literature chapter, wherein only abbreviated 
citations appear (author's name, date of publication). Footnotes, 
appendices and tables are numbered consecutively and integrated 
into the body of each chapter. The bibliography contains a complete, 
British-American listing of references.
While not necessarily the single most important element of the whole 
unemployment problem, the direct relationship between the number of 
unemployed and unemployment benefits assures it a high priority 
position in that hierarchy. Both nations admit that the parent issue 
shows every indication of permanency. Lyn Owen (The Observer, 13 
August 1978) stated: "Present unemployment is no brief dip in the
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graphs between sixties boom and North Sea oil bonanza, but in all 
probability a permanent reality. There are many children growing 
up now who will never know what it is like to be employed." The 
United States Congress declared recently that a state of "full 
employment" would exist when an unemployment rate of no more than 
four per cent (3.8 million) is reached.
Within the industrial relations field, it is hoped that this study 
will promote better understanding of the role benefits play in the 
parent problem scenario of unemployment, and that the recommendations 




THE PROPOSAL. NATURE AND SEQUENCE OF RESEARCH
The need for a comparative study of United Kingdom and United States’ 
unemployment benefits systems as a basis for identifying means of 
improvement to each of them is derived from their common economic 
and social problems associated with such benefits. These problems 
have become increasingly acute over the past five years, during which 
period the unemployment rate in both countries soared at the same time 
that buying power was eroded by the effects of spiralling inflation.
The two nations are party to similar historical roots, are economically 
interdependent, and subscribe generally to the same political and 
social goals. They share the belief that the unemployment insurance 
legislation now on their respective books is necessary to provide 
monetary benefits on a temporary basis to those who are unemployed through 
no fault of their own. They share also the conviction that ineligible 
persons must be prevented from successfully laying claim to such 
benefits through abuse and fraud tactics. These factors combine to 
postulate a need to compare key elements of their unemployment benefits 
systems and, from the results of the comparison, to distill useful 
recommendations for improvement of each system.
Of collateral importance, as part of the research effort, is the 
professional maturation to be realized by this researcher-university 
faculty member in terms of increased knowledge and exposure to an 
other-than-American point of view. In his Culture and Management,
Ross A Webber describes the ethnocentric nature of American management 
as follows: "On no subject are Americans more self-centred and
ethnocentric than on the management of economic enterprise." While
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Webber addressed his remark primarily to the business community, 
personal observation over many years convinces me that the same 
ethnocentricity applies in equal measure to the members of the academic 
profession.
In the interest of providing appropriate background in advance of 
detail contained in later chapters, it is appropriate at this point 
to outline the salient features of each nation’s system under study 
as preamble to further discussion of the proposal, nature and 
sequence of the research.
The British System. Evolved from the Elizabethan Poor Laws, the 
National Insurance (NI) Act of 1911 established a comprehensive 
framework of social welfare, expanded progressively through the years, 
of which Unemployment Benefits is one element. The Unemployment 
Benefit (UB) system is administered on a national basis, through a 
subordinate network of regional and local UB offices under the 
direct supervision of the Department of Employment (DE), the latter 
operating under policies of the Department of Health and Social 
Security (DHSS). Funding of unemployment benefits is integrated 
within the shared employee-employer NI contribution paid to the 
Inland Revenue, as receiving agent, through employer administrative 
channels. All administrative procedures, filing and recording claims, 
payment to claimants, and fraud control are uniform throughout the 
nation. Benefits can be paid up to a maximum of 312 days to those 
who were employed for at least 26 weeks during the relevant tax 
year and who are otherwise eligible. An earnings-related supplement 
is payable also for up to 6 months to unemployed persons whose 
normal earnings exceed a base level, the exact floor of which is 
revised periodically according to the cost of living/price index.
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The American System. As part of the Social Security Act of 1935, a 
federal-state partnership for administration of an unemployment 
insurance system was created. Congress legislated certain broad 
standards, primarily concerned with assuring impartiality of 
benefit administration and maintenance of complete financial records, 
which each state had to satisfy in order to participate in federal 
subsidy of state administrative costs. Although no state was 
compelled to establish an unemployment benefit programme, the 
lure of the federal subsidy - and the skyrocketing unemployment 
problem of the depression years - proved adequate to bring all 
states under the federal umbrella within a few years. As enacted, 
a payroll tax of 3 per cent was levied on employers within participating 
states, with provision that they receive up to 90 per cent credit 
of that amount against the federal tax for contributions they paid 
under (federally-approved) state unemployment insurance laws.
Currently, only three states (Alabama, Alaska and New Jersey) 
require employees to contribute with their employers to the state 
Unemployment Trust Fund; all other states impose contributions on 
employers only. As a consequence of the wide latitude accorded each 
state, unemployment insurance laws vary greatly among them. Eligibility 
standards, filing and recording of claims, duration and amount of 
benefits, fraud control measures and most other administrative 
procedures all fall within the jurisdiction of each state. All 
benefit payments are earnings-related, usually at about 50% of 
normal wages up to a maximum dollar figure. A 26-week maximum 
duration is observed in most states, with additional periods 
subsidized by federal and/or state funds during times of high 
unemployment. Depending upon the laws in the state where an employer 
does business, reduced payroll taxes may be authorized under an 
"Experience Rating" concept which rewards employers for achieving
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workforce stability (no dramatic layoff or firing incidence).
The Proposal
A preliminary research proposal was outlined early in 1976 to 
Mr Alan G Baker, Senior Lecturer in Manpower Studies and Head of 
the Manpower Studies Group (and Mr Geoffrey Hutton, then Director of 
Postgraduate Studies), both of the School of Management, University 
of Bath. Based on their interest in the subject, a literature 
search was begun in the United States in March 1976. At the same 
time, the initial proposal was refined to identify major comparison 
points and to confirm a dual-based research effort in the United 
Kingdom and the United States.
After revisions of the preliminary proposal during a two-month period 
of residency at the University of Bath (May-June 1976), the formal 
proposal was formally submitted under the title: A Comparative Study 
of British and American Unemployment Benefit Systems. Subsequently, 
the proposal was approved by the Board of Studies and the Senate of 
the University.
Nature and Sequence of the Research
The research issue is of public concern to the United Kingdom and 
the United States. In the UK (1971-1973), the Fisher Committee 
inquired into the whole spectrum of social welfare benefits, but 
without special focus on unemployment benefits. No similar study 
is known ever to have been undertaken in the United States on a 
national level, although individual states have studied the subject
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The objective of the research is four-fold; (1) portrayal and 
comparison of UK and USA legislative philosophies and administrative 
procedures which apply to unemployment benefits; (2) identification 
and comparison of abuse-fraud incidence and control measures; (3) 
analysis and comparison of UK/USA employer and claimant attitudes 
toward their respective systems; (4) recommendations of measures 
whereby each system might achieve greater economy while providing 
more efficient service to eligible claimants.
The overall objective featured extensive field work utilizing 
interviews with employers, claimants and system administrators, 
and administration of employer and claimant survey instruments during 
residency in the United Kingdom and the United States. Conduct of 
research was forecast in four phases:
Phase 1: USA-based, July 1976-May 1977
Phase 2: UK-based, June-December 1977
Phase 3: USA-based, January-May 1978
Phase 4: UK-based, June-September 1978, for completion of 
research and final draft of study. Each of these phases is explained 
in greater detail in the following paragraphs.
Phase 1: USA-based, July 1976-May 1977. Starting in July 1976, the 
literature search was continued and contact made with unemployment 
benefit divisions in New York, Mississippi, Illinois, Colorado, 
California and Hawaii. The last-mentioned of these, Hawaii, was 
the main vehicle for study of the American system. Personal visits 
to these states enroute to and from the United Kingdom expedited 
research of procedural and attitudinal interests. The four primary 
research elements of legislative philosophies, procedures, abuse-fraud
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and employer-claimant attitudes towards the state systems were 
examined, recorded and drafted in narrative form.
During the summer and early autumn of 1976, two types of attitude 
questionnaires were developed and administered; one for employers, 
the other for claimants. A combination of personal visit and 
telephone contact was used to obtain employer responses; personal 
interview only for claimant reaction. These questionnaire responses 
were then programmed for computer analysis for later use in the 
comparisons with counterpart British employer-claimant attitude 
questionnaires during Phase 2.
Extensive interviewing of random-choice employers and claimants 
was conducted in Hawaii (96 of each category), Buffalo (each 34) 
and Sacramento, California (each 26). Interviews of a lesser 
number of employers and claimants were conducted in Jackson, 
Mississippi (14 employers, 19 claimants), and Elgin, Illinois (21 
employers, 16 claimants). In all instances, claimant interviews 
took place off the premises of unemployment benefit offices, since 
co-operating benefit administrators in these locations wished to 
avoid any implication that this research was officially endorsed 
by their state government. Consequently, claimant interviews were 
conducted in parking lots and public streets just off but immediately 
adjacent to unemployment office premises while claimants were either 
enroute to or coming from them.
Agencies in the state of Hawaii especially co-operative through 
the USA-based research during Phase 1 are: Department of Labor and 
Industrial Relations, the Lex Brodie Small Business Association,
The Chamber of Commerce of Hawaii, the Hawaii Employers* Council, 
the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen’s Union, the 
Industrial Relations Institute of the University of Hawaii and various 
senators and representatives to the Hawaii State Legislature.
Phase 2: UK-based, June-December 1977. After completion of Phase 1, 
the research locus was moved to the United Kingdom in May 1977.
The County of Avon (Somerset) had been selected during the previous 
year’s residency as the prime area for United Kingdom research, with 
Bath as the operation centre. Contacts with regional (Southwest 
Region) unemployment benefit officials in Bristol, made in 1976, 
were renewed and on-site ’’attachments’’ arranged by Mr T D Brown, 
Regional Staff Training Officer, Department of Employment (DE), 
Bristol. These visits provided opportunity for detailed examination 
of premises, procedures and problem areas, and for interviews with 
key administrators from whom a "feel" of the administrative 
environment could be acquired. The UBO’s in Bristol, Trowbridge, 
Midsomer Norton and Bath were visited initially. Additional vists 
were made elsewhere in the United Kingdom, arranged personally 
during subsequent months. In addition to UBO visits, interviews 
weie conducted with other DE officials of the Southwest Region: the 
Assistant Regional Director, Regional Staff Officer, Regional 
Insurance Officer, and the Regional Fraud Officer - the last of 
especial importance due to the emphasis placed on this subject in 
the study. Return visits arranged at later times in order to explore 
in greater detail certain points which proved initially more complex 
than anticipated. '
Under the aegis of Mr A Willson, Overseas Division, DE headquarters 
in London, a total of 19 visits were made to various London-based
offices of the Department of Employment and the Department of Health 
and Social Security (DHSS). Key officials were interviewed and 
re-interviewed at these times, including Miss Barbara Rackham who 
supervises at the national level the control of abuse and prosecution 
of unemployment benefit fraud cases referred there by subordinate 
regional fraud officers. The London-based research provided education 
and insight into the operation of the national system and an opportunity 
to understand some of the administrative and philosophical conflicts 
arising from cultural differences among the people of England, Wales 
and Scotland. As part of these London visits, interviews of 
claimants and completion of claimant questionnaires were conducted 
in the borough of Deptford, a depressed area of the city.
During the London itinerary, which extended through the eight-month 
residency, with visits lasting two or three days each, the literature 
search was continued at the British Library, University of London 
Library, London Reference Library, and the London School of Economics 
Library. Further, contacts made with the British Institute of 
Management, Confederation of British Industry, and the Social Science 
Research Council were extremely helpful in identifying people, 
places and avenues to assist in the research effort and in opening 
their respective libraries for this purpose.
The library research in London, coupled with that conducted in 
the university libraries of Bath and Bristol, and in the Bath 
Municipal Reference Library, confirmed that no studies were presently 
in progress and no studies had been made previously which were 
similar in scope to the subject matter of this dissertation. Of 
special importance in this confirmation was the examination of all
009
studies now funded and those for which proposals for funding have 
been received by the Social Science Research Council.
The staff of the Chamber of Commerce of Bristol assisted in reviewing 
the UK employer and claimant questionnaires, already administered 
in the USA, and suggested changes which would render them colloquially 
appropriate in Britain. These questionnaires were then completed 
by members of Rotary Clubs in Bristol, Bath and London to obtain 
employer reactions. Claimant questionnaires were completed outside 
UBO premises in Bath, Bristol, London - to include Deptford - and 
Inverness.
The basic UK research, counterpart to that previously undertaken 
in the United States during Phase 1, was completed in early September 
1977. Following review and consultation with Mr Alan Baker, the 
comparison chapters for legislative philosophies and for procedures 
were drafted and submitted to him during the final October-December 
1977 period of UK residency.
Phase 3; USA-based, January-May 1978. During this period, certain 
points which had surfaced in the United Kingdom were explored for 
counterpart American data, such as "emergency procedures" for 
administering sudden, dramatic rises in claimant traffic. Further, 
the USA literature search was completed; this confirmed what had 
been noted in the United Kingdon, that np comparative studies had 
been made or were currently proposed of UK-USA unemployment benefits 
systems.
The comparative analysis was drafted between UK and American employer 
and claimant attitudes toward unemployment benefits. Other chapters -
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methodology, conclusions, recommendations - were put in final draft 
form.
Phase 4: UK-based, June-September 1978. During this final period of 
residency in the United Kingdom, revisions of previous work, updating 
of certain statistics, completion of the UK literature search write­
up and preparation of final draft were accomplished. After consultation 
with Mr Alan Baker, the study was prepared in final form and formally 




This review is divided into two parts. Part 1 focuses on the work 
of British authors and certain others within the Commonwealth;
Part 2 discusses the work of American writers in the field. Each 
of these Parts follows generally the same sequence of presentation 
as that observed in the arrangement of major chapters within the 
study itself: legislative philosophies, procedures, fraud-abuse, 
and attitudes.
The term "legislative philosophies" was coined by this researcher as 
a convenient title for one of the main elements of this study.
Since it does not exist in general use, there is no literature under 
that specific label. Consequently, in that area this review is an 
amalgam of the slow, largely qualitative reactions to unemployment 
and income maintenance by British and American society. Literature 
on procedures rests heavily on official government sources, and 
the commentary of writers who study procedures and evaluate their 
effect on those concerned, then make judgements on the efficacy, 
severity, or permissiveness of the systems from their own vantage 
point. Literature on fraud and abuse has been found mainly through 
combination of offical publications and the popular press, to include 
periodicals. The rising cry of public outrage against those who 
subvert the unemployment benefits system to support their voluntary 
idleness is a high saleable issue in our time. Government statistics 
and analysis of fraud-abuse form the basis for a wide range of media 
discussion. Attitudes are elusive properties, as expressed in that 
chapter, influenced by locale, socio-economic pressure and peer norms.
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among other factors. Within this disparate and wide-ranging set 
of possible literature sources, the contemporary media offers the 
best means to examine attitudes subjecti\eLy, while selected statistical 
recipes provide means for quantitative evaluation and comparison.
This review, thus, rests on diverse British-American historical and 
contemporary legislative, philosophical and government bases. The 
communication means which give these bases voice are equally diverse: 
historic and contemporary books, pamphlets, manuscripts, newspapers 
and periodicals of all sorts, radio, television, questionnaire 
and personal interview. What follows here in Part 1 and Part 2 
incorporates only written sources, excluding radio, television, 
questionnaire and personal interview.
As stated in the General Introduction, references discussed in 
this chapter are cited in abbreviated form, eg (author's surname, 
date of publication). Complete reference citations are listed 
alphabetically in the Bibliography.
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Part I (British Authors)
Significant events which illuminate the legislative path of the 
British Government in arriving at the present forms of public 
assistance to those who are unemployed, or are in want from some 
other reason, occurred over a period of 500 years. An appreciation 
of these events and the social climate which produced them depends 
on historical chronicles of those times and the interpretive 
commentary which certain writers have accorded them. Fortunately, 
there is a wealth of such documentation and, as is often the case 
with an abundance of resources and choice, selectivity becomes a 
problem equal almost in its yield of frustration to that encountered 
when resources are hard to come by. Of the two extremes, however, 
abundance is by far the more preferable.
Identification of legislative philosophies relevant to unemployment 
benefits is a tenuous undertaking, but perhaps with a heightened 
degree of uncertainty in the case of this study since no previous 
research on this subject has come to light. To acquire necessary 
background on what might be called "social enlightenment" required 
examination of numerous books and documents; yet this effort 
yielded only a small harvest in terms of direct application to the 
first of the core subjects, that of legislative philosophies. In 
short, the process of triage consumed a significant measure of 
the total effort.
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Of the writers whose work was of value in the acquisition of the 
general "flavour" mentioned above, was a quartet composed of J J and 
A J Bagley (1968), Cole (1948), Gilbert, B B (1966), and Bruce (1973). 
Among this group, the Bagleys (1968) portray the impact of the plague 
in 1348, its stimulation of peasant workforce mobility, and the 
repressive measures taken by the Crown to deny such mobility.
From these accounts, one can understand the dilemma confronting 
feudal landowners when, within a few weeks after the black death 
struck on its path from the Hampshire and Dorset coasts to London, 
there arose for the first time an acute shortage of labour - a 
disturbing and unexpected shift in the balance of that society.
The stop-gap measures of Edward III, which forbade employers to pay 
higher wages to assure their fields would be worked, followed by 
the harsh vagrancy penalties of the Tudors aimed at the migrating 
workers clearly establish the cause and effect relationship between 
these events and subsequent, directly related, legislative 
philosophies. Like the Bagley's, Bruce (1973) sketched a close 
association between the Elizabethan Poor Laws and the development 
of the welfare state. He described the Act of 1601 as "the 
culmination of a series of fumbling attempts to deal with the 
widespread poverty of Tudor times", and stated that the Tudor 
government confided the operation of its policies to unpaid local 
officials, justices of the peace and others whose ability to 
interpret and apply the law impartially was highly susceptible to 
whim and caprice. The singular achievement of the modern welfare 
state, according to Bruce, has been to assure equitable treatment 
of all recipients of various benefits consistent with statutory 
provisions, without regard to the vagaries of indMdual administrators.
Bruce made another point which had considerable influence on this
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dimension of the study. He stated his agreement with Gladstone's 
relief recommendations and belief that the Unemployed Workman's 
Act of 1905 failed because "it hardly affected the type of workman 
for whom, in periods of unemployment, it was intended, but attracted 
instead a class of under-employed workers, whose existence had 
hardly been suspected".
Beveridge (1909, 1942, 1960) wrote extensively on the subject of 
unemployment and its related aspects. Due to his important roles 
in both government and academe, and to his 1942 Report on which is 
based the current version of the national insurance scheme, Beveridge 
probably exerted greater influence over a longer period of time 
on the development of the British welfare state than any other 
single individual. He characterised unemployment insurance as 
contractual in two senses; it gave the insured legally enforceable 
rights which did not depend on any other of his resources or status; 
and second, these rights were contingent on contributions made 
during periods of work. The effect, according to Beveridge, was 
that unemployment ireurance was perceived by the working man as a 
fair bargiÉ»in. It was in his 1909 work that Beveridge wrote the 
oft-quoted "Workmen today, are men living on a quick-sand, which at 
any moment may engulf individuals, which at uncertain intervals 
sinks for months or years below the sea surface altogether".
Cole 0.948), although writing during the mid-career period of 
Beveridge, held the latter's same low opinion of the 1905 Act, but 
did view it as an important piece of legislation since it gave "the 
f/rst faint recognition of a public duty towards the unemployed".
He made also a strong indictment against the Poor Laws after their 
revision of 1834: "with its withdrawal of outdoor relief to the
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able-bodied and its segregation of sexes in the workhouse, it was 
the embodiment of that popular 'Malthusianism' which became the 
scientific cloak for the rich man's fear of his poor neighbour".
In this context Cole was amplifying what Rogers (1889)had said 
much earlier and even more forcefully. In discussing the Poor Laws 
after 1834, as they affected children of paupers, Rogers stated 
that "although commendable as a social goal (training children 
to do useful work), the system became a very real form of child 
slavery in many instances, with all the attendant abuses by certain 
masters against children who were, in those times, powerless under 
the law to seek redress".
Gilbert, B B (1970) traced the development of welfare policy through 
the relatively halycon years between the two great wars. In 
discussing the crisis of 1931 and unemployment insurance, Gilbert 
remarked on the suddenness with which it appeared and the lack of 
preparation for it by the British Government. In point of fact, 
neither the British nor American governments had made any viable 
preparations for the spectacular disaster of those years. At least 
the British had twenty years of experience in administering 
unemployment compensation to those eligible, whereas the United 
States had not yet enacted any similar legislation at all. In 
this context, Gilbert identified a problem which is still much 
in evidence today, that of the little difference between what 
certain unemployed! workers' families received in unemployment 
benefits and the local wage rates when those wage-earners were 
in work. This is an important point, since it assumes the character­
istics of a chronic, enduring problem which has become even more 
visible after an ensuing forty-five year period during which the 
legislative philosophy of liberalisation matured and prospered.
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Harris (1972), in his thoughtful commentary on the linkage between 
unemployment and political action, expands on the Cole and Rogers 
themes concerning the effects of assistance to the unemployed.
"For fifty years after the Poor Law reforms of 1834, unemployment 
as a serious theoretical and practical question was virtually ignored 
by English economic theorists and social reformers... It was 
believed by orthodox economic thinkers that gratuitous assistance 
to the unemployed would depress the level of wages, discourage 
labour mobility (which indicates awareness on Harris' part that 
the "status quo" philosophy had been abandoned), and put a premium 
on reckless procreation...and since the aggregate 'fund' for wages 
at any time was inelastic, individual workmen were unemployed simply 
because they tried to sell their labour at too high a price".
Harris offers further evidence as to the views of that era that 
"public employment and public relief for the unemployed were 
therefore regarded as both dangerous and futile...lack of employment 
was seen as either a voluntary condition which workmen incurred 
wilfully, or as an inevitable occurence which they (the workmen) should 
predict and provide for out of their earnings whilst employed".
The combined views of Cole, Gilbert, Rogers and Harris provided 
valuable insight into the interplay of conflict between employers' 
staunch maintenance of their traditional stand against coddling the 
unemployed and the growing insistence by the whole labour force 
that relief measures be legislated. It was from this base that 
identifications were made of specific legislative philosophies for 
which convenient labels were then coined ("status quo", "liberal­
isation", etc.).
Pollard (1968) provided additional evidence that the force of the
labour bloc was achieving certain of its objectives in the political 
arena. He mentioned th<â- taxation relief and gratis amenities for 
public health and cultural education enacted for the benefit of the 
working classes in the mid-nineteenth century. "At much the same 
time the vicious bias of the taxation system against the poor was 
relaxed. As large sections of them were, in effect, exempt from 
rates, the legislation of 1848-52 which provided for public health 
measures, public baths, common lodging houses and public libraries, 
among others, represented almost pure gain which gradually became 
effective in the following 30 years".
Brown K D (1971) summed up legislative progress in the field of 
social welfare as of the close of the last century: "By the last 
decade of the 19th Century many Englishmen had come to accept the 
need for substantial state intervention in order to tackle the 
problems of poverty". Brown commented further on the additional 
progress made during Edward VII's short reign: "The Edwardian era 
saw a significant change in the attitude of the state toward the 
unemployed...By 1914 the state had openly admitted its responsibility 
for legislating for those of its citizens who had no work." The 
fact that Cole, Pollard and Gilbert had already come to those same 
conclusions in their writings does not diminish the importance of 
Brown’s statements. They serve to corroborate and reinforce the 
other authors’ contentions, a valuable contribution in such a 
contentious area.
One draws further from Brown’s work in assessing the consolidation 
of labour’s gains during the Edwardian years, often looked upon as 
a golden period in British history. Indeed, the absence of full- 
scale wars make them so in comparison with other peiods. They were
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turbulent, nevertheless, because of sustained conflict and frequent 
open clashes between partisans of traditional work patterns and 
the rising political voice of the working classes insisting on a 
better, more secure way of life. Although the four major trade 
unions had been formed prior to Edward VII's accession, it was 
during his reign that they became truly important political forces.
The Trade Union Congress (TUC) was formed in 1867, the Social 
Democratic Federation (SDF) in 1883, Independent Labour Party (ILP) 
in 1893, and the Labour Representation Committee (LRC) in 1900.
The workers' ground swell in championing their rights, begun formally 
in 1895 when the ILP moved a resolution claiming that "one of the 
citizen’s inalienable rights should be the right to work and to 
enjoy the fruits of his own labours", came into its own during the 
first decade of the twentieth century.
Commentary on the translation of these legislative innovations into 
procedural reality is made only by a few writers. Among that small 
number, two have contributed materially to an understanding of the 
arguments for and against the issue of centralized versus decentralized 
administration.
McConnell (1966) points out that "privacy and freedom may find more 
secure shelter in the cold impersonality of large, centralized units 
...impersonality is the guarantee of individual freedom characteristic 
of a large unit". In that context, McConnell specified that 
impersonality means the avoidance of arbitrary official action, the 
following of prescribed procedure, conformance to established rules, 
and escape from bias whether for or against any individual.
Gilbert, N (1971), while agreeing essentially with McConnell in the
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overall benefits of centralized procedures, takes up the baton for 
decentralization stating that "community control, self-determination, 
participatory democracy and local initiative are catch-words that 
convey the strong feelings vested in the value of decentralization... 
Local governments are more knowledgeable about problems in their 
ares^ they are more responsive, they function more in line with 
the consent of the governed..." He added somewhat parenthetically 
that "...if they (local governments) fail, all is not lost...there 
is an existential quality about small decentralized units that is 
appealing". In discussing the disadvantages of decentralization, 
Gilbert; N, echoes the same theme of McConnell as outlined above.
Florence (1964) made reference to the strengthened voice of labour 
achieved through unity of its several components in his evaluation 
of the improved fortunes of the British worker toward the end of 
the first half of the twentieth century. "In spite of industrial 
slumps, unemployment insurance smoothed out incomes...In the 
depression of 1929-1935, for instance, the real total income of 
the working class in Britain did not measurably fall".
Within the chapter of this study which compares British with American 
administrative procedures is a discussion of one of the salient 
differences between the two systems; sources of contribution to 
unemployment benefit funds. This is a point which has not been 
addressed in any great length by writers of either country. One 
conjectures -fhtn' fUis point becomes important only through the
process of comparison; when viewed solely within the bounds of 
either nation's legislative arena, it appears to merit no more than 
passing attention.
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In Britain during the three-year period leading up to final passage 
of the National Insurance Act in December of 1911, its principal 
planners worked in conformance with three principles around which 
the parliamentary bill was fashioned; first, the coverage would be 
narrow in terms of workers eligible for benefits; second, trade 
union unemployment insurance would be incorporated into the 
Government plan on bases acceptable to the unions; and third, it 
would have to be contributory if it were not to be ruinously 
expensive,
Gilbert; B B (1966) discussed the third of these principles in some 
detail, emphasising that trade unionists and radicals feared that 
any employer-only insurance contribution would be added to his wage 
costs and so would be paid ultimately by the worker. They attempted, 
therefore, to make the state a third-party contributor, arguing 
that state costs could be recovered from a reduced "Poor Laws" 
expenditure. Meanwhile, Government planners asserted that by keeping 
the insurance contributory at roughly one-third each for employers 
and employees, that the state would furnish the remaining third.
This last was an innovation and the focus of some spirited debate.
It is stressed here that only the state contribution was under open 
debate, the shared employer-employee contribution feature was 
accepted by the Parliamentary Committee with no more than token 
discussion except by a faction within the trade union bloc which 
demurred at the prospect of employee contributions.
Fraser (1975) alluded to this subject: "It was agreed at an early 
stage to restrict the British scheme to a certain number of trades 
and to make it contributory, with state support... the main debating 
point was whether benefits should be withdrawn from men who were
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to blame for their own unemployment" (those who quit without good 
cause). Throughout the build-up of the bill prior to its introduction 
to Parliament, Beveridge, according to Fraser, insisted that the 
"principle of proportioning benefits to contributions must clearly 
be embodied in the bill".
Harris (1977) portrays some of the cloakroom in-fighting which took 
place just prior to the bill's full-scale Parliamentary consideration 
which began in May of 1911, Lloyd George considered himself the 
original proponent of unemployment insurance and openly discounted 
Churchill's contribution to the plan as a "few rhetorical speeches 
in Parliament". Harris made the point that unemployment insurance 
had been ready for legislative action for nearly two years (prior 
to May 1911) and its administrative structure had been carefully 
worked out to involve both capital (employers) and labour (employees) 
in collection of contributions.
As mentioned previously, a faction of the trade unions were not in 
favour of employee contributions; they felt that the scheme would 
have an adverse effect on the whole structure of unionism.
Brown, K D (1971) stated further that "Grayson, Hall and other 
malcontents on the left of the labour alliance were prepared to 
oppose the Insurance Bill outright...They were also against the 
contributory principle, the parliamentary correspondent of Justice 
condemning this proposal as 'mean, petty, and ridiculous'".
Evidence bearing on the contributory principle as a debatable issue 
indicates that, while there was some controversy surround**»^the 
subject, its importance was greatest with the Labour Party itself.
It is perceived by this researcher as a non-problem subject with a
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Britain-only context, as an issue which was accepted by employers 
and employees alike as a shared obligation.
Chisholm and Oeppen (1973) conducted a research study which analysed 
employment and, more particularly, unemployment from the standpoints 
of the industries involved and the regional locations of these industries. 
Although the study is of marginal interest with respect to the four 
major subjects treated in this dissertation, it does cast light on 
the incidence of unemployment through a series of tables and graphs 
which are of some use in the way of economic background data.
Literature dealing with abuse and fraud as well as with attitudes 
toward unemployment benefits is very limited so far as conventional 
publications are concerned. The majority of written material on 
these subjects appear in the form of editorials, articles by 
investigative reporters and short studies, many of which are 
published in various press media.
Investigation of holdings in the major libraries of the United Kingdom, 
and consultation with research personnel of the Confederation of 
British Industry, the Social Science Research Council and the 
British Institute of Management confirm that no comparative studies 
of British and American unemployment benefits have been completed 
to date nor are any presently proposed which cover the scope of 
that to which this literature search pertains. As a consequence, 
what there is of documentation is at once extremely varied and 
widely scattered since few pieces deal exclusively with either 
abuse-fraud or attitudes per se.
On the subject of abuse-fraud, Mcllroy (1976) comments on the "mounting
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public indignation that under the existing system...many workers 
are better off staying at home. This has led to costly abuses by 
a minority of ’scroungers'". He pressed this point - referred to 
in this study as the "Why Work" attitude - with an illustration 
that "a married man with two children and average outgoings would 
need to earn more than £75 a week to have a greater spending power 
that if he were unemployed". Mcllroy's purpose in making these 
comments was to communicate some of the background which led to 
the Government's decision not to take aggressive action against 
scroungers in the face of Tory campaigns for benefit reforms which 
would curtail abuses of the system. He makes a further point that 
the Government’s "own published figures have shown that many 
unemployed people have more spending power on the dole than if they 
were back in their same jobs". The Government decision was apparently 
forced by TUC pressure on the grounds that the result of such action 
would be to reduce benefits; this in spite of Government protestations 
that there would be no measures to reduce benefits but merely to end 
abuses and discourage scroungers.
As if to refute Mcllroy's statements, a number of illustrations 
and other commentary were published at about the same time attesting 
to the active campaign to prosecute abuse and fraud cases. The 
Telegraph (1976) published the results of an Old Bailey trial in 
which four women and a man were sentenced for swindling by means of 
forged benefit vouchers. Similarly, in the House of Lords, Lord 
Wells-Pestell (1976) stated that about 1,000 new cases of abuse are 
being investigated every week and that it was intended to increase 
the anti-abuse action of the Government. "We have not failed to 
recognise the seriousness of this problem. There were over 15,000 
successful prosecutions in 1975, twice the number in 1970...All
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the people who have faith in the national insurance scheme, and 
the many millions who willingly pay their dues, are deeply resentful 
when they see these abuses. A bad minority are bringing the scheme 
into contempt and should be properly dealt with".
A Financial Times (1976) editorial dwells on the same subject to 
advocate the taxing of benefits in accordance with "the intention 
of the Beveridge proposals to tax all social security benefits, 
and it is for admxistrative reasons only that the proposal was not 
put into effect". Beveridge is quoted further by this editorial:
"...the basic absurdity is of course that people earning no more 
than the dole are liable to pay tax..." and that "for a number of 
people legally entitled to benefit, it simply does not pay to go 
to work". Kennedy (1976) points out that since unemployment benefit 
is not taxed, " earned income can be worth less in the hands of 
recipients than State payments of an identical size to those who 
are not working". He adds another illustration contributing to the 
"Why Work" attitude with the account of a retail shoe shop director 
in the West End of London who advertised in the London Evening 
Standard a salary of £28 per week for school leavers while training 
in his business, without receiving a single applicant. When he 
queried the DE as to possible reasons for this lack of interest 
at a time when unemployment was high, he was told that "after 
deductions, NHS contribution, presumably some tax, and travelling 
expenses to and from the job, a school leaver is financially better 
off on the dole". He concluded his article with this comment : "It is 
a.. typical example of how the idealism sought in the 1930's has 
become utterly ridiculous and grossly abused by a great many people".
Even earlier than the 1976 Financial Times editorial was Howell's (1974)
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advocacy of taxing benefits. He asserted that "this nation has an 
unemployment complex...we are the only western nation where a man 
can be regularly better off out of work than when he is employed: 
because we are the only western nation to pay income tax rebates 
to the unemployed. These, when added to unemployment benefit 
regularly bring the level of income of the unemployed above their 
post-tax income when at work...The Department of Employment is 
aware of this, but has no plans for any such move (taxation of 
benefits) at the present time".
These and similar articles serve to impart the "flavour" of public 
and private opinion on the subject of the dole and its effects on 
motivation toward work on the part of both family men and young 
school leavers. The body of opinion thus conveyed is virtually the 
only repository of documentation available from which to distill 
and label current attitudes toward the system of unemployment 
benefits.
The analysis and commentary of Worsthorne (1977) were of immense 
value in gaining insight into some of the current factors which, in 
both Britain and the United States seem to be eroding traditional 
dedication to the work ethic. His point is: "for the great body 
of our fellow citizens, engaged in the industrial process, work 
offers little mental or physical satisfaction. It is a challenge 
neither to body nor mind, less so perhaps than at any earlier 
period...the advance of technology has rendered industrial work 
uniquely boring...many of the jobs are strictly mechanical, automatic, 
which reduce human beings to machines". Worsthorne identifies the 
key problem as "how to get people to work, since in a free society, 
which deplores coercion, they cannot be forced into the factories at
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the point of a gun". He then discusses the various courses of action 
put forth by the several political parties: Labour handed over the 
problem to the trade unions; the Conservatives favoured a purely 
competitive economy - work or starve - not taking into account the 
neutralising effects of various benefits already established. He 
interprets Mrs Thatcher’s intention as that of encouraging businessmen 
to be far bolder in standing up to wage demands in return for easing 
official restraints on private enterprise. Worsthorne prophesied 
that her solution would "be no more successful than Mr Callaghan, 
since neither solution goes to the heart of the problem...The problem 
of work in contemporary Britain will not be solved by relying on 
the strength of the trade unions or by relying on the strength of 
capital, but only by restoring the power of the State. And for 
this purpose, a form of National Government may well be necessary, 
despite the fact that this entails temporarily foregoing the luxury of 
our kind of democratic system".
Sleeman (1973) asserts that, in spite of the desirability of reducing 
the generosity of benefits as a means to encourage a general return 
to the Protestant Ethic, that the realities of our time point to 
the fact that "in Britain, as in all the Western World, the Welfare 
State is here to stay. There may be differences in the way it 
develops, according to which party is in power : the Conservatives 
favour more use of the market and more relating of benefits to 
recipient's means, and the Labour Party favour more use of State 
services provided communally as of right to all citizens. But it 
is not for nothing that the social services absorb nearly a quarter of 
the national product and that, even under the Conservative plans 
for slowing the rate of growth of public expenditure over the next 
five years, social service spending is expected to grow much faster
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than other forms of government spending". This theme is effective 
in bringing into the equation what a segment of the public would 
like to see by way of a rebirth of individual self-reliance and 
the discernible trends which are much in favour of increased rather 
than reduced public spending on various kinds of social welfare 
activities. Despite the fact that Sleeman’s work was completed in 
1972 (published in 1973), some six years prior to the completion 
of this comparative study, his predictions for more public welfare 
spending are borne out by current official data.
The Maki-Spindler (1975) report on the results of their studies 
on the effect of unemployment compensation on the rate of unemployment 
in Great Britain is a milestone in objective research and testing 
of hypotheses in the field of manpower management. Their previous 
work in 1974 and 1975 prompted a revision of the model (causes of 
unemployment) to add what they label as "unemployment induced 
compensation" and is represented as "still a relatively unfamiliar 
concept in the literature, albeit the possibility of this phenomenon 
was certainly not unknown to those who designed and maintained 
unemployment compensation schemes. These two authors conclude that 
changes in unemployment compensation tend to change the "budget 
space facing an individual who may be eligible for such payments". 
Essentially, Maki and Spindler state that such changes will have both 
income and substitution effects on the ]à)our-leisure decision, and, 
if leisure is considered a normal good, will tend to lead to an 
increased consumption of leisure when the ratio of benefits to 
ordinary work income is increased. Of over-riding interest is 
their conclusion that "unemployment compensation may induce both 
employed and unemployed workers to use unemployment time to undertake 
job search activity as well as more leisure for both of these may be
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indistinguishable statistically from 'involuntary unemployment'".
Among the fourteen distinguished contributors to the anthology of 
Worswick (1976) is Michael J Hill, whose studies concentrated on 
the means by which voluntary could be distinguished from involuntary 
unemployment. His analysis and commentary on this subject was of 
immense value in isolating and labeling certain claimant attitudes 
toward unemployment benefits. Hill makes clear that his contribution 
to Worswick is heavily dependent on the results of previous studies 
reported in a 1973 publication: Men Out of Work. The studies 
sampled 1,018 men who were registered as unemployed in Newcastle- 
upon-Tyne, Coventry and the London borough of Hammersmith in October 
1971. Hill alludes to the popular theory about voluntary unemployment 
deterring men from seeking work, and cites a number of anecdotes 
which appear to support that theory. He concludes, however, that 
"the main difficulty in testing this theory iS that it is almost 
impossible to refute, since to do so it is necessary to prove that 
the men in question cannot behave in any other way than the way 
they do...What is required, therefore, in relation to my hypothesis 
about voluntary unemployment is a value judgement about the amount 
of effort individuals should make in order to overcome their 
disadvantages and handicaps". In speaking about extended unemployment, 
he states that in recent years such men have become more selective.
It may also be tru-e that improved financial provisions for the 
unemployed have contributed to this. Accordingly, the easiest way 
to increase labour-market efficiency may be to reduce the extent 
of support for the unemployed, since the alternatives imply 
extension of training, rationalisation of employers' selection 
methods, and perhaps, above all, the elimination of low wages".
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Daniel (1974) focused mainly on the quantitative aspects of 
unemployment with accent on costs. In addition to that he comments 
on certain other aspects of unemployment. He found that the most 
common reason for not seeking another job was sickness, injury or 
disability and was present in the majority of middle age groups, 
but to a lesser extent among older workers. Within these groups, 
manual workers were much more likely than the non-manual to have 
given up working for this reason, with men much more likely to have 
done so than women. The second most common reason was family or 
domestic factors - particularly the case among younger workers, more 
women than men. Daniel found refutation for what certain other writers 
allege to be true with unemployed persons, to wit, that serious 
personality disorders arise out of unemployment. Daniel found just 
the opposite to be true, that "overall those who had dropped out of 
the labour market were inclined to be content with their lot. Asked 
if on balance they would prefer to be back in their old jobs or if 
they preferred things as they were, 54 per cent said they preferred 
their current status, 23 per cent said they would prefer to be back 
in their old jobs and 23 per cent had mixed feelings". Daniel's 
overall conclusion admits that "our findings on the costs of 
unemployment, however, showed that the provision of financial 
benefits alone would be unlikely to remove all the hardship of 
unemployment for many experience social and psychological costs, 
such as boredom, listlessness, depression, sense of inadequacy and 
failure, and social isolation...public policy assumes that a margin 
of financial deprivation is necessary to maintain the economic 
motivation to work...Nevertheless, if that policy is to be equitable 
it should at least ensure that all categories suffer a similar 
degree of deprivation, and there remains room for choice as to the 
form in which the benefits are best paid in order to serve their
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often conflicting objectives". This pronouncement as it relates to 
assuring that all categories suffer a similar degree of deprivation 
appears to this researcher as the ultimate in a fatuous statement.
On the face of it, there is no way that such assurance could be 
contrived given the multifarious occupations represented within the 
unemployed population, and the varying life-styles among those 
persons who earn about the same in terms of net buying power. In 
any otherwise valuable work, Daniel significantly diluted the 
seriousness of appeal by advocating an impossible device.
Phillips and Maddock (1973) shed some light on progressive 
liberalisation of benefits, particularly during the years 
immediately following World War II. This was of great value in 
identifying the continuing thread of great public generosity and 
understanding toward the unemployed, a hallmark of today's official 
position to assure adequate income support to the unemployed. 
Specifically, "...even if the governments of the inter-war years 
lacked a conscious pre-occupation with growth, they already clearly 
admitted a responsibility for the broader, more ill-defined subject 
of 'welfare'. In practice this meant that whilst they continued 
to be inhibited in their activities by a prevailing economic 
orthodoxy which was hostile to state intervention, nevertheless they 
were confronted by certain social problems like mass unemployment 
which they felt an obligation to alleviate".
Brittan and Lilley (1977) address this same subject somewhat left- 
handedly in referring to the proliferation of incomes policies: 
"Britain's poor relative economic performance since the war has long 
disappointed chauvinist economic commentators. But they can take 
pride in the one area of economic performance where Britain has topped
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the international league tables - its output of incomes policies.
No other country can match the number, diversity and increasing 
sophistication of Britain's incomes policies. They have been 
introduced by both parties: voluntary and compulsory, temporary 
and semi-permanent varieties have been tried...in much the same way 
as the quest for the Holy Grail recurs throughout the Arthurian 
legends". They characterise this trend of precipitate growth 
of benefits legislation as "the appetite grows with eating". This 
team of authors is adversely critical of incomes policy, and charge 
that "far from being a proud and statesmanlike achievement, an 
incomes policy is a most harmful trap. It does not cure inflation; 
it makes unemployment worse; it does not curb but increases the 
political power of trade unions".
In essence, Brittan and Lilley present a side of the coin which, in 
its prime sense, is the antithesis of liberalisation of benefits, 
a useful contrast to the usual stance.
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Part 2 (American Authors)
Long before the first faint beginnings of significant manpower 
planning by the United States federal government in 1921-22, useful 
examples of experience in that field were leadily available from 
certain European countries. Such examples, and the data from them, 
yielded valuable resource bases for the American legislators and 
social scientists interests in drafting specific bills for introduction 
into the legislative hopper toward the goal of providing some sort 
of guaranteed, funded relief for unemployed Americans.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (1931) completed a study of private 
unemployment compensation plans in effect in the United States 
and compared them with various national unemployment insurance 
systems in Europe. The Study was published under the title:
"Unemployment Benefit Plans in the United States and Unemployment 
Insurance in Foreign Countries." Within this work, the British 
system received a major emphasis, and effectively set the stage 
for the more intensive studies preceding enactment of the first 
social security-unemployment insurance legislation in the United 
States. The German system, particularly the periodic changes made 
during the stormy period of inflation-cum-unemployment in 1923,
1927, and 1929-33 also received attention in the Study. Both: the 
British and German systems provided much food for thought and 
structural analysis from which certain features surfaced as 
considerations for similar American legislation.
Of importance in this same connection was the experience acquired 
over previous years through American trade union programmes, employer- 
employee joint agreements and other private plans which involved
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specific company-wide arrangements. By and large, such plans were 
on the informal side, with workers who were prospective beneficiaries 
having no legal "hold" on the company or the union. Benefit 
payments depended upon maintenance of union membership, economic 
prosperity and good management of union funds. Unfortunately, such 
a healthy combination was not always present in the administration 
of these unemployment benefit plans.
Haber (1966) researched and discussed representative private unemploy­
ment insurance plans which, in retrospect, appeared to have exerted 
some influence on the nature of the 1935 national legislation.
It is interesting that the most progressive industries with respect 
to providing relief to employees during times of their unemployment 
were the needle trades and the engravers. In fact, joint agreement 
plans wherein both employer and employee, or one of them only, paid 
into the fund became a characteristics format in those industries 
as early as the 1920's. Haber relates further that company plans 
sponsored by individual enterprises for their employees only, 
without regard to their union affiliation, were in evidence before 
active American entry into World War I. By 1915, some 15 such plans 
were known, including the "Rochester Plan" to which 14 separate 
firms subscribed, accounting for upward of 80,000 workers covered.
The plans of Procter and Gamble, International Harvester, J I Case 
and General Electric aimed primarily at guarantees of employment 
for a set number of weeks per year. In the case of Procter and 
Gamble, the guarantee was for 48 weeks per year at full pay for 
"hourly paid employees whose annual earnings were less than $2,000, 
who were participants in the company's profit-sharing plan, and who 
had six months in service". In the face of the widespread private 
plans, whether company or union-sponsored, it seems strange indeed
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that US national legislation on unemployment insurance had to wait 
for enactment until prodded into fruition by the Great Depression of 
1929.
Raushenbush (1931) points to Wisconsin as the pioneer state in 
exploration of and serious legislative concern with unemployment 
insurance on a state-wide basis. State Senator Huber (Wisconsin) 
introduced this bill into the Wisconsin legislature on February 4, 
1921, the substance of which had been drafted by Professor John R 
Commons of the University of Wisconsin. This bill was revolutionary 
in that payments into the benefit fund were to be made by employers 
only, based on individual employer experience with employee turnover. 
This meant that the entire cost of benefits to unemployed workers 
was to be funded by payroll taxes on employers and that the operation 
of the benefit fund was controlled by the Wisconsin State Compensation 
Insurance Board. The Huber bill failed of passage in 1921 and during 
succeeding years as well. Yet, the philosophy and procedures it 
contained prevailed until, finally, in 1932, the Wisconsin legislature 
passed it by an overwhelming majority - during the depths of the 
Depression. Still, this was fully 3 years before any such 
definitive move was made by the US Congress. Raushenbush, on his 
retirement as Director of the Unemployment Compensation Department 
of the Wisconsin Industrial Commission from 1934 to 1967, reviewed 
the Wisconsin experience. He paid special attention to the in­
fighting which took place between opposing factions of the Wisconsin 
legislature prior to the eventual 1932 enactment of the unemployment 
insurance bill. Some 3 years of effort and discussion preceded the 
enactment. One faction argued that a compulsory unemployment 
insurance law was not of an emergency nature and thus should not 
be considered. This appears a startling rationale in light of the
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breadlines and soup kitchens which were steadily proliferating 
in Wisconsin as well as elsewhere all over the nation during 
that period. Employers formed a bloc and exerted influence on 
state representatives to kill the bill. For example, in 1931, 
the Wisconsin Manufacturers* Association voted 207 to 2 in favour of 
side-tracking presentation of the bill to the Wisconsin legislature.
Governor LeFollette, a staunch proponent of the legislation, 
stepped into the picture with a tactic which partly disarmed the 
opposition. He agreed to give employers their chance by urging that 
the legislation become conditional upon industry's failure to establish 
a fair voluntary system in Wisconsin within a reasonable time.
In this way, the employers were faced with a requirement to 
voluntarily establish a plan in their respective firms which would 
compensate workers during involuntary layoffs in order to prevent 
the law from taking general effect. In either case, unemployment 
insurance was to be the final outcome whether at the behest of 
individual employers or imposed upon them by state fiat.
Altmeyer (1967) reviewed the operation of the whole system from a 
national point of view at about the same time as Raushenbush, and 
under similar circumstances, on his retirement as Assistant Secretary 
of Labor and in other positions during an 18-year period ending 
in 1953. His review concentrated on ways the system could be improved.
He concluded that the surest promise of overall improvement would 
be realized "under a nationwide system of unemployment insurance 
administered by dedicated and competent men and women". He concluded 
that federal standards for benefits, maximum duration of benefit 
payments, and unemployment taxes levied on total payroll would 
offer the greatest promise of improvement. In sum, he proposed 
a nationwide system much like that in operation in the United Kingdom
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since 1911. The philosophy of "state sovereignty", however, has 
proved strong enough up to this time to deny serious consideration 
of a national system.
A trio of writers in the field of unemployment insurance research 
and manpower policy merit special attention because of books and 
articles they produced singly and in mutual collaboration over a 
number of years. The sum of these works provides greater insight 
to events and conditions leading to the 1935 legislation, and to the 
subsequent changes in public acceptance of legislation offering 
progressively more generous benefits to the unemployed.
E Wight Bakke (1930) probably is the best-known of this trio. His 
works in the early 1930's stand as anchor points in the literature 
of the field. The first of these. After the Shutdown (1932), 
interpreted the directions of United States manpower policy up 
to that time with respect to employment, unemployment, cost of 
living, wages and productivity. The second work. Ten Thousand 
Out of Work (1933) expanded in greater depth on its predecessor's 
coverage. Bakke followed these two books with many articles and 
addresses on these same subjects during the ensuring 30 years of 
government service. Among these, his essay "The Mission of Manpower 
Policy"(1969) has as its central theme that while the focus upon 
the disadvantaged worker had been an essential feature of manpower 
policy, it fell far short of constituting the whole of that policy. 
He set forth the larger dimensions of a comprehensive manpower 
policy.
Plague (1976) and Leo Kramer, the other members of the Bakke trio, 
updated Bakke's work in their Manpower Policies and Programs. All
three had been closely associated in previous years, principally 
while Bakke was a graduate student and Clague was serving as 
Commissioner of Labour Statistics from 1946-65. Clague and Kramer 
placed Bakke's work in the historical context of manpower policies 
that reach back to the Great Depression of the 1930's and the 
immediate post-World War II years. The result was a portrayal of 
four decades of manpower policy in terms of the issues to which 
the policy had been addressed. Of special note in this connection 
was the contrast drawn by Clague-Kramer between the bitter unemployment 
of the 1930's and the nearly "full employment" of the 1940's.
They brought out the view that the latter condition had made an 
indelible impression on the American public mind, and that the 
high employment of the 40*s tended to confirm the idea that the 
battle of unemployment had been won; there remained only a few 
improvements to make the whole pattern perfect. These two writers 
went on to conclude that, by 1961, the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations 
had barely made a beginning in tackling the manpower problems of 
the nation. Unemployment averaged about 4 million annually through 
the years 1962-64 and all the federally sponsored manpower programmes 
put together touched only 100,000 workers per year. Of more current 
note is the Clague-Kramer view of the 11 years preceding 1975.
During that period, manpower policies focused on up-grading the 
disadvantaged unemployed through education, training and work 
experience. With the decline of the economy in the 1970's, 
greater emphasis was placed on public service employment. However, 
in 1975, with unemployment rates of 8 and 9 percent, opportunities 
for placing programme enrollees in either private or public service 
employment almost vanished. Private industry, now slowly absorbing 
some of its previous layoffs, was able to provide only a small 
number of new job opportunities. They concluded that whenever
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the economy improves enough to increase employment significantly, 
private industry's priority in hirirg will go to former employees, 
especially those drawing unemployment insurance benefits, who are 
entitled to recall as jobs develop. Thus, disadvantaged persons 
and youths with limited working experience, as well as the long-term 
unemployed, will continue to have difficulty in finding employment.
The thrust of these views is to place continuing importance on the 
extension of benefit payments to periods beyond the capability 
of state funds to support them, with the consequent syphoning off 
of federal funds - to shore up state insolvency - programmed for 
other purposes. The influence of these works on the legislative 
philosophies segment of this study was of major proportion, since 
they provided a global dimension to not only specific events but 
to the immediate and foreseeable consequences of forward strides and 
faltering steps in the legislative arena.
Levine (1972) in commenting on tlis general subject, alleged there 
were signs of changing viewpoints toward unemployment benefits 
on the part of management in the private sector, a sector which 
usually has not been sympathetic toward enlarged responsibilities 
under public auspices. Levine stated that until 1970 industry 
attitudes toward income maintenance of unemployed persons were 
largely coloured by cost considerations and concern about preserving 
low unemployment insurance tax rates. He believes that, at about that 
time - early 70's - socially minded business leaders began to see 
overall manpower goals in a more positive and attractive light, and 
became more easily persuaded to support an enlarged role for 
unemployment insurance in the nation's economic life. One of the 
advantages traditionally cited in favour of the federal-state system
of unemployment insurance over a solely national system is the 
opportunity for experimentation on a limited scale. Collaterally, 
the same system makes it possible for states to proceed with their 
own innovations without having to depend on national legislation. 
This, according to Levine, is the type of experimentation which 
Massachusetts and Michigan carried on in permitting unemployment 
benefits to continue for 18 weeks beyond the usual maximum 
duration if the recipient v/as attending an industrial retraining 
or vocational training course.
Becker (1960) provides valuable background in the subject in his 
review of the American unemployment insurance experience over the 
period of its first twenty-five years, comparing its origins with 
the German and other European systems. He comments with a certain 
acerbity on the laggard pace with which the USA pursued social 
security legislation in general, and points out that unemployment 
insurance, as one part of the 1935 package, came within a hair of 
being declared unconstitutional. Becker makes other statements 
indicating the less favoured position of unemployment benefits 
in the social security system whi/et referring to the exclusion of 
able-bodied unemployed from benefits. Becker postulates that 
unemployment insurance is less popular because "it stands lower in 
society's list of priorities than many other needs." Sympathy 
rises more easily and naturally in a case of the widowed mother, 
the orphaned child, the sick or aged, and even for the workman 
injured at his job." He states also that unemployment insurance 
provides an excellent example of the American preference for what 
might be called "competitive collectivism". Becker explains this 
term by referring to the "existence of separate state systems and 
the use of the tax technique called 'experience rating'". The
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combination of these two features, according to Becker, constitutes 
competitive collective action. Experience rating represents a 
reward to an employer who achieves a stable workforce, in that his 
payroll tax is lowered. Separate state systems amount to a type 
of competition among the states in the attraction of prospective 
employers to do business in that state having the lowest tax base, 
and the lowest cost unemployment benefits toward which employers 
must pay taxes.
Moving to literature which addresses procedures, most of it is 
generated by state governments, and explains organization of the 
state administrative network; means by which claims are filed, 
processed and paid. Federally-sponsored literature is concerned 
primarily with informing state administrations of amendments to 
the basic unemployment insurance law, and with analysis and publication 
of statistical data compiled on a national level from each state's 
input. Certain writers have contributed to this literature through 
studies of specific elements within the system. Compared to the 
commentary available on fraud-abuse and attitudes, however, the 
field of procedure-related literature is quite arid.
Murray (1973) studied the problem of duration of benefits relative 
to duration of unemployment, emphasising the gradual extension of 
benefits during the recession periods. He made the point that duration 
of benefits was severely restricted at the beginning of the 
unemployment insurance programme by "overcautious actuarial estimates" 
as to how long benefits could be paid with the unemployment tax 
allocated for the purpose. Murray concluded: "extended benefits 
should continue to be paid when unemployment is high either in a 
state or nationwide, as specified by state or federal triggers
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equal to 50 percent of entitlement to regular state benefits, 
up to a maximum of 13 additional weeks, with an overall maximum 
of 39 weeks". In fact, the 39-week figure was increased and extended 
to a maximum of 65 weeks by a combination of state and federal-funded 
extensions starting in 1974. By 1978 certain states Unemployment 
rates had begun to recede below the point where extensions were 
automatic, and duration was once again at the 26-week mark.
Murray stated that the first 26 weeks of regular benefits should 
be 100 percent state financed, while extended benefits should be 
50 percent federal financed. He emphasised that comprehensive 
statistics on extended benefits, including the characteristics 
of the recipients of such benefits should be obtained and analysed, 
along with special studies of post-exhaustion experience of claimants 
for both regular and extended benefits. This conclusion was 
translated into practice by the federal government in 1974, and 
is currently (1978) being implemented in principle.
The primary procedural issues focus on funding, as Murray's study 
suggests. During the recent U.S. recession, the unemployment rate 
rose as high as 8.9 percent (May 1975), with 8.5 million workers 
unemployed. Since then the economy has experienced a gradual 
recovery, with the unemployment rate fluctuating only slightly at 
the 6.1% level, as of April 1978. The high unemployment rates and 
the concomitant levels of unemployment compensation claims have 
put a great strain on the administrative apparatuses of both the 
unemployment insurance services in each state and on the employment 
- job finding - services at state and federal levels.
The Congressional Budget Office (1977) made a general assessment 
of major elements of the unemployment benefits procedures, with major
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concentration on the dollar aspects. Unemployment compensation 
benefits, according to its summary, replace, on average, between 
50 and 60 percent of a worker's after-tax income. However, this 
result does not take into account the effects of fringe benefits 
or work-related expenses on this net wage replacement rate, nor 
does it include other income assistance such as food stamps, which 
the unemployed may receive. The gross amount of payments nationwide, 
due to proliferation of programmes and extension/expansion of benefit 
payments jumped from $6 billion in 1974 to $14 billion in 1975 
to over $19 billion in 1976. Estimates of overall expenditures for 
benefit payments approach $25 billion in 1977 and 1978 (each year).
The result becomes significant when compared to the funds generated 
through payroll taxes (largely from employer contributions), the 
total sum of which in 1976 was some $8 billion - a deficit of $11 
billion ($19 billion expended) which was made up from the federal 
treasury through loans to states.
The extent of the deficit problem for states obliged to borrow 
from the federal government in order to finance continued unemployment 
benefit payments can be appreciated by the total amount of out­
standing advances to state trust funds, a figure in excess of $2 
billion as of May 1978. Some 22 states have been recipient to 
such loans, notably Connecticut ($276.2 million), Illinois ($146.8 
million), Massachusetts ($180 million), Michigan ($388 million).
New Jersey ($404.3 million) and Washington ($107.6 million).
Weighted against stature of the more impressive totals mentioned 
above, Hawaii's case - as an illustration of the procedural 
complexities attending funding - appears minor. Yet its importance 
must be judged relative to the state tax base, equally minor
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relative to the states whose loans number in the hundreds of millions. 
Hawaii's workforce is 394,000 of a total state population of 850,000 
permanent residents. Hawaii offers an example of the types of remedy 
which state legislatures examine in order to re-establish healthy 
funding of unemployment benefits.
Hawaii's fund went into deficit in 1975, and in 1976 the state 
was obliged to borrow ^ 22.5 million from the federal government 
to keep payments afloat to eligible unemployed. The Hawaii Legislature 
responded by levying each employer with a standard 3.5% payroll 
tax and suspending "experience rating" procedures which lower taxes 
for employers who achieve stability of employment within their 
workforce. By late 1977, the Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund 
was again in the black. The question then became one of how to 
prevent a repeat of the same type of financial woe in the future.
Two plans were advanced to the Legislature: the Hitch Plan and 
the Mayeda Plan. Dr Thomas K Hitch (1978) Senior Vice President 
for Economic Research, First Hawaiian Bank proposed a "Benefit 
Ratio" plan designed to raise enough money to pay unemployment 
benefits but not so much that cash reserves in excess of $50 
million were built up. The rationale of the plan: an employer's 
money should not be tied up in the fund when it could be put to 
better use in his business. To achieve that balance. Hitch recommended 
use of the benefit ratio - an expression of total benefits charged 
an employer's account divided by that employer's taxable payroll 
for the period of the three years just ended. Under that economic 
principle. Hitch maintained, only three years of an employer's 
history of layoffs are considered, so that although a good long-
045
term employment stability record is not necessarily assured a low 
tax, neither is he punished for a bad stability record during the 
same period.
The Mayeda plan, developed by Thomas Mayeda (1978), head administrator 
of the state's Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund, guards against 
dramatic yearly changes in employers' yearly contributions to the 
Trust Fund. For example, an employer who had a bad year and laid 
off a sizeable number of employees who then drew unemployment benefits 
would not have his payroll taxes climb the following year. Rather, 
the jump in benefits would be spread out over a long period. No 
employer would pay more than a 5% tax; those in business less than 
one year would pay a flat 3%. Each employer has an account, determined 
by subtracting the amount paid out in unemployment insurance benefits 
from the employer's total contributions to the fund. To determine 
an employer's reserve ratio, the balance (reserve) is divided by 
his average annual taxable payroll averaged over three years. Each 
reserve ratio is matched to one of 13 predetermined contribution 
rates ranging from zero for employers whose ratio is 15% or more, 
to 5% for those with a negative balance. Until the fund reaches 
an "adequate" level, employers would pay a "fund solvency" tax 
ranging from 0.4% to 2.4%. This plan does not contain a "forgiveness" 
factor (as does the Hitch plan). As to that criticism, Mayeda 
replied that "Maybe you can forgive one employer for a bad year or 
two, but somebody has to pay for that bad year. It doesn't just 
disappear, you know. So what ends up happening is the rest (of 
Hawaii's 18,000 employers) shoulder the burden from which the 
responsible employer has been relieved".
A procedural issue of major importance, and the subject of periodic
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controversy, is that of "experience rating". Many authors have 
commented on this issue, notably among them Haber (1966) and 
Becker (1972).
Haber reviewed the legislative debate which ultimately led to 
inclusion of experience rating in the 1935 Act, but not before 
much acrimony had been endured by the committee members charged 
with the final drafting of the bill. Becker (1972), having 
commented on this subject in several of his previous works, devoted 
the whole of the cited volume to it. He explained the rating as 
a system of levying unemployment insurance tax "in some relation 
to the individual employer's experience with unemployment".
Essentially, this translates into a reward in the form of a lower 
per capita tax on employee earnings to employers who have achieved 
stability in their workforce - no significant layoffs and rehires - 
but a steady, uninterrupted level of employment throughout the year. 
Becker concluded that the effects of experience rating are significant 
and desirable, and that it strengthens the market mentality. In 
the latter sense, Becker stated that it conforms to and confirms 
a system which makes each state responsible for its own costs, which 
draws its revenues almost entirely from a tax on covered employers, 
which restricts benefits to those employees whose employers are 
required to make contributions, and which proportions those benefits 
to each claimant's wages. He makes a final statement "It is quite 
possible that experience rating is something like a cement that 
holds this entire structure together, and ch/efly for this reason 
is supported or opposed by friends or foes."
The subject of unemployment benefit fraud and abuse is not distinguished 
by a wealth of literature. That which does exist is found mainly in
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periodicals and in the press. Some authors, however, the greater 
number of whom have been or are currently associated with the Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research, have devoted some parts of their 
work to fraud and abuse incidence. In addition, short studies 
and compilations of statistics with explanatory commentary have 
been made by labor departments of certain states, and by the U.S. 
Department of Labor.
This latter agency, the U.S. Department of Labor (1977), published 
a short review of fraud and abuse in the federal-state unemployment 
insurance system containing valuable background information drawn 
from representative state systems. One point made in this review 
is that there are differing views as to who should receive jobless 
benefit protection, eligibility standards, and what constitutes 
a disqualifying act. The answers to these and other related questions 
depend primarily on which state law governs and how it is interpreted 
and applied. Basic to the issue is that an individual cannot be 
charged with abusing the programme pf benefits are properly paid 
pursuant to the (state) law that governs the case. This points up 
what is stressed in many references to the American federal- 
state relationship governing administration of unemployment compensation. 
The federal review makes a second point: that a fraudulent claim 
for benefits is a crime, usually classed as a misdemeanour and 
punished under applicable criminal law according to individual state 
statutes. Of significance is the upward push in the total amount 
of fraudulent payments throughout the USA from $17.7 million in 
1974 to $22.5 million in 1975 to $31.9 million in 1976. During 
these same years these Department of Labor data show that both the 
number of prosecutions recommended and the number of convictions as 
a percent of prosecutions recommended have declined. This suggests
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that at the same time that more generous payments have become the 
rule, stress on detection and prosecution of fraud has become less 
aggressive. One postulates that fraud thus becomes easier to 
perpetrate when the threat of punishment is less of a deterrent.
Papier (1977) wrote a comprehensive paper on unemployment benefit 
fraud in the state of Ohio, covering in detail the means by which 
fraud allegations are investigated. Ohio is very aggressive in 
its detection and prosecution programme, maintaining at state 
level an Investigation Department of 45 full-time employees. This 
Department "endeavours to uncover and investigate all cases of 
suspected fraud, preparej? fraud charges against individual claimants, 
collects benefits fraudulently received, and prepares cases for 
prosecution." Based on his Department's experience. Papier makes 
the point that fraud appears to be contagious. "Where several or 
more claimants with the same employer are detected as involved in 
possible fraud, a Bureau (Ohio Bureau of Employment Services of 
which the Investigation Department is one element) investigator 
will check the employer's records against claims filed by others of 
his employees. Additional fraud may then be found." He concludes 
further that the number of potential cases of fraud is affected 
by the total volume of beneficiaries. "Over the past quarter- 
century through 1975, fraud charges were developed in Ohio with 
respect to one out of every 100 bénéficiarf6^ ., Of the 64,915 
fraud charges developed, prosecution was recommended for one out 
of ten cases. Ninety-six percent of the prosecuted cases resulted 
in convictions. Publicity concerning prosecutions often leads to 
tips on additional suspects."
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McMahon Ç1978) reinforces Papier's assertion that an aggressive 
fraud and prosecution policy is necessary to control increasing 
attempts to subvert the system's intent. In a paper titled 
"Benefit Payment Controls" McMahon emphasised the necessity for 
co-ordination of effort and co-operation among the local (Unemployment 
benefit) offices, the central office (at New York state government 
level), and the Investigation Section if the stated goal of the 
Department (New York Department of Labor) is to be achieved. "Local 
office personnel are the first line of defence in fraud control".
The New York fraud control policy is stated by McMahon as: "It is 
the Department's policy to take aggressive action to prevent, 
discourage and discover the occurrence of fraud by claimants, 
employers or Department employees. All suspected cases of fraud 
are followed through to conclusion by full investig^ion, imposition 
of the legal penalties including prosecution when justified, and 
publication of convictions obtained."
Nation's Business (March 1977) quotes U.S. Department of Labor 
statistics of 103,307 reported cases of minor fraud nationwide in 
fiscal 1976. In addition, there were 9,952 cases of criminal fraud 
turned over for prosecution. This compares with 81,130 cases of 
minor fraud and 10,397 cases of criminal fraud in the previous fiscal 
year. Further comparisons are made in the wide variance among state- 
administered programmes, with benefits ranging from as high as $165 
per week in Connecticut to as low as $63 per week in Texas. Some 
states, it seems, vigorously see to it that claimants conscientiously 
seek work while they collect benefits, while other states simply pay 
the benefits with few questions asked. When Congress set up 
unemployment compensation, it envisioned a programme of short-term 
relief running no longer than 12 to 16 weeks. By 1953, according to
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Nation's Business, most states had extended the benefit period to a 
maximum of 26 weeks. This, in turn, was increased to 39 weeks, then 
52 weeks, and finally to 65 weeks - all with federal subsidy. The 
ability of the states to detect fraudulent claims was severely set 
back in October 1975, when the Health, Education, and Welfare 
Department (HEW) halted the states' practice of matching claims 
against Social Security deductions filed by employers. HEW held 
that this violated provisions of federal privacy laws. The 
Department of Labor is still seeking to lift the ban. Nation's 
Business deplores the necessity for circumventing devices which 
39 states have used to get around the HEW barrier in an effort 
to detect and prevent fraudulent benefit payments being made. These 
states have called in wage records from employers - which is a 
legal requirement - in order to match John or Jane Doe's unemployment 
benefit claim with the same name on an employer's list. The problem 
for the administrators is one of finding and closing legal "loopholes". 
As related in this editorial, a computer-prograimner employee of 
the Louisiana state unemployment benefits system stated: "There are 
a million loopholes, but most people are not smart enough to find 
them. Unemployment compensation creates a sort of utopia. It 
lets people work for a year and be on vacation for a year. Of course, 
you can't live like a king, but it gives you a chance to travel 
around, and that's the American dream." The editorial urges employers 
to actively police the fraudulent claims made against their accounts 
by former employees and contest the payment at every turn of the 
road. "To employers, this is your programme. It can only operate 
successfully if you actively co-operate with your state officials 
by reporting abuses to them."
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On the same general theme, Business Week (January 17, 1977) contains 
a lengthy staff study on the whole spectrum of "welfare" in the 
United States, one related element of which is unemployment 
compensation. The sense of the piece is an indictment of the 
overall system on the following counts: painful load on the tax­
payers, especially the employers in the sense that they pay the full 
cost of unemployment insurance; the system is wasteful and inefficient, 
"a happy hunting ground for chiselers and cheats." It does pay 
tribute to the efforts of the HEW for having brought the error 
rate down, but castigates it once again in alleging that "more than 
40% of the cases involved overpayments, underpayments, or payments 
to inéligibles."
Tomlinson (1975) calls for responsible citizens to bring to an end 
the unemployment compensation "rip-off" which, he alleges, characterises 
operation of the current system. "If the unemployment compensation 
programme is to be preserved to help deserving jobless, responsible 
citizens must counter the influence of self-serving pressure groups 
and bureaucrats to see that its excesses and abuses are brought to 
an end. Write the President and your Congressman or state officials 
today."
These three preceding listings all point up the concern for the lack 
of legal controls which contribute to fraud and abuse of the various 
state systems, and where legal controls do exist the lack of pains 
taken to actually exercise them. None of these writers appear to 
seek withholding aid from workers who lose their jobs through no 
fault of their own, and are willing and able to work. These writers 
do, however, represent the current system's operation as one of legal 
"rip-off".
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Turning now to attitude-oriented literature, a number of writers 
have devoted comment to the adverse light in which the unemployment 
benefits system is held by the general public, especially by 
employers who foot the cost. Commentary applies to various aspects 
of the system, to include, cost, abuse and fraud, the ability of 
administrators to crack down on fraudulent claims and the linkage 
between generous benefits and the tive to return to work.
Blaustein (1968) drew attention to the adverse attitudes toward 
galloping costs of funding the system. He commented that, unlike 
welfare, unemployment insurance has concerned itself with the avoidance 
of poverty rather than its alleviation. He viewed its prime 
function as prevention of impoverishment of the normally employed 
worker and his family during periods of temporary, involuntary 
unemployment. Blaustein made the assumption that relatively few 
of the insured unemployed are destitute at the time of job separation 
but that most of them would be if unemployment continued for long 
without some outside (unemployment insurance) support.
One of the foremost American authors and thinkers on the subject 
of attitudes toward unemployment benefits is Leonard P Adams. Two 
of Adams’ works are of special significance with respect to consideration 
of attitudes within the purview of this study. Adams (1969) made 
a comprehensive study of the transition period of the public 
employment service between 1933 and 1968, in which the public 
attitudes toward the work ethic during the peak depression years 
and just before World War II were examined. He concluded that the 
work ethic had been severely challenged by the Roosevelt administration's 
policy of make-work projects for which otherwise unemployed persons 
were paid according to dubious quality and quantity standards.
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standards which never would have been considered adequate under 
normal economic circumstances. One consequence of what he perceived 
as lowered work requirements was a growing tendency to work only so 
long as was necessary to establish eligibility for government-sponsored 
subsidies, and then abandon efforts to find long-term work in favour 
of reliance on the subsidies, one of which was unemployment insurance, 
Adams suggests that the seeds of work-shy attitudes were sown 
during that period.
Adams (1971) stated as the purpose of his work "to review the 
evidence with respect to the attitudes and opinions of various 
segments of the population on the unemployment insurance (UI) system 
as these views have evolved over the last 35 years." In this work, 
Adams outlined what he termed "the most common misconceptions that 
admiistrators believed to be held by different publics," namely 
employers, workers, and the general public. He concluded that some 
employers think that the balance in the reserve fund belongs to 
them, and that their contributions are not a tax; that UI is a 
give-way programme without any checks on availability and other 
eligibility requirements; that the administration favours the 
claimants to such a degree that it is useless for them (the 
employers) to report disqualifying information or to file protests 
in any circumstances; that claimants should be made to take any 
kind of work or be denied benefits; that none of the claimants 
want to work. Yet no specific studies were reported by Adams with 
respect to employer attitudes and opinions except for a survey in 
Ohio and in Connecticut. Adams stated that "a majority of the 
states" administrators seemed to realise that employers do not 
understand the programme very well, and they therefore mentioned 
the constant need for (employer) education to counter "a reflection
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of indifference, failure to comprehend how the programme works, 
and lack of time to give it much thought or attention."
Adams mentioned also some of the common misconceptions on the part 
of workers-potential or former claimants. Some confuse UI with 
Social Security and think that they have also contributed to the UI 
reserve fund; that benefits should be paid when they apply regardless 
of whether or not they satisfy all the eligibility requirements 
and irrespective of the causes of their unemployment; that UI is 
welfare and therefore they do not apply ^note: this suggests that 
"stigma" remains in some elements of the workforce as it attaches 
to government give-away programmes; that once they have filed an 
application for work with the (U.S. or state, or both) Employment 
Service, they do not have to make a search for jobs on their own 
initiative), Adams found too that UI is often confused with welfare 
by the general public, and that a stigma is, in fact, attached 
to acceptance of benefits which are considered "rocking-chair money"; 
that unemployed workers can usually find jobs if they really want 
to work and that claimants are "people who have no real desire to 
work."
Feldstein (1975) favours taxing unemployment benefits as though 
they were regular income, but stops short of saying that such 
benefits are too generous. He does say that the size of the benefits 
"makes people fussier about the jobs that they take, and it makes 
them look longer for jobs." Feldstein's view is supported by a 
Brookings Institution study which found that people on jobless pay 
remain unemployed as much as 31 percent longer than those unemployed 
people who choose not to collect insurance while seeking work.
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Lesher (1976) states that $35 billion in the period 1973-1975 has 
been paid out under unemployment benefits nationwide, the lion's 
share of which came from employers. As others have done, he points 
to the fact that twenty-two states ran out of money and had to 
borrow from the federal government in order to keep unemployment 
benefits flowing. Even the federal government's special fund 
for this purpose was exhausted at one point, and general revenues 
had to be authorised to finance the states.
Certain administrators of various state-level unemployment benefits 
systems agree that the original concept of the unemployment benefits 
programme has been fragmented for too many other purposes. "Frankly, 
the Congress and the nation have asked the system to be the major 
anti-recession programme, when it was never designed nor intended 
to be such", according to John D Crosier (1977) Director of the 
Massachesetts Division of Employment Security. Barrett (1977) 
of Montana believes that the unemployed person has ceased to be the 
responsibility of the employer community and has become the 
responsibility of society in general after 39 weeks of unemployment. 
After that time, some other social programmes should be designed 
to care for the long-term unemployed, not because their needs are 
any less, but because their needs should be answered from other 
sources. Barrett concludes that if changes in this direction do 
not occur, the unemployment insurance system which started out to 
assist those with direct attachments to the labour force, will 
eventually become less of a work-related system and more of an income 
maintenance or welfare system. He stated that the workers or 
employers do not want that to happen and, as an administrator, Barrett
believes it would be tragedy.
056
CHAPTER 3
COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PHILOSOPHIES
Introduction
The title "Legislative Philosophies" as used herein combines two 
terms embracing the series of governmental enactments in the United 
Kingdom and in the United States resulting from progressive change 
in each nation's major philosophies (system of ideas) on public 
assistance to the unemployed. In both countries such philosophies 
have become more insistent over the years that legislative buffers 
be interposed between the individual and the adverse effects of 
unemployment in order that his basic needs can be satisfied and his 
dignity be maintained during periods when income from work is cut 
off. Satisfaction of such aims gradually became accepted as a 
normal issue for legislative debate; over a period of time such 
debate has led to steady increases in numbers and categories of 
workers eligible, and in the amount of benefits to which they are 
entitled while unemployed.
This chapter compares the legislative philosophies of the United 
Kingdom with those of the United States. This researcher has 
adopted the point of view that philosophy does not precede societal 
conditions, but rather emerges from them. Accordingly, a certain 
amount of social history must be woven into the fabric of these 
comparisons to assure an appreciation of conditions from which 
philosophies emanated. Neither coherent philosophies nor related 
legislation in either nation suddenly jumped, full-grown into
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into national consciousness. The systems of ideas which may at some 
later point lead to legislative action are products of varying 
lengths of time, among which the only uniformity is probably the 
lag of legislative response.
For convenience of treatment, this chapter is divided into three 
time periods, each of which discusses emergence or mutation of 
philosophies on the focal subject of unemployment benefits.
a. Early Period (mid-1300*s-1911): inchoate British 
philosophies of relief to the poor, with special 
reference to the unemployed; comparison with American 
adaptations of imported British philosophies.
b. Middle Period (1911-1935): definitive British translation 
of philosophies into comprehensive legislation:
National Insurance Act of 1911: comparison with American 
philosophies reflecting an awakening of public interest 
in unemployment and other welfare benefits.
c. Current Period (1935-present): influence of Beveridge 
on British philosophy and legislation: USA Social 
Security Act of 1935: comparisons of contemporary
philosophies and related legislation in Britain and USA.
No one of these periods is discrete unto itself. The interdependent
relationship among them is revealed through changing social and 
industrial patterns, particularly with respect to the burgeoning 
incentive in both countries to improve living standards and the 
general quality of life.
Note that there is much heavier dependence on the British experience
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over the American in the coverage of the Early Period. This is due 
to the enormous time gap between the first signs of British national 
concern with the subject and United States' entry into that field 
some 600 years later. It is during the Middle Period that the USA 
gradually developed a better equation with Britain in terms of 
interest and activity in unemployment benefits at individual state 
and finally at the national level.
EARLY PERIOD (Mid-1300's-1911)
Emergence of the "Status Quo" Philosophy in Britain
Acceptance by the British government of a measure of responsibility 
for relief of want among its poor generally is thought to date from 
the time of the Elizabethan Poor Laws (1598-1601). Yet, there were 
fore-runners of those laws some two hundred years before. Essentially 
punitive in thrust, these fourteenth century laws were reflections 
of a "status quo" philosophy that workers should remain in place, 
prevented from migrating from their home locales. That they 
sought to migrate was the result of the combined effects of two 
conditions, one social, the other economic.
The social condition arose from the devastation caused by the "black 
death" which struck large areas of Britain in 1348. The death toll 
was so heavy that in some of the most severely affected regions, 
no longer were there enough workers to till the land or tend cattle 
adequately. The sudden loss of manpower prompted landowners to 
attract replacement workers from other areas by offering them premium 
wages. During the same period, there was a dramatic rise in the demand
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for wool which led other landowners to convert tracts of cultivated 
land to sheep pastures, The effect of these two conditions was 
disruption of traditional labour supply markets and unprecedented 
wage increases.
From such circumstances emerged the "status quo" philosophy which 
was subsequently translated into legislation to re-establish and 
maintain traditional socio-economic patterns. It is evident that 
this philosophy does not reflect the sentiments of the workers 
themselves, but rather of those who were in positions of social 
influence and legal authority t,o translate "status quo" into 
legislative reality. As used here, that label refers to the two 
primary elements of the philosophy which were actually incorporated 
into the Poor Law of 1388: prohibition against employers offering 
higher wages as incentives to attract workers, and denial to workers 
of the possibility of migration - "vagrancy" in the parlance of 
those times - to seek work elsewhere without specific authority from 
local officials to do so.
"Status Quo" in the United States
The "status quo" philosophy, as discussed in the British context, 
had no place within the economic climate of the American colonies 
or, later, in the ensuing political and social development of the 
United States. Such a philosophy would have been in direct 
opposition to the national interest during that period.
From the earliest colonial days, political authorities consistently 
encouraged settlers to explore and develop new lands to which they
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could be granted title literally for the asking. Although the 
acreage available for gratis freehold acquisition gradually diminished 
as the population grew, homesteads of roughly 160 acres in certain 
areas of the West and Southwest were still offered as late as 
1908. A few such areas still exist today, although a token price 
per acre is charged and suitable guarantees are required that the 
property will be improved within reasonable time limit. Thus, 
the thrust has been consistently "Go West, Young Man", as opposed 
to "Stay in Place".
Philosophy of the "Able-bodied Unemployed" in Britain
A second philosophy emerged in Britain concurrent with "status quo" 
and, along with it, was expressed as part of the Poor Law of 1388,
This philosophy suggested, if only faintly, that persons physically 
or mentally unable to earn a living by working should receive a 
degree of preferential treatment better than that deserved by able- 
bodied unemployed. From the pertinent section of the 1388 legislation, 
this point of philosophy takes the following form: "... every person 
who goes begging and yet is able to serve or labour shall be treated 
like those who go out of the hundred without holding the letters 
patent,..beggars impotent to serve shall stay in the cities and 
towns where they happen to be dwelling at the time of the proclamation 
of this statute...or within forty days shall draw them to other 
towns within the hundred, rape or wapentake or to the towns where 
they were born..."^
The effect of the first-quoted phrase "...and yet is able to serve
1. Bagley J J & A J. The English Poor Law. London:Macmillan, 1966.
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or labour..." clearly distinguishes the able-bodied worker who
applies for public assistance from one not able-bodied. Unfortunately,
however, no difference was acknowledged by the 1388 law between the
able-bodied layabout who chose not to work and the able-bodied
unemployed worker who actively sought re-employment. Both types
were classed as one within the legal framework, thus both were
equally subject to the punishment of stocks, imprisonment and return
to original home parish imposed upon thse "who go out of the hindred
2
without holding the letters patent".
References to the "able-bodied unemployed" appear frequently in 
legislation enacted subsequent to 1388; indeed, the philosophy 
attaching to it remains implicit today in eligibility standards 
for unemployment benefits. Changing social conditions which led 
gradually to greater recognition by the state to relieve the needy 
made specific exclusion of the able-bodied unemployed. The public 
conscience considered immoral the gratis provision of public goods 
and services to those able to work for them. Life was lived close 
to the hand, and labour was mostly unskilled, which meant that 
almost anyone could do it. Semi-skilled labour required training 
under some form of apprenticeship; once an individual completed 
such training, a somewhat better standard of living was virtually 
assured. For persons who achieved even semi-skilled status, certainly 
for those who achieved affluence through hard work the thought 
was abhorrent that any of their tax monies could be enjoyed by 
those who chose not to work.
During the following century, while little change was made in the
2. Ibid.
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1388 provisions, the "vagrancy" problem progressively worsened. 
Eventual action in the form of harsher methods of punishment for
3
vagabondage were imposed by the Acts of 1495 and 1501 . Despite 
the whipping, branding and imprisonment specified for those 
convicted of vagrancy, it steadily increased. To strengthen the 
effectiveness of legislation aimed at "status quo", Henry VIII 
passed the Beggars Act in 1531, in which better treatment for those 
unable to work than that accorded layabouts was more clearly 
ennunciated. The Act granted "...all aged, poor, and impotent 
persons compelled to live by alms permission to beg within a limited
4
area" . This was the first formal statement of tolerance for 
those who were unemployed by reason of infîrmity; it also admitted 
a degree of state responsibility for such persons in legalising 
their efforts to beg charity from others.
Previously, the Church had played a key role in relieving want 
within individual parishes. Revenues for this purpose were collected 
from parishioners of better circumstances, but generally through 
voluntary contributions. Such resources did not go very far in 
relieving acute cases when they appeared in significant number; 
consequently, individual begging was commonplace, though not legally 
authorised. Beggars had been subject to punishment at the whim 
of local authorities until the Lfi^ l Act provided them a measure 
of legal status. That same Act issued pointed instructions as to 
the treatment of "sturdy, vagabonds and valiant beggars" which terms 
described those unemployed through choice. Such persons were to
5
"be set and kept at continual labour" . This stern dictum appeared 
again in the Acts of 1547 and 1576, and was emphasised later in
3. Tanner, J R. Tudor Constitutional Documents, London
4. Ibid.
5. Webb S and B. English Poor Law History, London
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two milestone pieces of social legislation of 1598 and 1601.
Both these Acts were so alike in thrust that they have come to be 
considered as one package, known as the Elizabethan Poor Laws,
These Laws set up a far more efficient system than previous legislation 
had done for administration of public assistance to the physically 
or mentally disabled poor and for controlling vagabondage. With 
modifications, these Laws remained in effect for well over three 
centuries. Historians are quick to point out that their initial 
successes were due to a series of supportive economic factors which 
lent impetus to the machinery of the system: rising grain prices 
and falling wool prices encouraged landowners to cultivate more 
land while cutting back on sheep - a return to the original pattern 
of the fourteenth century. Need for farm labour effectively 
syphoned off many vagrants who had been unable to find work even 
when they looked for it^.
The "Able-bodied Unemployed" Philosophy in the USA
This philosophy, as described within the British experience, has 
been a societal norm in the USA dating from the earliest colonial 
times. Its longevity is understandable when one considers that the 
physical demands levied on inhabitants of a developing country 
necessarily excluded those who were not, at least on arrival, able- 
bodied, Those same demands effectively militated against build-up 
of unemployment, especially for those who were able to work. In the 
American connotation, the term "able-bodied unemployed" applied to
6, Bagley, J J and A J, The English Poor Law, London:Macmillan, 1966
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a small number of men who chose the qpen road of a wanderer, working 
only when necessary for survival, and who were considered undesirables 
by conventional society. They were targets for the active hostility 
by most of the citizenry, especially the harsh, often brutal, 
treatment from local police.
During that period, there was no state or national legislation by 
which assistance of any kind was available to the poor, regardless 
of the reason for their poverty. Nor was there a societal climate 
which would tolerate an idea that assistance was due those who 
remained unemployed through choice. As in Britain, some American 
trade unions and the management of certain companies developed 
plans for providing some relief to workers who were thrown out of 
work through no fault of their own. Such plans were on the informal 
side structurally, with workers having no legal hold on the union or 
the company. Cash benefits from these types of sources were minimal, 
made only for items which could not be supplied in kind. Most often, 
benefits took the form of staple food items, used clothing and coal 
or wood for cooking and heating. This same format was used generally 
by the few public and private charities which ministered to the poor, 
only a few of which made no distinction betwen those who were so 
through choice and those who were victims of circumstance.
Some local governments provided minimum, very temporary assistance 
to destitute members of the community, most often in towns or cities 
which depended upon one or two major industries for employment.
When cyclical or seasonal layoffs were part of the economic pattern, 
a few of the more far-seeing municipalities legislated aid for the 
lowest-paid workers unemployed during these periods. In such cases.
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assistance was available only to bonafide workers; the able-bodied 
voluntary unemployed were rigidly excluded.
The Stigma of Being Poor - Britain
While the Poor Laws represented a quantum gain in administrative
efficiency over what preceded them, much has been said of the
callousness with which they were implemented. Such callousness
reflects at once the philosophy attached to the "Able-bodied
Unemployed" and of another element as well, that which is labeled
as the "stigma of being poor". The adamant public sentiment of
that day that assistance be given to able-bodied unemployed only
in exchange for work had hardened to the point where it was
legislatively institutionalised under the title "Houses of Correction"
The able-bodied layabouts and work-seekers alike were lumped
together as "offenders" in the public conscience. As expressed by
Thomas Noel in the doggerel: "Rattle his bones over the stones; he’s
7
only a pauper whom nobody owns" . Contributing to this sentiment 
was the resentment of taxpayers toward the poor because of the 
pressures exerted by the Crown through the counties to collect 
revenues for the support of the Houses, re-designated later as 
"workhouses".
By the early part of the eighteenth century, these workhouses had 
taken on the character of jails, with punishment, unremitting labour 
and the most spartan living conditions the chief means employed to 
justify support of those committed there^. The "offender" status of
7. Ibid.
8. Rogers, Thorold. Six Centuries of Work & Wages. London: Swan 
Sonnenschein and Co., 1889.
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the poor in the public eye appears as the most likely basis for 
the philosophy of "stigma” which attached not only to the head of 
the household but to all members of the family.
The Poor Laws came under periodic governmental scrutiny, especially 
in those times when the number of inmates in workhouses bacame 
so large as to threaten the adequacy of the supporting tax revenues. 
The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, while doing away the Speenhamland
9
system and some of the degrading results attributed to it, 
strengthened the punitive character of the workhouse system. As 
Chadwick explained: "By the workhouse system is meant having all 
relief through the workhouse, making this workhouse an uninviting 
place of wholesome restraint, preventing any of its inmates from 
going out or receiving visitors...disallowing beer and tobacco, and 
finding them work...rendering the person who administers the relief 
the hardest taskmaster and the worst paymaster, that the idle and 
dissolute can apply to"^^. It was believed that if the workhouses 
were made less like a prison in any respect, its purpose would be 
subverted. According to the Hammonds, the logic of 1834 rested 
on the logic that "The pauper was as much culprit as victim. At 
any rate, he was so often a culprit that it was dangerous ever 
to treat him as a victim"^^. One governmental administrator of 
that period wrote: "We devote ourselves to those who are weak.
9. Speenhamland system: inaugurated by the Berkshire magistrates 
at the Pelican Inn in Speenhamland in 1795. Relief was given 
to able-bodied poor without requiring them to enter the 
workhouse. Instead, in exchange for work they received pay 
which fluctuated according to the price of bread flour, 
giving rise to degradation of workers, it was alleged, and 
reducing them to virtual serfdom.
10. Chadwin, Edwin. Member, later Secretary of the Poor Law 
Board, 1833.
11. Hammond, J L & Barbara. The Bleak Age, London : Haze11,
Watson and Viney Ltd., for Penguin Books Ltd, 1934.
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who have somehow failed" . This powerful and demeaning social taint 
persisted over the course of several centuries and, indeed, is 
not an infrequently expressed point of view today.
Signs of Change to the "Stigma" Philosophy
Indications of mutation in this philosophy appeared toward the close 
of the nineteenth century. The power of the working classes to make 
their voice heard in Parliament was increased dramatically by 
the Reform Acts of 1876 and 1884, by which almost all working men 
received the right to vote. The formation of four labour groups
13
between 1867 and 1900 enabled them to increase their social pressure ,
and press for enactment of the Unemployed Workmen's Act of 1905. The
major effect of this legislation was, in the words of Lloyd George:
"a measure which would do very little good except it recognised
a very important principle... the right of a man to call upon the
14
state to provide him with work"
A corollary effect was a lessening of the "offender" status attached 
to the poor. The Act was permissive in that it enabled local 
authorities and charitable organisations to set up Distress 
Committees for the unemployed in the larger towns and extend a 
degree of relief from rate-paying to unemployed persons.
Further signs of an easing of the philosophy of "stigma" were two 
recommendations submitted in 1909 to John Burns, President of the
12. Cole G D H, Short History of the British Working Class Movement
1787-1947. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1948.
13. Trade Union Congress (TUC), 1887: Social Democratic Federation
(SDF), 1883; Independent Labour Party (ILP), 1893; Labour 
Representation Committee (LRC), 1900.
14. Clegg H A., Alan Fox and A F Thompson. A History of British
Trade Unions Since 1889. Vol. 1, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1964.
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Local Government Board: first, that workhouses be abolished and 
that treatment of paupers should be curative and restorative rather 
than punitive; and second, that able-bodied poor should in exchange 
for assistance work" except in "exceptional and temporary circumstances"^^. 
The effect of that last phrase stimulated official acknowledgement 
that unemployed able-bodied workers were deserving of public 
consideration, without stigma, when their status was due to events 
beyond their power to control.
Still another indication of a softening of the philosophy is 
perceived in the coining of the term "public assistance" by the 
government. The purpose of that new term was to encourage a 
general public shift away from the long-held system of ideas that 
poverty for whatever reason was denigrating and a sign of wilful 
individual failure of some sort^^. The term grew out of an embryo 
effort to destigmatise the social status of impoverished persons.
In the United States during this same period a fleeting indication 
appeared of other than local interest in the problem of income 
maintenance for unemployed workers. Professor H R Seager of Columbia 
University took the lead in setting up state-level discussions in 
New York of the unemployment insurance issue. Later, during the 
years 1907-1911, Professor C R Henderson urged that American 
Association of Labor Legislation to spearhead a campaign for
17
passage of national enactments patterned after the British model
15. Report of the Royal Commission to Examine the Poor Laws, 1909.
16. Labour Leader. 8 September 1905.
17. Altmeyer, Arthur J. "Unemployment Insurance: A Look at
the Past and the Future". Unemployment Insurance Review,
October 1967.
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His initiative was successful to the extent that a committee was 
appointed by the New York governor to consider the ramifications 
of such legislation within the economic climate of that era.
It is apparent that the committee was more a device to forestall 
the necessity for legislative attention on this unwelcome subject 
than a serious invitation for substantive recommendations.
The Stigma of Being Poor - USA
This philosophy was brought to the American colonies as part of 
the residual heritage of the colonists themselves. This "stigma" 
although discussed thus far only within its British context, 
nevertheless was endemic in other nations as well, some of which 
sent colonists to America during the same period as Britain. 
Consequently, the socio-economic separation between classes w 
imported virtually intact within the personal systems of new 
arrivals. Since colonies at their outset were essentially commercial 
enterprises, there was an already-established hierarchy wherein 
the appointed governor and his staff were at the highest level, 
followed in descending order of importance by merchants, factors 
and soldiers, with the workig classes occupying the same niche 
in the social pattern as in their mother country. All of this 
served to simply transport the class system from one country to 
another.
The strong initial influence of the class system and the "stigma
18. Personal System: describes the whole of an individual's
experience, to include family environment, religion, siblings, 
neighbourhood, bias, prejudice, interests, ambitions which 
ave part of the itiual'Q ur>i <çue.-nass .
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of being poor" became less and less visible as a function of shared 
hardships among those who pressed westward in search of new lands 
to which they could acquire title virtually for the asking.
Apart from the privations which all levels of pioneer society were 
forced to endure together, there was an imperative to share and 
co-operate in the interest of common survival. Communal efforts 
- security during Indian forays, land clearing, house and barn 
building - all contributed to lessening the importance of previous 
social classifications.
To be poor in material possessions was the usual human condition 
in those circles, accepted as part of the social scenery. Equally 
accepted by the settlers was the requirement for hard work, 
frequently under a variety of risks, to sustain and improve the 
quality of their lives. Effectively, poverty was destigmatised 
by the force of its pervasiveness and through over-riding 
environmental urgencies in pioneer society.
As cities proliferated westward over the continent, certain of 
them prospered, becoming larger and increasingly sophisticated, 
the "stigma of being poor" reasserted itself. Such stigma readily 
attached to those newly-arrived immigrants who joined sizable 
communities already stratified into social classes. Yet the residual 
effect was a fragility of the stigma in that it could be readily 




The advent of the twentieth century saw Britain having traveled 
a long way down the road of experience in social philosophy and 
related legislation on which it had embarked some six centuries 
earlier. As of 1905, Britain put on its national books new 
legislation which had the effect of recognising a degree of state 
responsibility toward those who were rendered unemployed through 
no fault of their own.
By contrast, the United States had not yet recognised a need for 
similar action, and remained wedded to philosophies imported from 
Britain during the previous two centuries: that of the "able-bodied 
unemployed", and the "stigma of being poor". Public assistance was 
confined to local governments with only loose attempts at intra­
state co-ordination by charity "boards" - and that only in some 
states.
The first American national legislation even marginally within the 
broad definition of social welfare came into being just before 
1910. It required employers to carry insurance with private companies 
to indemnify industrial injury to workers. Primarily a defensive 
mechanism for employers, this was the result of a growing tendency 
for courts to award sizable damages to workers who brought suit 
against their employers for injuries incurred on the job. The 
legislation made "Workmen's Compensation" insurance by employers 
mandatory and covered ipjiries arising from workers' own carelessness 
as well as from employer negligence; it also removed the right of 
employees to sue their employers privately for damages. The subject 
of income maintenance for those involuntarily unemployed had not
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been raised or even discussed, except in New York, and there only by 
a committee whose importance can be imputed from the fact that 
no substantive results from its efforts are known.
Of the three philosophies identified in the Early Period, only two 
are discernible in Britain after the turn of the century: the 
"able-bodied unemployed", and the "stigma of being poor", the 
same philosophies operative in the United States at that time.
The third, "status quo", had faded from British public consciousness 
during the latter half of the previous century. Not only was worker 
mobility now permitted in Britain, but was actively encouraged 
from time to time in order to redistribute the work-force in 
response to regional needs. Both philosophies have endured and 
are perceived as strong in Britain and the USA today among those 
who remain oriented toward the "work ethic".
One may well wonder why the United States, with its history of 
ready acceptance of immigrants and assistance to people of other 
nations had displayed no real interest in legislating assistance 
to its own unemployed. The British example in this field coupled 
with the special, close historical ties between the two nations 
could have been reasonably expected to produce at least some visible 
stimulus to American consciousness in that regard.
It is postulated that this seeming departure from an American 
pattern of humanitarian concern arose from interplay of two factors. 
First, social problems related directly to high unemployment were 
virtually unknown. The continuing reqiirements for manpower in a 
prospering economy during a century of expansion of national borders 
used up any surplus in this commodity before it became more than a
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local problem. Second, the traditional mobility of the American 
work-force - quite the opposite of the former British "status quo" 
philosophy - adjusted manpower supply imbalances without the 
necessity of political intervention.
British Philosophies and the National Insurance Act of 1911
The Edwardian years are often looked upon as a golden period in
British history. Indeed, the absence of full-scale wars make them
so by comparison with certain other periods. They were turbulent,
nevertheless, because of labour's mounting dissatisfaction with
traditional work patterns. Working men were insisting more and
more vigorously on higher pay scales and greater job security.
Tensions caused by worker militancy in these matters were heightened
by the plight of veterans of the Boer War returning to find no jobs
and little provision made for their re-entry into civilian life.
The unemployment rate with the TUC-affiliated membership alone
climbed steadily from 2.3% in 1900 to 4.0% in 1902, reaching
6.3% in 1905 - the year of the Manchester Unemployed Riots. The
effect of prolonged unemployment, which reached 9.5% in October of
1908, produced dramatic revisions of established British thinking
19
regarding the place of labour in the scheme of life
Sir William Beveridge, pioneering the study of cause and effect
relationships between unemployment and various social ills of
that day, was convinced that unemployment was fundamental to the
whole question of poverty. In 1909 he wrote: "Workmen today are
19. Board of Trade. Seventeenth Abstract of Labour Statistics, 
BPP, 61.
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men living on a quicksand, which at any moment may engulf individuals,
20
which at uncertain intervals sinks below the sea surface altogether"
The effect of labour pressures and sentiments like those of Beveridge
impelled Lloyd George to make vigorous introduction to Parliament
of a long much debated, much revised National Insurance Bill.
His views on the subject were clear and forceful: "I cannot help
believing that before this generation has passed away, we shall
have advanced a great step towards that good time when poverty,
and the degradation which always follows in its camp, will be as
21
remote as the wolves which once infested its forests"
Passage of the National Insurance Act of 1911 proclaimed that 
philosophies relating to the public assistance had reached a 
stage of maturity strong enough to cause enactment of legislation 
specifically designed to relieve want. The Act enunciated a fundamental 
change in the government's philosophy concerning its responsibility 
to administer to the health and welfare of its poorest citizens.
Part I of the Act applied to health and welfare benefits; Part II 
established unemployment benefits for certain categories of 
workers. The phrase "certain categories" is emphasised since 
eligibility for unemployment benefits did not include all workers, 
but only those in specific manual trades, principally building 
and engineering. Thus, the humanitarian effects of the Act, 
reflections of current philosophy modification, were marred by narrow 
eligibility rules and restriction to roughly one-fourth of the 
workforce.
20. Beveridge, William. Unemployment, A Problem of Industry.
London: Macmillan, 1909.
21. George, Richard Lloyd. Lloyd George. From a speech of the 
FM at Newcastle upon Tyne, 1910.
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The "Liberalisation" Philosophy
This philosophy emerged from social conditions which were created 
more through external than internal pressures. These external 
influences are traceable directly to World War I, and the demands 
it made on the economy and, in turn, on the workers supporting the 
war effort in the factories and on the farms. Several factors 
appear as prime movers in promoting general acceptance of the 
"liberalisation" philosophy, a label to describe willingness to 
support greater generosity of benefit payments and to bring more 
workers within eligibility limits.
One important factor is the build-up throughout the war years of 
the unemployment fund to an amount exceeding five times its pre-war 
level. The size of the fund was such that it presented convincing 
evidence that the country could afford to extend coverage to more 
workers without a related budgetary threat. There was plenty of 
money to pay benefits to the numbeis of unemployed workers anticipated 
in the wake of post-war industrial slump. And there were those 
in government who, recalling with anxiety the unemployment strife 
after the Boer War, looked toward those post-war years and contemplated 
the employment problems they might bring.
Another factor was the "rightness" of extending coverage as a 
fitting expression of unity while the country was on a total war 
footing. This factor combined with the fund build-up to promote 
unopposed passage of the Munitions Workers Act of 1916. This brought 
health and unemployment benefits coverage to all workers engaged 
in or connected with munitions work and certain other trades - 
ammunition, explosives, chemicals, metals, rubber, leather and bricks -
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whe'Meror not these trades were in fact engaged in munitions work.
The Munitions Act was the first legi&ation to reflect the 
liberalisation philosophy since it extended coverage to virtually 
everyone working in any industry, except those in agriculture and 
domestic service.
In 1920, unemployment insurance coverage was extended further to 
all manual workers earning less than £250 annually, except for 
agricultural and domestic workers. This time, however, the basic 
philosophy was not translated into legislation as a function of 
war solidarity, but by fear of what the large numbers of unemployed 
ex-servicemen might do if some practical response to their plight 
was not made.
The liberalisation philosophy was essentially government-sponsored
and nurtured. Closely allied to it, and emerging during the same
period, was a derivative reflecting society's admission that not
only does the government have a responsibility for relief of its
unemployed citizens, but that such citizens have a "right" to make
22
claims upon the government to provide them work . The element of 
"right" in such a context is important here since it represents 
a liberalisation of the government's previous admission of obligation 
to provide for its citizens.
Developing American Interest 1911-1935
Except for the brief interest in 1907 of Seager's committee in New
22. Brown, R G B .  The Management of Welfare. Glasgow: William 
Collins & Sons Ltd, 1975.
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York, the subject of unemployment insurance remained on the shelf
until the mid-World War I period. With the growing inevitability
of American involvement in that war, some thought at the national
level was directed to post-war manpower planning to avoid if
possible the same type of unemployment unrest that occurred in
Britain after the Boer War. In 1916, a "resolution" was introduced
into Congress for appointment of a national insurance commission
23
for "mitigation of the evil of unemployment" . Some states, 
notably New York, Massachussetts, Illinois, and especially Wisconsin 
displayed active interest in serious planning in that field. State 
Senator Huber of Wisconsin introduced the "Huber" bill into the 
Wisconsin legislature in 1921, the main features of which had been 
drafted by Professor John R Commons of the University of Wisconsin. 
It is interesting to note that Huber's bill provided input
into the unemployment benefit fund be made solely by employers, 
based on individual employer experience with employee turnover. 
Current practice in most states follows Huber's recommendation.
The bill failed of passage in 1921 and in every succeeding session
in which it was re-introduced until, finally, in 1932 a much
modified version of the original passed by a large majority.
Wisconsin is held up as the pioneer state in taking definitive
action to provide unemployment benefits. Much of the later federal
24
legislation is patterned after that of Wisonsin
Harking back to 1921, there was a brief but sharp business recession
23. United States Commission on Industrial Relations. Final 
Report, 64th Congress, 1st Session, 1916. Washington, B.C., 
U.S.Government Printing Office.
24. Rauschenbusch, Paul. "Wisconsin's Unemployment Compensation 
Act". American Labor Legislation Review, Vol.22, 1931.
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that year. Its greatest effect was to frighten that segment of 
the public which had eqpyed boom years during World War I in the 
production of items for the allied war effort, both before and 
during active involvement by the United States. Accustomed to 
prosperity and fat paycheques, workers and legislators alike were 
appalled at the fall-off in employment and corresponding decline 
of individual buying power. The then-Secretary of Commerce,
Herbert Hoover, later to become the 31st Presihnt, chaired in 1921 
a presidential Commission to deal with recession problems. The 
Commission recommended compilation of a catalogue of federal^-funded 
works projects which could be implemented at any time unemployment 
became a serious threat to the general welfare. As it happened, 
by the time the Commission published its recommendations a brisk 
recovery was already in progress and no action was taken on them.
An illustrative sidelight on the decidedly inchoate stage of
unemployment planning during that period can be gleaned from one
of the Hoover Commission's earliest snags. It was agreed among
the members that one of the essential bases for its work was the
actual unemployment figure and rate. However, no national unemployment
statistics were recorded at that time. Undismayed, the Commission
arrived at this base statistic by a voice vote, derived from the
best estimate of individual commissioners. "A majority of Commission
members voted that there were 5,000,000 unemployed at that moment
,25
in time, and that figure because the accepted statistic
Brief recessions occurred in 1924 and 1927, from which recovery was 
sufficiently rapid as to discourage further consideration either
25. Clague, E and L Kramer. Manpower Policies and Programs.
Kalamazoo: W E Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1976.
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of continued downturn or of public-funded work projects recommended 
by the 1921 Commission. The absolute peak of the business and stock 
market arrived in 1929. Prices were attractive, credit was the 
basis upon which skyrocketing commercial activity was conducted.
The euphoria born of this peak economic condition came to sudden, 
shattering disaster with the collapse of the stock market on 
October 29, 1929. National financial catastrophe followed 
immediately, with severe international repercussions; catastrophe 
that seemed to feed on itself and then regenerate to monumental 
dimensions during the ensuing near-decade. It is within this 
climate of economic crisis that mutations in the traditional 
British and American philosophy of "self-reliance" can be perceived 
with perhaps some greater clarity than would be possible under 
less exigent circumstances.
The Philosophy of Self-reliance
The philosophy of reliance on self as the primary means of survival 
attaches equally to British and American tradition. As this 
philosophy is seen to influence legislation on assistance to the 
unemployed, a marked disparity is perceivable between these two 
nations dating from the British Act of 1911. While no similar 
legislation appeared in the United States for another quarter 
century, fluctuations in the popular strength of this philosophy 
in each nation are susceptible to comparison between them.
In Britain, the increasingly powerful voice of labour exerted
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significant influence on pre-World War I government decision-making, 
certainly on the passage of the National Insurance Act of 1911.
With passage came a gradual decline in the importance attached 
to the philosophy of self-reliance as the sole pillar of survival. 
The decline was accompanied by a corresponding rise in the popular 
realisation by workers covered under the Act that the government 
was now in the business of shoring up that pillar when they became 
unemployed through no fault of their own.
By the time the 1935 American counterpart legislation to the 
British Act of 1911 appeared, an entire British generation had grown 
up in the shelter of its benefit security and the liberalisation 
of benefits which periodically ensued. Only toward the close of 
the quarter-century time gap was a reason for change in the (l'Kf>Gty'\cjarr\ 
philosophy of self-reliance precipitated by events - those of the 
Great Depression.
CURRENT PERIOD (1935 to date)
By the mid-thirties, the traditional American philosophy of self- 
reliance had been softened sufficiently through the trauma of 
economic depression to permit passage of the Social Security Act 
of 1935. This Act resolved much of the long-standing disparity 
in the field of social welfare between Britain and the USA, Britain 
with a head-start of a quarter-century. The major characteristic 
in both countries during the Current Period with respect to unemployment 
benefits is perceived as progressive alteration of existing philosophies 
rather than emergence of new ones.
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In Britain, the liberalisation philosophy first identified 
during the Middle Period matured until, by 1939, four insurance 
funds had been legislated, each responding to a specific need: 
health insurance, unemployment insurance, agricultural unemployment 
insurance and pensions for the aged, widows and orphans. Eligitility 
for these benefits depended upon contributions paid in by the 
insured. The liberalisation philosophy led also to public assistance 
legislation, under which benefits were based on need, not 
contributions. In fact, the name "public assistance" was an effort 
to destigmatise the charity nature of the Poor Law, now in its 
final stage.
Further impetus to the liberalisation philosophy was implicit 
in the recommendations of the Beveridge Report, published in 1942. 
Beveridge sought to consolidate the various pieces of legislation 
into one comprehensive system founded on two complementary bases; 
obligatory contributions by workers as the primary means of assuring 
income maintenance to the unemployed; and what was intended as a 
secondary part of the system, national assistance to those who did 
not qualify for the first type of benefits by reason of having no 
affiliation with the work force - need, not contribution to govern 
the amount of benefits.
These recommendations of Beveridge reflected interplay between 
the philosophies of liberalisation and the "stigma of being poor".
It was reasoned then that benefits received as a result of 
contributions would be a matter of right, not of public charity, 
thus no "stigma" should attach to them. National assistance benefits, 
based on need were, on the other hand, plainly charity. Periodic
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efforts to destigmatise such benefits were made through changes in 
title: originally "public assistance" they were subsequently renamed 
"national assistance", and in 1966 again renamed as "supplementary 
benefits". In that same 1966 action is yet another interplay 
between liberalisation and "stigma" . The "right" to benefits, 
previously enjoyed only by those making contributions to unemployment 
insurance, was extended to claimants for supplementary benefits 
based on rules of qualification and not, as in the case of insurance, 
on length and amount of contribution.
The American Social Security Act of 1935 contained two principal 
features: old age pensions and unemployment benefits. Coming as 
it did in the most devastating economic crisis in American history, 
the Act was looked upon as the first, firm promise that the aged 
and unemployed would receive a measure of protection in future 
against the type of grievous want seen everywhere since 1929.
Further, the Act was viewed as a logical, much-needed, but very 
tardy milestone in the evolution of social legislation, but only 
after its enactment. In spite of the social condition which prompted 
its ultimate passage, while still in the Bill-debate stage there 
were strong attacks on its in the Congress. These attacks were 
founded substantially on the reluctance of some lawmakers to formally 
draw away from the traditional philosophy of self-reliance in favour 
of federally-supported relief measures.
Such attacks were less virulent against the old-age pension sections 
of the Bill but, as if to compensate for this more tolerant attitude 
toward old people, were vehement indeed against the unemployment 
insurance sections. One evidence of this, when the legislative 
decision point was reached in the Congress with respect to the
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whole package of Bill, was that unemployment insurance was relegated 
to last place on the agenda in spite of the fact that the Council 
of Economic Advisers had placed it first. Opposition to unemployment 
legislation at the national level was based on two salient fears: 
first, there was anxiety that federal action would be declared 
unconstitutional since it pre-empted state authority without, so 
it was argued, compelling reasons for doing so. Second, in weakening 
the requirement for workers to earn through work the right to even 
minimal survival, the incentive to work would be correspondingly 
weakened. This argument relates directly to the philosophy of 
self-reliance and the worry in the minds of legislators in setting 
a legislative precedent which would diminish its importance in 
future.
A brief word is appropriate at this juncture concerning the vastly 
different philosophy in Britain compared to that in the USA with 
respect to the political level at which legislative action should 
be taken. These opposing philosophies embrace the entire national 
life of each nation and apply directly to, but are not confined 
to, the issue of unemployment benefits.
British Centralisation and American Decentralisation Opposing 
Philosophies
Britain's history manifests a traditional devotion to the philosophy 
that the effectiveness of a policy or programme is best assured 
by legislating for it at the national level, and applying derivative 
provisions uniformly throughout the land. The United States is
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equally devoted to the opposing philosophy, as expressed in the 10th 
Amendment of the Constitution; in substance: only when Congress 
has been persuaded that the national interest would be best served 
through federal legislation on a given issue should the free exercise 
of state sovereignty on that issue be pre-empted.
A trace of legislation in Britain related to relief measures for
the poor reveals few examples of legislative initiative at other
than the national level. Although the Speenhamland plan was
26
conceived by the "country gentlemen of Berkshire" in 1795, it 
was not intended only for local application. During that same 
year the plan was incorporated into an Act of Parliament for uniform 
implementation throughout the realm. It is true that
Church, town and county actions were taken in some instances to 
relieve the needy within their jurisdictions, yet significant 
legislation appears to have been confined to Westminster. Although 
local authorities presently administer certain welfare-related 
benefits, such as council housing, rent rebates and free school 
meals, the mandate for them to do so is parented in national enactments. 
Indeed, it is difficult to find evidence that legislation on this 
general subject was ever entertained except at the national level.
It can be argued that the monarchic political structure of Britain 
historically places greater emphasis on control being retained 
by the highest authority. It seems clear that the philosophy of 
centralisation, as revealed quite consistently by the pattern of 
social welfare legislation, remains strong and vigorous.
26. Hammond, J L and Barbara. The Bleak Age. London : Penguin 
Books Ltd, 1934.
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In the United States, the traditional legislative legacy of state 
sovereignty was ultimately altered to permit some federal measures 
for unemployment relief through the action of a series of woes 
derived from the crash in 1929. Municipal and state relief resources 
to aid the unemployed, if any, were soon exhausted, which left only 
voluntary charities to shoulder the burden of providing the most 
basic necessities. Yet in spite of these seemingly monumental 
arguments for immediate and definitive federal response to the plight 
of unemployed masses throughout the country, the combined strength 
of the philosophies of self-reliance and state sovereignty remained 
formidable bars to remedial legislation over the period of the next 
five years. While stop-gap legislation at the local, state and 
ultimately the federal level in the form of nationally-funded public 
works projects was forthcoming and did some good, it became 
increasingly apparent in spite of continuing demurrers by obdurate 
states' rights congressmen and senators that the real need was 
for an encompassing piece of federal action. The real catalyst 
for the serious drafting and debate of such legislation in the 
Congress was Wisconsin's 1932 unemployment benefits act. Yet even 
with this example, three more years of acrimonious debate in the 
Congress were necessary before the negative votes by champions of 
state sovsreignty-at-all-costs^overcome and the Social Security Act 
of 1935 enacted. Part II of this Act established a federal umbrella 
for unemployment benefits, while leaving to each state the option 
to participate or not and, if it did participate, to elect the 
procedures and benefit amount to be applied within the state 
jurisdiction.
This federal-state compromise arrangement was palatable enough 
for proponent and opponent alike to live and face their respective
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constituencies with. The Act contained certain concepts imported 
directly from the British experience, notably per capita payroll 
taxes paid into special funds atvd the "right" of claimants to 
benefits derived from such funds. There were still significant 
differences, however, reflecting the philosophic divergence between 
them. First, the philosophy of self-reliance is perceived as having 
declined markedly in Britain since the passage of the 1911 Act, as a 
logical effect of the flat-rate benefits paid without reference to 
claimants’ previous earnings level. By comparison, the original 
1935 Act in the USA clearly established at the outset earnings-related 
benefits for both old-age pensions and unemployment benefits, as 
elements of the federal umbrella. The liberalisation philosophy 
in Britain, as mentioned previously, had had a twenty-five year 
period in which to grow and affect legislation before any American 
counterpart came into being. Thus, the USA began with its 
traditional philosophy of self-relienace uneroded by time and events. 
Second, the American Act reflected a compromise which established 
a basic legislative umbrella for unemployment benefits at the 
national level, while leaving each state the option to participate 
or not; only participation in the old-age pension legislation was 
obligatory for all states.
The palliative device of imposing on the states only the requirement 
of subscribing to federally-controlled old-age pensions - seen 
at that time secure from attack on emotional grounds - while 
preserving state option on unemployment insurance beyond certain 
basic underpinning enabled legislators on both sides of the fence 
to hold their heads up as defenders of traditional values. The 
American philosophy of self-reliance thus gradually was diluted to
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the degree necessary to accommodate legislation which responded 
to pressing social needs, but no further.
In Britain there is no evidence that any need for similar compromise 
was perceived either before or since passage of the 1911 Act.
From Lord Beveridge to Richard Titmuss, the concept for all forms 
of social legislation appears to depend upon national rather than, 
say, county decision for translation into practical measures.
The comparison here involves two philosophies: self-reliance gradually 
giving way in both nations in the face of compelling social imperatives 
but with Britain in a twenty-five year lead over the USA; and a 
sharing in America of sovereignty between national and state governments 
on unemployment benefits while Britain legislated this issue only 
at the national level.
Continuing Liberalisation in Britain and the USA
Reference is made to earlier discussions of the liberalisation 
philosophy and its translation into legislation in both Britain and 
the United States. It should be remembered that in the United 
States, only since passage of the 1935 Act has there been real 
basis upon which to observe the liberalisation philosophy in terms 
of subsequent, related legislation. From the end of World War II, 
howver, there is ample evidence in both nations that the liberalisation 
philosophy has been active and remains so today.
In 1948, based on the recommendations of the Beveridge Report, a 
sweeping restructure of the whole social security system was
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undertaken in Britain. At irregular intervals through the years, 
before as well as after World War II, increases in the amount of 
benefits were authorised in an attempt to maintain reasonable 
viability with steadily rising prices. Unemployment benefits 
marched from seven shillings (1912) to the present £15.00; an 
earning-related supplement was tacked on to pensions in 1961, 
and then appended to unemployment and sickness benefits as well in 
1966. The whole catalogue of social security benefits has been 
progressively expa-nded until today there are some sixty bereEit 
possibilities susceptible to claim, either singly or in combination, 
according to individual claimant circumstances.
In the United States, the liberalisation philosophy at the federal
and state levels acted to push the kinds of benefits and the
amounts attached to each of them upward at various times during
the years since 1935. Under the state sovereignty philosophy,
states proceeded in this upward direction largely at their own individual
pace as changes in intra-state economic-labour conditions were
assessed by state legislatures. The federal government did step
into the piecture from time to time when the combined pressure of
a number of states' representatives was strong enough to force
it. The original Act was expanded in 1940 to provide benefits
for widows of workers with minor children; in 1956 disability
insurance became a part of the system, with medical insurance
for the aged (Medicare) added in 1966.
It is at this point in time that the impetus of the British and 
American versions and practices of the liberalisation philosophy 
appear to have resulted in a convergence sufficient enough to produce 
a body of social welfare legislation strikingly congruent between
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them. Yet the administrative procedures involved in delivering 
the legislation to claimants are strikingly dissimilar in certain 
basic ways. Comparison of such procedures appears in a later 
Part of this study.
With the "energy crisi^' of the early '70's in the USA, unemployment 
skyrocketed, one effect of which was to bankrupt the unemployment 
benefits fund in a number of states. To continue benefit payments 
to claimants, these states were obliged to borrow from the federal 
Treasury. In 1974 and 1975 the liberalisation philosophy, already 
having prompted several increases in benefits in old-age pensions 
and unemployment benefits as a consequence of a 6-year inflationary 
spiral which showed no sign of levelling out, federal action provided 
funds to states by which to extend the 26-week maximum duration of 
unemployment benefits, normal in most states, to 65 weeks.
To this point, discussion of the Current Period has focused on 
mutations perceived in the philosophy of liberalisation, with 
secondary attention to its interplay with that of self-reliance. 
Essentially, the rise of the former has contributed to a corresponding 
decline of the latter. This is seen as logical and inevitable, 
since fluctuation of one directly affects the stability of the other.
The "able-bodied unemployed" philosophy still constitutes one of 
the basic supports on which eligibility standards are founded in 
both Britain and the United States: unemployed persons whose work 
record demonstrates attachment to the regular work force and who 
actively seek new work are entitled to unemployment benefits; those 
whose past work record and current activities argue otherwise are 
disqualified. Certain administrative procedures, however, by which
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this philosophy is translated into practice differ markedly between 
the two nations. In this regard, the liberalisation philosophy 
is seen currently to exert both a positive and negative thrust.
On the positive side, it operates to cause periodic benefit increases 
in order to keep claimants * buying power near the level at which 
goods are priced. On the negative side, it is seen by some to 
over-compensate for past real or fancied administrator severity 
and intransigence in dealing with claimants by permitting casual, 
rather than scrupulous enforcement of claims control measures.
These issues are discussed and compared in another chapter of this 
study.
The "stigma" philosophy has been disavowed in Britain and the United 
States in various ways throughout the Current Period. "Stigma" 
certainly becomes less visible during times of high unemployment 
when great numbers of people are forced to rely on various benefits 
to replace income from work. Yet, if less visible "stigma" remains 
a taint felt in varying intensity depending upon the degree of 
individual identity with the regular workforce. Those who so 
identify are seen to feel the stigma label most strongly, since 
they seek to rejoin the workforce and only feel fulfilled while 
an active, working, contributing member of it.
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CHAPTER 4
COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
Introduction
This chapter is concerned with comparison of key procedures between 
British and American systems for administration of unemployment 
benefits. It is useful at the outset to define "comparison" and 
"key procedures" as these terms relate to each other and to the 
subject matter. "Comparison" includes the related areas of 
description and discussion which provide substance to identification 
of similarities and differences. "Key procedures" are those major 
administrative activities by which each nation applies its governing 
legislation to employers and claimants. Within that latter term, 
"key" refers to procedures selected from the whole body of each 
nation's operating regulations which, in the judgment of this 
researcher, best illustrate inter-system similarities and differences
These comparisons are facilitated by a number of shared objectives 
between the two nations, including the following, as derived 
from the language of the basic Acts and from commentary by various 
writers in the field:
a. to provide cash benefits to workers as a matter of 
right while they are unemployed through no fault of 
their own.
b. to relate benefits to prior wages so that claimants may 
maintain a reasonable standard of living during the
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period of search for a new job.
c. to provide government assistance to workers in locating 
job opportunities and, when necessary, help them to 
acquire different or additional skills to increase 
their employability.
Note the implicit assumptions that unemployment is involuntary, 
benefits are of temporary duration, and that government has an 
active role to play in the job-finding process.
Seven procedural areas have been selected as bases for comparison.
They represent anchor points for the system of which they are part, 
and highlight within manageable limits the scope of activities with 
which unemployment benefits are concerned. These seven areas are:
British centralization of procedures versus American decentralization 
to a federal-state system; sources of contribution and methods of 
payment; fund management; experience rating; eligibility and related 
standards; employer non-compliance; and emergency procedures.
Presently, there is no British counterpart to the American experience 
rating, and no general American counterpart to the British emergency 
procedures. Inclusion here of these two one-sided - currently, at 
least - features serves to emphasise the areas of basic dissimilarity 
between the two systems which stand out sharply in the midst of 
other, less dissimilar, areas.
British National - American Federal-state System
The underlying philosophy of these two approaches was discussed
in the "Legislative Philosophies" chapter of this study. No comparisons
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were made at that time of operational characteristics or the 
advantages and disadvantages which accrue to each of them. Such 
comparisons are timely now in order to provide a general backdrop 
against which subsequent comparisons of more specialised procedural 
areas may be clearly reflected. Essentially, comparisons are between 
British centralization of decisions regarding functions and 
administrative procedures of the unemployment benefits system and 
American decentralization of these same decisions to each of the 
fifty state governments.
In Britain, overall responsibility for the whole national programme 
of social welfare, of which unemployment benefits is one element, 
rests with the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS). 
Decisions on matters of policy affecting any of its elements are 
made by DHSS on the basis of input from appropriate subordinate 
agencies, along with special studies such as those from the Committee 
on Local Authority and Allied Personnel Services (1968), the Fisher 
Committee (1973), and various "consultative documents" produced 
in response to specific study requirements.
With respect to unemployment benefits, the Department of Employment 
(DE) is charged with implementation of DHSS policy in direct servicing 
of claimants. In that role, the DE develops eligibility, payment 
and related procedures for claimants, makes payments and initiates 
action against fraud. This chapter touches on all the above operations 
except that of fraud, which is the subject of a later chapter.
DE claims procedures are derived from national legislation and 
operated through a network of six regional and over 900 local 
unemployment benefits offices (UBO's). The DE is officially known
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as the DE Group (Figure 4.1): its other elements are the Health
& Safety Commission (Figure 4.2): an independent body designated
as the Advisory, Conciliation & Arbitration Service (Figure 4.3):
and the Manpower Services Commission (Figure 4.4). The DE Group
is headed by the Secretary of State for Employment, currently the
Right Honourable Albert Booth, MP. Reporting directly to him is
the Permanent Secretary, Sir Kenneth Barnes who is responsible for
the organisation and efficiency of the whole Department and directs
the Civil Service staff. The prime DE task is "to promote the
1
efficient use of manpower in a socially responsible way" .
While certain functional activities of the DE have been delegated 
to subordinate elements, an impressive number of them - fourteen - 
are retained at Departmental level, one of which is unemployment 
benefits. Such tasks lie severally in the fields of administration, 
policy and planning, and operations (Figure 4.5). The centralization 
of policy development and decision-making at the national level is 
thus further illustrated. Regional benefit officers do prepare 
and forward recommendations on certain matters, such as prosecution 
of fraud, for Departmental consideration and final decision. Through 
this medium a degree of influence on that decision is sometimes 
possible, depending upon the issue, how it is argued by the regional 
benefit officer concerned, and how these arguments are perceived 
at Departmental level. Essentially, regional attention centres 
on monitorship and inspection of day-to-day operational and 
administrative functions, assuring prompt processing of claims and 
benefit payments according to the letter of the law. Adjudication 
of "grey" areas is not within the province of a regional benefit office.
1. A Guide to the DE Group. Information Directorate of the
Department of Employment, May 1977.
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but the function of DE "insurance officers" who render decisions 
based both on the letter of the law and case precedent.
Discretionary authority is limited at regional level to such issues 
as furnishing interpretation to UBO's on new procedural instructions, 
authorising employer-assisted benefit procedures and necessary funds 
to UBO's suddenly confronted with dramatic rises in claimant traffic. 
When such instances become generalised within a region and extra­
ordinary measures must be taken to cope with them, such as increasing 
the weekly signing to fortnightly intervals. Departmental decision 
must be sought. Administrators at regional level use as a rule of 
thumb the criterion that problems associated with routine "weekly 
signing" are generally within regional discretion; others are referred 
to London.
In the United States, administration of unemployment insurance is 
not centralized at the national level, but operates instead through 
a decentralized, bilateral federal-state relationship under which 
each state is virtually autonomous. The 1935 Act established a set 
of minimum standards which each state must adopt in order to become 
a certified participant in the programme. The federal standards 
constitute a foundation upon which member states super-impose their 
own eligibility and payment regulations. The aim here is to assure 
each state the freedom to tailor its programme according to prevailing 
social and economic conditions, while assuring the integrity of all 
such programmes through monitorship of the federal standards.
While some states did delay their federal participation because of 
unwillingness to subscribe to federal standards, employers and 
legislators exerted sufficient pressure on state legislatures so
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that, one after another, each state elected to join the federal 
programme. Employers were attracted by the tax advantages which 
accrued to them by virtue of state participation; state legislators 
were attracted by the federal grants to states covering total 
administrative costs of approved state unemployment insurance plans. 
In effect, the Act preserved the cosmetics of state sovereignty 
while making it impractical for any state to remain outside the 
federal option.
Each state designated an agency to administer and monitor its 
programme. All such agencies are associated directly with each 
state's department of labor, and are known by various titles, 
such as Department of Labor Claims, Office of Unemployment, and the 
like. While operating procedures differ among states, the terms 
of reference of each such agency are similar. In all states, the 
responsible agency is located at the state capital, with branch 
offices dispersed geographically according to population density.
The federal standards imposed on states as prerequisite to full
partnership include such basic elements as definitions of essential 
2
terms , basis for tax credits allowed employers in participating 
states against the federal tax, certain excluded employments, 
status of non-profit organisations, and the like. Standards for 
eligibility, contributions, amount and duration of benefit, penalties 
levied against claimants and employers, and related subjects are 
wholly within the province of individual state legislative action.
As a consequence, there are virtually fifty different state systems
2. For example: "employer" is defined in the U.S. 1935 Social
Security Act as any individual or any one of specified types 
of legal entity that had one or more individuals performing 
service for it.
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for unemployment insurance operating within the latitude allowed 
by the umbrella of federal standards.
Comparisons between British centralization of authority at the 
national level and American decentralization through federal-state 
shared authority narrow to two main issues, decision-making and 
effective communication, with a third issue - responsiveness - 
of interest value only.
Decision-making and Effective Communication
In the British system, decisions taken at the national level affect 
the totality of the system since they are applied uniformly throughout 
the United Kingdom. While there is room for special consideration 
to be accorded one locale to the exclusion of others, justification 
for preferential treatment is difficult to sell at Departmental or 
Parliament levels. As a corollary, system-wide decisions have the 
appeal of being seen as equitable by everyone, whether or not the 
effect of the decision itself is applauded. In the United States,
3
decision-making is fragmented among fifty-two political entities , 
thus any procedural uniformity is accidental. The British 
feature of uniform application is absent; in fact, some of the 
procedural disparities among the states actually attract unemployed 
to certain of those where benefits are more generous and eligibility 
easier to establish. For the taxpayers in such in-migration states.
3. Fifty states, plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia.
For convenience, "fifty" is commonly used to denote member 
entities of the union.
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4
this attraction is an issue of high-temper and bitter contention .
Effective communication is construed here in a dual sense: administration
of the system, and understandability by the public. In the first
sense, the British system is clearly easier to administer since only
at the national level are procedural changes made. While input
by way of recommendations and counsel from county and local
governments may be welcomed, procedures are cast in final form at
the national level. This feature makes possible a greater certainty
that policy or procedural directives will be interpreted as the
drafters intend, since administrators at all levels belong to the
same Department. And in cases where language does engender
variations in interpretation, correction can be made at one stroke
from the national level. In the United States, for reasons
already discussed in connection with other procedural areas,
simplicity of administration and understandability of its effects
by the general public and administrators alike is inhibited because
of fifty virtually autonomous decision-makers. One of the great
difficulties encountered in the conduct of USA-based research for
this study can be laid at the door of built-in complexity and conflicting
procedures among these states.
In the second sense, understandability by the public, the British 
system has both the need and the capability to communicate effectively. 
Since the claimant in Inverness will be equally affected by a 
procedural change as will a claimant in Swansea, Departmental
4. There have been attempts by some states (New York, Lousiana,
and Hawaii most recently) to limit in-migration of unemployed 
from other slates and nations; such attempts have been declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court when only grounds of 
"unemployed status" are used as basis.
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communications must be made clear to both. By contrast, in the 
United States even intra-state communications to claimants are 
liable to contamination by the interplay of interpretations of 
federal standards. Resolution of such problems in the USA, much 
of which lies in the field of reassuring claimants as to their 
rights to benefits, is perceived as taking a longer time and requiring 
the intercession of more administrators than in Britain. This is 
due to the layering of bureaucracies at the US local, state, and 
national level, each of which enjoys significant latitude to 
adopt its own stance on such matters.
Related Issue: Responsiveness
Of related interest is the issue of which system is the more 
capable of quick, effective response to special, regional unemployment 
situations which do not prevail elsewhere in the country. Such 
special circumstances might arise, for example, from a local industry 
shutting down because of diminished availability of raw materials 
or mineral resources, or from agricultural and directly-related 
activities being ruined by climatic extremes, plant or animal 
disease. On the one hand, one postulates that the British system 
is likely to be slower to react to localised situations because 
of its dependence on centralized administration, and that the 
American system of individual state control is capable of faster 
reaction since no national body need be consulted. On the other 
hand, research of both systems reveals little evidence supporting a 
conclusion that either system is actually better than the other in 
these respects. The British system operates through a regional and 
local network, all linked to the national administration by telephone
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and electronic communications. These factors in combination with 
a reduced traffic requirements - roughly, one-fourth the population 
and even less overall distances involved than the United States, 
and sufficient Departmental latitude to authorise departures from 
or expansion of normal procedures when needed pending formal London 
approval, appears to essentially equalise the ability of both nations 
to respond quickly and effectively to circumstances of varying 
complexity and pervasiveness. In any case, available evidence does 
not support a conclusion as to which system offers greater advantages 
than the other in terms of reaction capability.
British-American Contribution Procedures
Comparison of British and American unemployment insurance contribution 
procedures reveal two major points of difference. First, the British 
system requires shared employer-employee contributions; by contrast, 
within the American system only three states have opted for shared 
contributions, the other forty-seven require them solely from 
employers. Second, in Britain such contributions are not maintained 
as a separate revenue item, but pooled into one DHSS social security 
fund; in the United States they are maintained as a distinct and 
separate fund at both state and federal levels. Directly related 
to employer contributions in the United States is a feature called 
"experience rating", which is of sufficient importance to merit 
separate treatment later in this chapter.
In Britain, the concept of shared employer-employee contributions 
was never the cause of general controversy or parliamentary debate.
In fact, the actual debate and passage through Parliament of the
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whole final draft of Part II (unemployment insurance) of the bill 
which became the National Insurance Act of 1911 is, according to 
Gilbert, "almost without interest"^. The lengthy parliamentary 
struggle over Part I (health insurance) eclipsed discussion of 
unemployment insurance, Fraser corroborates this, stating in 
substance that only as an internal Labour Party issue is there 
evidence that the shared contribution concept was the subject of 
dispute^. Yet this same subject evoked considerable conflict in 
the United States prior to and during Congressional debate on 
Part II (unemployment insurance) which ultimately became the 
Social Security Act of 1935.
This issue of contribution sources constitutes an appropriate and 
convenient vehicle with which to illustrate in some detail a major 
dichotomy between British and American procedural concepts.
In Britain, the planning, drafting and development of the insurance
bill had been in the works long before it finally was introduced
to Parliament in 1911. As early as 1908, Winston Churchill and
Sir H Llewellyn Smith had made preliminary proposals on suitable
language for a bill in response to Lloyd George's insistence that
7
such legislation be brought to Parliament . Evidence shows that 
from the outset the concept of employer-employee shared contributions 
was incorporated into these and later versions of the bill. No 
evidence has been found that contribution sources which would 
exclude employees was ever envisaged by Government drafters.
In a speech to the British Association in Sheffield on 1 September 1910,
5. Gilbert, Bentley B. The Evolution of National Insurance in
Great Britain. London: Michale Joseph, 1966.




Sir H Llewellyn Smith outlined reasons for enactment of unemployment
insurance and the main principles upon which the bill was founded:
insurance must be compulsory, must be contributory, and must provide
a maximum limit to the amount of benefit. He concluded his
remarks by saying: "Our analysis, therefore, leads us step-by-step
to a national contributory scheme of insurance university in its Y
g
operation."
Beveridge mentions nothing in any of his works of an alternative 
employer-only, or employee-only source of contribution. Harris, in 
his 1977 biography of Beveridge, provides the most recent reflection 
of Beveridge's endorsement of the shared source concept: "In January 
1911 the details of the health scheme had still to be worked out, 
and a wide range of private interests had still to be placated.
Unemployment insurance on the other hand had been ready for legislation
for nearly two years. Its administrative structure had been carefully
worked out, and arrangements had been made to involve both capital 
and labour in the collection of contributions and management of
9
benefits".
Formal opportunities for Members of Parliament to raise questions 
concerning any of the procedures drafted into the bill began on 
4 May 1911 when Lloyd George, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
introduced the bill on the floor of the House of Commons. "I think 
it must be a relief to the Members of the House of Commons to turn 
from controversial questions for a moment to a question which, at 
any rate, has never been the subject of controversy between the
8. Smith, Sir H Llewellyn. Speech to British Association, 1 
September 1910, as reported in The Times, 2 September 1910.
9. Harris, Jose. William Beveridge. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1977 (underscoring for emphasis).
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parties in the state. Those parties are in general agreement as 
to the evil which has to be remedied... general agreement as to its 
urgency...general agreement as to the main proposals upon which 
the remedy ought to be based..."The Bill involves a compulsory 
deduction from the wages of all the employed classes who earn 
weekly wages... there will be a contribution from the employer and 
a further contribution from the state..."
The Times referred again to the non-controversial nature of Part II 
û.n November 1911^^: "An examination of the two shapes of the 
unemployment insurance scheme - as it went to the Standing Committee 
andas it has now come out - confirms the opinion expressed in these 
columns yesterday as to the care with which the scheme has been 
framed...though the opportunities for discussion were unlimited, 
the changes made prove to be very small". The changes mentioned 
raised benefits from 6 to 7 shillings per week, and reduced minimum 
age eligibility from 18 to 16 years.
When the Parliament cast its final vote on 4 December 1911, the 
bill passed with 188 ayes against 156 noes, with the requirement 
for employer and employee shared contributions intact.
The tranquility with which the bill was received by the Commons 
and by the public generally was not duplicated within the ranks 
of the Labour Party itself. There, the leadership was split and 
the issue of who should pay - or share - the cost. Grayson, Hall
10. Parliamentary Debates. Volume XXV, Fifth Series (May 1-May 19, 
1911).
11. The Times. 18 November 1911.
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12
and other "malcontents on the left of the labour alliance"
were prepared to oppose the bill outright because of their
dislike of the contributory feature. The Social Democrats joined
them against the contributory principle as it concerned workers,
13
and condemned it as 'mean, petty, and ridiculous'". Finally,
the official Labour position was announced in two Labour Leader
articles and, in spite of continuing intra-Party opposition,
advocated acceptance of the shared contributory concept to avoid
the tendency of lower-paid workers to regard themselves as objects
of state charity - as was feared would be the case if workers were
not required to contribute to their own unemployment benefit
insurance. When the contributory issue finally came to vote
within the Labour Party, the shared employer-employee concept was
14
approved by a vote of 223 to 44 . Some internal Party agitation
against worker contributions continued for a time, but effective, 
widespread resistance to it faded as the promise of the bill's 
overall advantages became better publicised and understood by the 
rank and file workers.
Almost a quarter-century later in the United States, during the 
planning discussions and official debates in the Congress on 
whether benefit funds should be financed through employer-only or 
shared contributions, there were more signs of visible controversy 
than had been the case in the United Kingdom. Unlike the UK 
concept, employer-only contributions appeared as the favoured mode 
by which benefit funds should be established, although the subject
12. Brown, K D. Labour and Unemployment, 1900-1914. Newton
Abbot, Devon; David & Charles, 1971.
13. Ibid.
14. Labour Leader. 16 and 22 June 1911.
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was classed as a "secondary i s s u e " . I n  1934, at the height of 
the depression when the effects of unemployment were so painfully 
evident throughout the nation. President Roosevelt created the 
Committee on Economic Security which, in turn, appointed a 23-man 
Advisory Council to draft a viable piece of unemployment insurance 
legislation. The Council was composed of prominent members of both 
labour and management ranks. Within the Council, after extended 
discussion, a majority voted against employee contributions and 
settled on the employer-only option, but left to states the choice 
of whether to include employees as well.
Records of Council meetings held in November 1934, indicate that 
a 5-member bloc of its employer-members felt so strongly in favour 
of shared employer-employee contributions as a compulsory provision 
of the bill that they wrote a separate dissenting opinion advocating 
them. This bloc believed that employee contributions would "make 
it possible to have more adequate benefits, as well as a more 
effective administration, since the workers would have a clearer 
conception of their responsibilities".^^ Although Council members 
agreed that, on the surface, employee contributions added to those 
of the employer would be seen as a fairer method, and would make 
employees more conscious of the fact that such benefits do not 
appear magically, two important disadvantages were outlined as 
present in a shared system. First, it was argued that workers 
could not afford the deduction from wages that a shared method would 
require since such a deduction would be in addition to that required 
by the social security portion (Part I) of the bill. Second,
15. Haber W and Murray, M G. Unemployment Insurance in the 
American Economy. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D Irwin, Inc., 
1966.
16. Economic Security Act Hearings. House of Representatives, 
74th Congress, 1st Session on HR 4120, 22 November 1934.
106
workers would consider that their contributions gave them
license for elective periods of absenteeism from the regular work
force in order to enjoy the benefits which they had already paid for.
Even a few American labour leaders subscribed to the shared
contribution concept on the groxiK^S that an employer-only system
would enable employers to exert greater influence on legislators
thah would be the case if employees were also a part of the funding 
17
base. According to a later account by a Committee member of the 
in-fighting which took place on this and other issues, the "secondary" 
issue discussed above faded in the face of the attractive feature 
that credit against the federal tax would be allowed employers for 
contributions made under a state unemployment compensation law, 
provided the state subscribed to basic federal requirements in 
the administration of that compensation. In the final debates in 
Congress prior to passage of the bill in 1935, the unemployment 
insurance (Part II) portion appeared to hold interest only because 
of the possibility that it might be declared unconstituional.
After Attorney General reassurances on the point , Part II glided 
through the Congress with as little questioning and open opposition 
as had been the case with its 1911 counterpart in the British 
Parliament. As mentioned previously, the federal unemployment 
insurance law permits employees to be taxed at the option of the 
state, yet only nine states have ever done so, and only three
17. Adams, Leonard P. Public Attitudes Toward Unemployment 
Insurance. Kalamazoo: The Upjohn Institute, 1971.
18. Eliot, Thomas. "The Social Security Act - 25 Years After". 
Atlantic Monthly, August 1960.
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19Alabama, Alaska and New Jersey - continue to do so now
Since the Act's passage, records do not indicate any concerted 
attempts for federal action to change the option of each state 
to choose between employer-only and a shared contribution system, 
nor is there any indication of interest in the matter at this time. 
Employers in certain states (Ohio, Hawaii and Colorado most 
recently) have made noises in that direction through various 
businessmen's associations, but no evidence has been found of 
national ground-swell in its favour.
Comparison of the British and American system of funding unemployment 
benefits makes clear that neither nation has modified its original 
legislative concept. Britain adheres to shared employer-employee 
contributions just as strongly as the USA (in all but three states) 
appears to support employer-only contributions. In Britain, unemployment 
benefits are funded as part of the overall national insurance 
contribution. Lacking a separate identity, contributions toward 
these benefits appear to generate little stir. The shared nature 
of contributions is perceived as a fair system by the British 
people. American employers in various states raise the issue from 
time to time, but there is no unified lobby in the national Congress 
pressing for adoption of a compulsory shared system. Without 
question, there is a palliative effect exerted on American employers'
19. In Alabama and New Jersey, employees are taxed in addition 
to their employers on the first $4,200 received from one or 
more employers in a calendar year. In Alaska, employees are 
taxed on the first $7,200. Employee contributions are 
deducted by the employers and remitted with their own 
contributions to the state agency. In Alabama the employee 
rate is 0.5% (employer’s rate is 3.6%) and is paid only when 
fund is below a state-established minimum amount. In Alaska, 
the employee rate is 0.6% (employer's 4.0%); in New Jersey 
employees pay 0.25% (employer's 4.6%). Source: US Department 
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1977.
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militancy on this issue because of the credits allowed them against 
up to 90 per cent of their federal tax for contributions made to 
state unemployment benefit programmes. In the absence of such a 
tax credit, it seems likely that American employers would seek 
more aggressively to modify the law so as to require employees 
share the costs of income maintenance for unemployed workers. The 
acceptance of long-standing custom on this point by employers and 
employees of each nation no doubt has some impact in retaining the 
status quo, although such influence is not susceptible to other 
than qualitative assessment. There is no reason to believe that 
either Britain or the USA will alter their current system of unemployment 
benefit contribution sources in the foreseeable future.
Funds: British Pooling; American Separate Identities
Unemployment insurance in Britain is one element of the total
national insurance package administered by the DHSS through the
DE, the latter agency in the role of providing direct-servicing to
claimants. The Collector of Taxes, Department of Inland Revenue
is the receiving agent for employer and employee contributions,
which are remitted by each employer. Under this system, the employer
withholds from each employee's weekly pay two types of contribution:
weekly increment of annual income tax, and national insurance. Both
employee and employer contributions are received by Inland Revenue,
20
according to instructions published by that Department . This 
arrangement brings both income tax and national insurance contributions 
into the hands of the Inland Revenue. That office then breaks out
20. Employer's Guide to PAYE. London: Department of Inland 
Revenue. April 1977.
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and transfers the insurance portion laterally to the DHSS which, 
in turn, provides funds to the DE for actual payment of unemployment 
benefits (see Figure 4.6). There is no budget formula governing 
internal apportionment or separation of insurance receipts among 
the sixty-odd types of DHSS benefits, except as may develop 
pragmatically. The insurance funds are thus pooled, allocated 
as required to the paying agencies - DE for unemployment benefits - 
and supplemented by government general funds in case of deficit.
This system of pooling clearly lends flexibility to the apportionment 
process, since funds are not identified with pre-determined 
expenditure limits for each specific benefit. Yet, one speculates, 
the advantage of internal flexibility may be offset by difficulties 
of control. Without formalised guidelines for benefit-by-benefit 
disbursements, administrators may become less exigent in 
scrutinizing claims filed and aj>pl ^ )*ng verification procedures before 
authorising payment. As a consequence, over-payments and unwarranted 
payments may occur over a period of time which, when ultimately 
revealed, become hot issues in Parliament and in the press. Just 
such a hot issue was precipitated by the Ninth Report of the 
Committee of Public Accounts, published 29 September 1977. This 
same Report is discussed in conjunction with "Attitudes" later in 
this study.
In the United States, unemployment insurance contributions are
maintained separately from all other funds at state and national
level. Employers make quarterly remittances to the state tax office
where they are credited to each employer's account in the state
unemployment trust fund. Each state then deposits that part of such
21
credits due the federal government to individual state accounts
21. Explanation of "credits due the federal government" is
included under the section of this study titled "Experience 
Rating".
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in the Federal Unemployment Trust Fund (FUTF) in Washington.
There, these credits flow into three sub-accounts: an employment
security account,for administrationcf federal-state job placement
programmes, the federal unemployment account, to provide non-interest
22
bearing loans to states with low reserves from which to pay benefits ;
and an extended unemployment compensation account, to reimburse 
states for the federal share of federal-state extended benefits 
during periods of unusually high state unemployment (see Figure 4.7). 
Use of these sub-accounts points up a greater rigidity of American 
allocation controls compared with those in the British system, and 
the corresponding lesser flexibility to re-apportion funds during 
periods of greater need in one sub-account area over another.
Such internal re-apportionment under US federal accounting procedures 
requires justification before the FUTF approving authority, rarely 
and grudgingly given. The effect of these tight controls is to require 
US budget planners and administrators to "live with" their estimates 
of dollar expenditures to the extent they are finally approved 
throughout a given fiscal year. Provision for routine mid-stream 
re-allocation of funds to meet unprogrammed requirements is not a 
well-oiled part of the system. While these constraining realities 
may compel US budgeters toward meticulous forecasting techniques, 
they do not provide reasonable latitude or machinery for shifting 
of funds in the face of necessity.
22. Since 1973, most states have been obliged to use federal loans 
to assure continuation of benefit payments, due to the rapid 
rise of general unemployment. The state of Hawaii, for 
example, owes the federal fund $22.5 million.
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Handling of Administrative Paperwork
An interesting comparison surfaces on the subject of British versus 
American paperwork operations. In the USA, each state designs and 
publishes its own administrative forms for use by employers in 
maintaining their records and to forward their contributions. An 
illustrative list of such forms used currently in the state of 
Hawaii is at Appendix 4 -A. This list applies to unemployment 
insurance only, thus is shorter than that at Appendix 5-B, which 
applies to Britain where employers must apply the full catalogue 
of income tax and national insurance record and claim forms. Yet, 
just as with his British counterpart, the American employer's 
administrative load does not end with unemployment insurance.
American employers are obligated to deduct from each employee's 
pay a number of state and federal taxes, and forward them according 
to a fixed time schedule to the appropriate tax office. Each of 
these demands a different set of forms for completion under its 
own set of instructions. For example, the American employer services 
each employee by withholding and forwarding state income tax to 
the state tax office, federal income tax to the federal Internal 
Revenue Service, unemployment insurance to the state unemployment 
insurance office, federal and state social security (old age pension) 
taxes separately to federal and state receiving agencies, private 
group medical and dental insurance premiums, if any, and any additional 
employee-authorised payroll deductions such as bank allotments, 
life insurance premiums, annuities, bond purchases and the like to 
specific addresses. In terms of administrative complexity and 
man-hours required from the employer and his staff - at employer 
expense - for discharge of insurance and service-related obligations 
to employees, the American employer appears to pay a heavy price to
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preserve the outward signs of state sovereignty while responding 
to federal mandates. Sears Roebuck recently complained that no 
less than 72 separate forms were used annually to satisfy the aggregate 
of local, state, federal and employee-elected administrative 
requirements for each of its thousands of employees. By contrast, 
the 25 forms used by British employers uniformly throughout the 
United Kingdom reflect a more efficient, co-ordinated and less 
costly administrative pattern.
Experience Rating
"Experience Rating" is a procedural area in the American system
for which there is no parallel in Britain. Experience rating places
the major burden of financing unemployment benefits on those employers
who achieve the least stability within their workforce; correspondingly,
employers who maintain employee equilibrium pay a reduced payroll
tax.
When the whole subject of unemployment insurance was being debated 
prior to the enactment of the Social Security Act of 1935, three 
arguments supported inclusion of experience rating as an element 
of the proposed legislation. First, based on the generally accepted 
concept in the United States that employers should finance unemployment 
benefits, experience rating would exert direct pressure on the 
individual employer to manage his business in such a way as to avoid 
turbulence in this workforce. Second, experience rating would give 
employers a collateral interest in identifying and preventing 
claimant abuses to the system. Third, since unemployment benefits 
are a part of the true, social costs of production, prices to consumers
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should reflect these costs as integral parts of a free, competitive
price system. According to Joseph Becker: "It is certain that
the cost of unemployment benefits constitutes an added incentive
to statilise employment, and it is certain that some employers have
some degree of control over the pattern of employment. It is
therefore certain that experience rating is a force, pervasive and
continuous, working in the direction of employment stabilisation.
But the exact strength of this force is a matter of conjecture.
All that can be said is that, other things being equal, it is better
to have a force which works with rather than against the economy
23
in the pursuit of full employment".
There were counter-arguments as well which pointed up certain 
undesirable aspects of experience rating: first, employers would 
have just as much incentive to keep benefit levels low if payroll 
taxes were uniform instead of variable, and might encourage greater 
unity among employers because division between high cost and low 
cost employers' experience rating would not exist; second, experience 
rating poses a threat to state unemployment fund solvency, since 
each state enjoys freedom to vary its tax rates. High unemployment 
coupled with an otherwise stable workforce might deplete state 
benefit funds faster than the reduced tax base could provide 
replacement input. Just such a situation hÆ occurred in many states 
since 1973.
In this connection, it should be remembered that the Social 
Security Act does not compel, but permits, experience rating to 
be used by the states. In fact, not all states took advantage of
23. Becker, Joseph M S J. Twenty-five Years of Unemployment 
Insurance. Kalamazoo: The W E Upjohn Institute, 1961.
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that option until 1948 - when Mississippi amended its law to include 
it.
Operation of experience rating by states, as outlined in the 
federal legislation, allowed employers a lowered rate of contribution 
if the tax rates were based on not less than 3 years of "experience 
with respect to unemployment or other factors bearing a direct 
relation to unemployment risk". The 3-year requirement was changed 
in 1954 to permit 1-year's experience, but 14 states still observe 
the original 3-year term within their specific state laws. The 
state of Delaware requires a 4-year experience term. Within that 
period, the employer must accumulate and maintain in his state's 
Trust Fund account a specified reserve sum before his rate is 
reduced; then rates are assigned by the state tax office to employers 
at the beginning of each subsequence tax year. Currently, all 
state systems provide that no employer will be granted a rate 
reduction unless over the years he contributes more to the fund 
than his workers draw in benefits. At Appendix 4-C is an excerpt from 
the Hawaii employers' handbook illustrating operation of experience 
rating in that state.
Experience rating remains a highly controversial topic on the 
American scene. It is also very firmly established practice.
There appears little indication that either the practice or the 
principle governing it will be modified to any significant degree 
in the foreseeable future. As an incentive measure for employers 
to manage effectively, in order to reduce seasonal fluctuations 
in numbers of workers needed through changes in marketing, 
purchasing, production and distribution policies, experience rating 
is expected to endure despite periodic murmers advocating mutation.
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British and American Eligibility and Related Standards
This procedural area includes many points of agreement between 
the British and typical American state systems concerning claimant 
eligibility and related standards. The British system has the 
distinct general advantage of ready manageability due to its uniform 
application throughout the United Kingdom. Within the United States, 
states which participate as partners in the federal-state system 
- all states currently do so - national standards are imposed under 
the Social Security Act primarily in the area of financing. Hence, 
in the USA each state has established different standards for benefit 
eligibility in keeping within-state views and conditions. Differences 
range from slight to marked, but all standards are common as to 
type and purpose.
In both nations there is measurement of the worker's demonstrated
attachment to the labour force as an element of eligibility for
benefits. Currently, in Britain, that element is determined for
the standard rate of benefit by the requirement that the claimant
must have contributed on earnings of at least £750 during the
24
"relevant tax year" . In the USA, states differ in the amount 
which a claimant must have earned and the period of such earnings; 
generally, total earnings required range from $150 (Hawaii) to 
$800 (Illinois) during the course of the previous four calendar 
quarters.
24. The "relevant tax year" ends on 5 April before the "benefit
year" in which the period of interruption of employment which 
includes a claim begins. A "benefit year" starts on the 
first Sunday in January of each year. Source: DE and DHSS 
documents and interviews.
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Both nations require that a claimant be able, willing and available 
for work and free from disqualification for such acts as voluntary 
quitting without just cause, misconduct connected with the work 
and refusal of suitable work. Within the above requirements, 
both Britain and all states within the United States oblige claimants 
to register at their nearest Employment Service Office (same title 
in both countries) as a declaration of being "able, willing and 
available". These Employment Offices serve as a clearing house 
between employers and job-seekers for the purpose of matching 
job vacancies with qualified workers who are unemployed. Some 
American states provide that a claimant must be available for 
"suitable" work; others incorporate the concept of suitability for 
the individual claimant in terms of work in his usual occupation, 
or for which he is reasonably fitted by training and experience.
In Britain, suitability is defined officially as a job in the 
claimant's normal line of work. However, if unemployment persists, 
other types of work may be declared suitable provided wages and 
working conditions are acceptable to the appropriate trade union 
covering the type of work concerned.
Variations in the interpretation of "suitable" work by individuals, 
employers and labour organisations make this term a highly volatile 
property, subject to parochial definition. Labour union involvement 
in determination of "suitability" appears more the rule in Britain 
than in the United States, where individual state law sets forth 
the conditions of "suitable" work.
Another area of general British-American agreement is that claimants 
must file for benefits in person and that they must confirm their 
continued eligibility to the UBO at designated intervals. In
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Britain, a concession to this rule is made when a claimant lives 
more than 10 miles from his UBO; in such cases claims may be 
handled by mail. Otherwise all claimants are required to file the 
initial claim in person and report back to the UBO each week at a 
specified time and day for "signing" to declare continued unemployment 
status and eligibility to receive benefits. A test of "fortnightly 
signing" within certain UBO jurisdictions in Britian was conducted 
in 1977-78 to determine the feasibility of its general adoption.
Under the test system, claimants signed in person at the UBO at 
two-week intervals; they were paid benefits for one week in arrears 
and one week in advance. Commenting on the test, officials in London 
and Bristol (the latter a region in which several UBO's were involved 
in the test) applauded the advantages of less daily traffic 
congestion in each UBO, while expressing anxiety over the prospect 
of increased fraud because of the one-week-in-advance payment 
feature. Without exception, however, they thought that in times 
of high unemployment the fortnightly signing offered sufficient 
practical advantages to over-ride the risk of increased fraud.
Similarly, in many American states there are UBO premises too 
small to accommodate the heavy claimant traffic that high unemployment 
brings. Most such states have long since (1973) modified weekly 
signing to two-week intervals. Of these, almost all have gone to 
mail re-confirmation of unemployment status. The lack of control 
in such a system is readily apparent. After a time, according to 
responsible benefits officials in California, New York, Mississippi, 
and Hawaii, verification of claimants' continued eligibility becomes 
virtually perfunctory and fraud may go undetected for a long time 
before it is discovered. Administrators in both Britain and the 
United States agree that fortnightly signing enables them to
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concentrate on those claimants with special problems, while routine 
claims are processed on the basis of good faith. The administrative 
trade-off in which efficient processing during periocb of high 
unemployment can be assured only by accepting a greater risk of 
fiddling by claimants appears common to both nations.
Similarities: Disqualification
Aside from minor administrative cosmetics, both the British and
American state systems are in agreement on the following major 
25
conditions which either deny or delay benefit payments to claimants
when they :
a. will take only certain kinds of work, request more 
wages than others are being paid for the same kind of 
work, will work only for certain employers and only 
during certain hours or days of the week.
b. are sick or otherwise unable to work, unless supported 
by a doctor's certificate to that effect.
c. quit without just cause, refused or failed to apply for 
or accept suitable work.
d. are out of work because of active participation in a 
labour dispute, or are receiving benefits under another 
employment security law.
25. Source: analysis of relevant British and American claimant 
regulations, supplemented by interviews with appropriate 
officials. British : Leaflet NI 12 (January 1977) and Leaflet 
NI 196 (April 1977) and related forms; Interviews: ESA and 
UBO Trowbridge, Bath, London (June-September 1977). American: 
state regulations for New York, Mississippi, Colorado, California, 
Illinois and Hawaii; Interviews: benefits agencies in Buffalo 
(NY), Jackson (Miss), Denver and Aspen (Colo), Sacramento (Calif), 
Elgin (111) and Honolulu (April 1976-May 1977).
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Significant Differences: Disqualification
Significant differences exist between the British and typical 
American state systems on the following points:
b. Imprisonment. In Britain, disqualification is automatic 
when a claimant "is detained or imprisoned in legal 
custody". Although like disqualification is usual in 
the United States, it does not appear as part of formal 
regulations in every state. Interviews reveal that the 
concept in some states is to insure income maintenance 
for prisoners' families while short (up to 3 months) 
sentences are being served by the claimant. Britidi law, 
therefore, appears uncompromising in automatically 
disqualifying claimants and their families from unemployment 
benfits when inprisonment is involved. However, the 
British system provides for prisoners' families under 
a different benefit pattern, that of Supplementary 
Benefits among others.
b. Absence from home, thus unavailable to accept job offer.
In Britain, absence from Great Britain, Northern Ireland
i>Ê.and the Isle of Man may^entitled benefits for up to 4 
weeks provided claimant is absent-fôr the purpose of 
looking for work in another country of the European 
Economic Community, provided further that permission to 
do so has been obtained from the appropriate UBO.
All US states disqualify claimants definitively who are 
absent from their official domicile at any time during a 




Disqualification of claimants from receiving unemployment benefits 
is an element of both the British and United States systems.
Earlier in this g+udy some of the salient reasons and conditions of 
claimant disqualification have been compared. Further sanctions 
under criminal law applicable to claimants suspected of fraud are 
covered in a later o± this study, along with those which apply
to employers involved as accessories to collusion. Although the 
thrust of eligibility and compliance regulations in both countries 
clearly points to the claimant as a more likely potential wrong-doer 
than is an employer, each country has legislation for subjecting 
the latter to punitive discipline. Comparisons in the following 
paragraphs illustrate differences between British and American 
specific penalties which may be applied against employers who offend 
against administrative regulations; mentioned too is the relative 
severity of those penalties on the employer.
As stated earlier, the British system requires employer and employee 
contributions for income tax and national insurance to be remitted 
monthly by the employer to the Department of Inland Revenue. That 
Department then transfers the national insurance portion to the DHSS 
which, in turn, allocates unemployment benefit funds to the DE for 
payment. Inland Revenue and DHSS each publish instruction manuals 
for employer use in satisfying the full range of administrative 
procedures, including records maintenance, calculation of deductions 
and remittance schedules.
26
With respect to employer penalties, the Inland Revenue Guide places
26. Employer's Guide to PAYE (Chapter 1, paragraphs 2 and 3). 
Department of Inland Revenue, April 1977.
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in top priority the declaration that it is the employer's duty to
deduct income tax and that he "may incur liability to penalties"
through failure to do so. Following immediately is assertion of the
right by officers of the Inland Revenue to inspect the employer's
records to insure that the correct amounts of tax are being deducted
and paid over to the Department. Employers are required to pay
contributions within 14 days after the end of the month during which
the deductions should have been made. This Guide, however, does
not specify the penalties to which a recalcitrant employer may be
subjected. Such penalties appear in locally-published forms as
part of a formal letter requesting immediate payment of delinquent 
27
contributions.
Employer ron-compliance typically elicits a reminder from the 
Department, or several reminders if contributions are not forth­
coming. In extreme cases penalties up to £50 may be levied by 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue or a court and, if the failure 
continues after such levy has been made, a further penalty of up 
to £10 per day may be imposed. In cases where an employer furnishes 
incorrect information in connection with investigation of non-compliance, 
a penalty of up to £500 may result.
DHSS: Obstruction of Inspectors and Failure to Remit
The DHSS is forthright in the specific penalties which may be 
imposed for employer failure to comply with instructions contained 
in the DHSS "Employer's Guide to National Insurance Contributions". 
Aside from the use of the work "must" in listing employer actions
27. Form P42 (Bath) and interviews with Collector of Taxes (Bath)
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no less than a dozen times in the overall text of these instructions, 
Part 16 of that publication ("National Insurance Inspectors, Offences 
and Confidentiality") describes in detail the power of national 
insurance inspectors to enter employer premises for examination of 
any pertinent documents and interrogation of personnel concerned 
with assuring employer compliance. Penalties imposed on conviction 
of obstruction of inspectors or failure to pay contributions are 
restricted to monetary fines of up to £50 for each offence. Further, 
any person who refuses or neglects to answer questions, give 
information or produce documents is liable to a find of £10 for 
each offence. These fines are, of course, levied in addition to 
the requirement to pay in full any national insurance amounts due.
Delayed Employer Responses to UBO Queries
There is another area of employer non-compliance which should be
discussed in this general area, that of excessive delay or wilful
refusal by employers to respond to UBO queries relevant to benefit
claims filed by former employees. Within 24 hours after a claimant
files for benefits, the UBO sends a query form to the former employer
for details on duration of claimant's employment, reason for leaving,
and the like requesting that employer return the completed form
as soon as possible. No specific time limit for reply is stated
in the query (see Appendix D), although a week to ten days is
considered reasonable by officials in those UBO's contacted in this 
28
regard . If an employer does not reply within this informal time­
frame, the UBO makes one or more follow-up reminders by letter;
28. Bath, Bristol, Trowbridge, Reading, Inverness, Swindon, London,
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ultimately a personal visit to such an employer is made by UBO
personnel in an effort to elicit the necessary information on which
29
to base claimant eligibility for benefits
There are no formalised penalties imposed on employers who either
neglect or refuse to supply information on former employees to UBO's.
30
UBO staff personnel in seven different locations stated, in 
substance, than when employers fail to co-operate with UBO's, only 
informal means exist by which compliance may be achieved. These 
means consist of "dropping the word" to an employer that continued 
unwillingness to supply information may lead to a detailed examination 
of his records by DHSS inspectors. The implied threat is clear 
that such an examination can be expected to reveal inaccuracies which, 
even if no penalties are appropriate, will certainly cause some 
disruption to normal administrative routine and discomfj4ure. to 
the employer. An impending inspection in itself constitutes a 
threat since most employers feel it is virtually impossible to 
maintain contributions records in such pristine condition as to 
be unassailable in any way by a determined inspector.
Discussion of the lack of formal means to insure employer response 
with UBO personnel and with DE staff at Departmentel level indicates 
general toleration of this situation. The usual reaction was that 
current informal means - friendly persuasion - appear sufficient 
to bring recalcitrant employers into line, therefore why legislate 
a formal penalty? These personnel indicate further that not much 
trouble is encoutered in this area, that employers as a group
29. Benefits to claimants are paid on the basis of information 
supplied by them on the claim until verification is received 
from UBO query to employer. Thus, claimants are not penalised 
by employer failure to reply.
30. Bath, Bristol, etc. loc. cit.
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co-operate promptly with UBO queries. The salient point here is 
that, in the absence of legal obligation to respond to UBO queries 
concerning former employees, employers must be intimidated to do so 
in order that claimants’ legal eligibility for such benefits can 
be verified. It is a paradoxical situation wHch currently requires 
border-line legal means to achieve a legal objective.
In the United States, penalties imposed on employers for failure 
to file or pay state or federal income tax are separate from the 
unemployment insurance contribution system. Such penalties are 
progressively more severe as the amount of tax due and duration of 
payment delinquency increases, and include heavy fines and/or 
periods of imprisonment at the outer end of the penalty spectrum.
With respect to unemployment insurance contributions, all American 
states levy specific counterpart penalties for the same general
31types of employer-non-complicant discussed under the British system. 
These penalties operate to oblige employer promptness in remitting 
contributions (quarterly, instead of monthly as in the British system) 
to the state agency and filing of Wage and Separation Reports to 
assist in verification of a former employee's claim for benefits.
Each of these penalty areas is discussed briefly in the following 
paragraphs.
USA: Obstruction of Inspectors and Failure to Remit
Each state operates its own field audit system under which auditors
31. Obstruction of inspectors, failure to remit, and delayed replies 
to UBO queries.
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examine all employers- accounts periodically. These accounts may 
be selected at random by industry, area, or employer. Records are 
audited in individual cases where there appears to be discrepancies 
in reporting. The penalties for employer "fiddling" to avoid 
payment of just contributions range from fines up to $200, imprisonment 
up to 60 days, or both.
While there is some variance among the states on punitive measures 
employed against late-paying employers, a typical penalty levied 
in such cases is 10 per cent of the total contribution due plus 
interest thereon at the rate of two-thirds of one per cent on the 
total contribution and penalty amount for any month or fraction of 
a month during which an employer is delinquent. Such delinquencies 
date from the 21st day (in most states) following the end of a 
calendar quarter. The monetary impact of this penalty can be better 
appreciated by the following example of a delinquent employer whose 
workforce numbers 100 persons, each of whom is paid $500 per month, 
on which the employer is taxed a per capita 3 per cent of gross 
earniigs for unemployment insurance. Thus, a monthly payroll of £50,000, 
a quarterly payroll of £150,000 on which the tax is $4,500 when paid 
promptly. If this employer is delinquent for 30 days before he pays 
the contribution, his penalty would be calculated as follows:
$4,500 plus $450 (10% of contribution) plus $32.67 (interest on 
$4,500 for the 30-day delinquency), for a total of $4,982.67, of 
which £482.67 (£267) is penalty. For each day of lesser delinquency 
periods, there is an automatic fine of not less than $10.
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Delayed Employer Responses to UBO Queries
The administrative process in general use among the American states 
to verify eligibility of claimants through contact with their former 
employers is similar to that used in the United Kingdom. Each 
claimant's most recent employer is queried by the claimant's UBO 
for pertinent information regarding the conditions under which he 
left work. Theemployer must reply within 5 days (7 in some states) 
from the postmarked date of mailing from the UBO. Failure to do 
so causes an assessment of $10 against the employer which, if reply 
is not immediately forthcoming, may be increased up to $200 and/or 
imprisonment up to 60 days, or both. These penalties are in addition 
to charges made against the employer's account in the state trust 
fund equal to any over-payments which may have been made to the 
claimant due to employer's failure to reply promptly.
Comparison of the British system of employer penalties with that 
used typically in an American state reveals strong similarity in 
purpose, but marked difference in severity. The British system 
imposes monetary fines of up to £50 and makes no provision for 
imprisonment. A typical American state may impose monetary fines 
of up to four times the British maximum, and imprisonment up to 
sixty days - or both - for the same types of employer failure.
Emergency Procedures
Emergency procedures in the United Kingdom and the United States 
are similar in purpose: to respond promptly and effectively to mass 
layoffs which render unusually large numbers of workers jobless.
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As is true with all other applications of the unemployment benefits 
system in Britain, emergency procedures are initiated in accordance 
with nationally-developed criteria. By contrast, each American state 
is left to develop procedures, or not, with which to handle sudden 
dramatic rises in claimant traffic as it wishes; there is no national 
criteria or mandate for state actions in such contingencies.
In Britain, the DE has maintained for many years a special branch
(Branch "D") in the Manpower General Division which, among its other
tasks, designs, reviews and updates procedures to meet the various 
32
emergency needs . As concerns mass layoffs. Branch "D" envisions 
such possibilities primarily within a limited geographical area 
wherein some economic, labour or climatic condition has exerted 
a crippling effect on industry.- Or, it may be of a more extensive, 
multi-regional nature causing wholesale layoff of workers from 
several industries. The most exaggerated case would involve runaway 
layoffs of a national scale. In any of these eventualities, there is 
an imperative need for continuity in income maintenance payments 
for those already on the register and prompt action to serve those 
just thrust into that status. Branch "D" does not publicise these 
emergency measures, feeling that to do so might suggest a sort of 
"doomsday" approach, or even be seen to precipitate an emergency 
situation.
While no national office exists in the United States to accomplish 
Branch "D"-type tasks, the same rationale and imperatives are 
acknowledged in substance by all states that they may react positively 
to mass claimant filing.
32. Interviews: Department of Employment, Manpower General Division, 
London, 27 July-19 August 1977.
128
Since "emergency" procedures are categorised as of temporary nature, 
neither the UK nor the USA benefit offices are staffed routinely 
with personnel sufficient in number to respond to needs which may
33never, or only infrequently, materialise. Both British and American 
local administrators are authorised to hire part-time help as needed 
throughout the period of emergency. Long-term hires during extended 
period of high claimant activity require approval from higher 
authority - regional and national in the case of Britain, state-level 
in the case of American states.
The most recent test of emergency unemployment benefits procedures
in Britain occurred in 1974 during the miner’s strike. The British
Government was obliged to impose severe restrictions on consumption
of energy during the period of the strike. Electricity was reduced to
a few hours per day for private homes; commercial enterprises were
required to observe 3-day work weeks. Within a 6-week period after
the beginning of the strike, unemployment skyrocketed from 900,000
to nearly 2,300,000. DE prior planning yielded emergency procedures
which were called into play to cope with the overnight avalanche
of claimants. The key element during that time was the enlistment
of employers and their normal administrative staff as auxilliaries
to local UBO's. For participating employers, additional energy was
authorised each to compensate for that consumed by benefits-related
administration. Effectively, each employer assumed the responsibilities
of a branch-UBO for his own workers who were, by Government decree,
unable to work for two or three days of the normal work weeks.
According to DE sources in London, a collateral benefit accrued
intangibly to the general employer image since he, in the eyes of
33. Interviews: Employment Security administrators: Hawaii,
Colorado, New York, Ohio, Mississippi, Illinois, January- 
May 1978.
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employees, was seen to respond to their needs during a time of crisis. 
The local UBO staff, augmented where necessary with temporary help, 
provided advice and training to employers and their staff personnel 
on an "as-needed" basis. Certain procedures were streamlined, 
and simplified forms used to render them more easily handled by non­
professional administrators. The success of these emergency procedures 
was well-publicised in the media during and after the termination 
of the strike.
Not unexpectedly, the extent of detailed planning for emergencies
in each American state is directly proportionate to the perceived
likelihood that events in that region might require them. Although
all states profess to have such emergency procedures on their books,
34
at least three states among the total number queried on this
subject or visited directly were unable to produce written evidence
of it. For example, the claims officer at Hawaii's Department of
Labor and Industrial Relations searched the operations manual without
success before stating that, although she was sure she had seen it
at sometime in the past, it was not present then. Conversely, two
of the other states queried, Colorado and Mississippi, produced
detailed plans for coping with runaway claims traffic. Colorado's 
35Robert D Hase stated that his state occasionally experiences mass 
layoffs in the Colorado Fuel and Iron Works (CF&I), one of the 
state's largest employers. In February 1978, a layoff of some 3,000 
workers was imminent and plans were activated to provide for the 
sudden rush of unemployment benefit claims. Colorado has 35 local 
offices throughout the state, organised into four areas under direction
34. New York, Illinois, Mississippi, Colorado, California, Nevada, 
Ohio and Hawaii.
35. Hase, Robert D, Director, Unemployment Insurance, Colorado. 
Letter, 27 February 1978.
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of four area managers. Through this network, local managers are 
generally able to receive advance notice of a CF&I-type situation. 
The Colorado emergency procedures, according to the state Director 
of Unemployment Insurance, are patterned closely after the British 
system: co-ordination effected with employer to implement a mass 
claims-taking effort at the job-site; claimant traffic flow is 
regulated into the Job Service Center (British UBO) in manageable 
numbers ; claims forms and administrative procedures are reduced to 
bare essentials to expedite the formalities of the claims process 
and insure prompt payment. The emergency plan in Mississippi 
approximates closely the Colorado plan.
In sum, the British system is uniformly applied as needed throughout 
the Kingdom, with latitude accorded local UBO managers to use 
streamlined administrative procedures, and to insure prompt response 
to sudden increases in claimant traffic. Dissimilarly, the American 
system at the federal level has no provisions for such emergencies; 
each state develops them according to its own precepts. Purposes 
of such procedures are common to both nations. Thus, the salient 
difference between the British and American systems lies in the 
non-involvement on a formal basis of the U.S. federal government, 
and on the consequent non-uniformity of emergency procedures per se 
among the states. The American rationale is that, barring a repeat 
of the Great Depression, wholesale unemployment on a nationwide 
scale is so unlikely as not to require federal emergency plans.
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Figure 4,i
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT GROUP ORGANISATION CHART (1977)
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Source: A Guide to the DE Group. Information Directorate of the 
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Source: A Guide to the DE Group. Information Directorate of the
Department of Employment, May 1977.
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Figure 4.3
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Source: A Guide to the DE Group. Information Directorate of the
Department of Employment, May 1977.
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Figure 4.4
MANPOWER SERVICES COMMISSION (1977)
COMMISSION 
10 Commissioners
Employment Service Agency Training Services Agency
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Source: A Guide to the DE Group. Information Directora of the
Department of Employment, May 1977
Figure 4.5
ACTIVITIES AND FUNCTIONS RETAINED FOR DE-LEVEL ADMINISTRATION (1977)
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LIST OF FORMS FOR USE BY EMPLOYERS IN THE STATE OF HAWAII
1. Report to Determine Liability (as a taxable employing unit).
2. Notice to Workers (information to workers on benefit rights
- displayed at the workplace by employer).
3. Quarterly Contribution Report.
4. Employment and Payroll Data of employers with Establishments
on Different Islands or Engaged in Different Industrial 
Activity (not unique to Hawaii since several states 
include off-shore islands within state borders.)
5. Wage and Separation Report (due within 5 working days after
date of mailing from claimant's UBO).
6. Notice of Contribution Assessment or Credit Adjustment
(sent to employers for above purposes by UBO).
7. Claim for Refund of Contributions Paid (cash refund claim
by employers who have terminated their business 
enterprise).
8. Waiver of Employer's Experience Record (for use in




LIST OF FORMS FOR USE BY EMPLOYERS. INCOME TAX AND INSURANCE 
CONTRIBUTIONS (UNITED KINGDOM)
1. Notice to employer of code or amended code.
2. PAYE Tax Tables and Deduction Cards.
3. Return of expenses payment fees, bonuses for an employee
to whom P H D  is not applicable.
4. Deduction Card (Pll) for both weekly and monthly paid employees
5. Return of payments, benefits to or for directors and certain
employees.
6. Deduction Card (PllS) where the arrangement in para 13 is
adopted.
7. Covering Form to be issued with Deduction Cards before
beginning of the year.
8. Covering Form to be used with Supplementary issue of Deduction
Cards.
9. Covering Form to be issued with Deduction Cards to a new
employer.
10. Remittance Card.
11. Payslip - employer's remittances.
12. Employer's requisition form.
13. Employer's Annual Statement, Declaration and Certificate.
14. Notes for guidance on completion of form P35.
15. Employer's Supplementary Return.
16. Students employed during vacation: declaration by employer
and statement by student.
17. Return of persons employed by non-resident employers.
18. Particulars of employee leaving, employer's certificate.





LIST OF FORMS FOR USE BY EMPLOYERS, INCOME TAX AND INSURANCE 
CONTRIBUTIONS (UNITED KINGDOM) Continued
20. Employer's application for authority to refund tax exceeding
£50 to new employee.
21. Authority to refund tax exceeding £50 to new employee.
22. Refund during unemployment: employee's application.
23. Employer's certificate of pay and tax deductions to be given
to employee at end of year.
24. Notification of retirement of an employee to whom a pension
is paid by the employer.
25. Pamphlet "Income Tax: Notes on Expenses, Payments and Benefits
for Directors and Certain Employees".
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APPENDIX 4-C
Operation of Experience Rating in Hawaii
"...an employer may be eligible for a reduced rate if certain 
conditions are met. A new employer normally will pay the standard 
rate of 3.5 per cent unless he has taken over the experience record 
of a pre-decessor employer. When his account has been chargeable 
with benefits for the twelve-month period prior to his rate 
computation date (December 31st), he will be eligible for a reduced 
rate. Depending upon the condition of the Unemployment Trust 
Fund, one of the three contribution schedules will be applicable 
for a given calendar year. The lowest rates for schedules I, II, 
and III are .8%, 14% and .2% respectively. The maximum rate for 
all three schedules is 3.5%.
Rates are computed for eligible employers at the beginning of 
each year. In March, employers will be furnished an "Experience 
Rating Tabulation". On the form will be shown the wage and contri­
bution data of employer for the last three years and the reserve 
balance. Employers should compare the data with their records 
and verify the computation of the contribution rate. Any increase 
in taxable wages or decrease in the reserve due to benefit charges 
may result in rate increases.
Upon checking the data, if employer finds an error in computation 
or discrepancy in. the wage data reported, application for review 
and re-determination should be submitted to the Division in writing, 
setting forth the reasons, within 15 days from mailing of the 
notice.




or business, or substantially all the assets of another employer 
who was a subject employer at the time of the transfer, may 
acquire the contribution rate and experience record of the pre­
decessor employer. Form UC86 (Waiver of Employer’s Experience 
Record) relinquishing all the rights of pre-decessor's prior 
record to the successor must be signed by both pre-decessor and 
successor employers. Forms must be filed within 60 days of the 
transfer of business and all contributions and reports (contribution 
and wage separation) due from the pre-decessor must be cleared within 
the same 60-day period. If employer fails to file Form UC86 
within the 60 days after the transfer of business, it may be filed 
by March 1st of the following year at which time the experience 
records of the pre-decessor and successor will be combined in 
determining the rate for the successor for the new calendar year.
If there were more than one pre-decessor employer and their rates 
were the same, the successor’s rate will be the same. However, 
if the rates of the predecessors were not the same, the successor
must pay at the standard rate of 3.5 per cent until the next
determination of rates when the combined experience records are 
used to determine a new rate.’’
Note ; due to the $22.5 debt owed to the Federal Unemployment Account 
of the Federal Unemployment Trust Fund, the Hawaii legislature sus­
pended experience rating in 1976 and 1977 as a means of reducing the
amount of this obligation. At least eight other states have done the
same thing for the same reason.
Source: A Handbook for Employers. Unemployment Insurance Division, 
Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, Unemployment 
Insurance Division, State of Hawaii.
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A claim for unemployment benefit has been made by the person named 
below who says that he was recently employed by you. To enable 
the claim to be properly determined, will you please answer the 
questions on the back of this form and return it as soon as possible 
using the enclosed addressed label.
The claimant's right to benefit may be affected if:-
(a) he lost his employment through his misconduct.
"Misconduct" includes such matters as breaches of 
discipline or works rules, or conduct which is 
inconsistent with the fulfilment of conditions of 
employment, or which prevents an employee from 
performing his work efficiently; or
(b) he refused or failed to accept suitable employment; or
(c) he left his employment voluntarily without just cause; or
(d) he lost employment by reason of a stoppage of work which
was due to a trade dispute; or
(e) he receives a payment either in lieu of notice or in 
lieu of the remuneration which he would have received 
had his employment not been terminated.
If it appears that benefit is not payable for any such reason, your 
reply will be put before the Statutory Authorities who adjudicate 
on claims for benefit and may also be shown to the claimant and 
to any person or body representing him for the purposes of his claim.







2. National Insurance Number
3. Address at which employed (if different from above)
4. Department/Name of foreman.
Check/Clock No,
5. Capacity in which employed
UB 85 (Env. EDE 58)
ooOOoo
Please answer all relevant questions
l.(a) Is the period of employment 
stated by the claimant from
....... to............ correct?
If not, please give correct 
period.
(b) Did he ordinarily work from 
Monday to Saturday inclusive 
each week?
(c) On which day(s) did he NOT 
ordinarily work?
(a)  (Yes or No)
From......... to...... »
....(last day actually worked)
(b) ................ (Yes or No)
(if answer is "No", please 
answer question (c))
(c) .......................
2.(a) Did you discharge the
claimant: if so, on what 
date?
(b) If so, was he discharged 
because of unsatisfactory 
conduct of any kind?
(c) If so, please give full 
details of the incident(s) 
which led to his discharge
(d) If you discharged him because 
of redundancy, did you offer 
him alternative employment?
(e) If so, please give full details 
of the alternative employment 
offered.
(a)  (Yes or No) .
From........ to.........
(last day actually worked)
(b)  (yes or No)
(c)
(d) ........... (Yes or No)
(e)
3. If the claimant left your
employment voluntarily what 
reason did he give?
APPENDIX 4-D'
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4. If the claimant was discharged
because of unsatisfactory 
conduct or left your employment 
voluntarily :
(a) would the employment otherwise 
  have lasted for at least another
six weeks?
(b) If not, until what date would 
it probably have lasted?




5.(a) To what period of notice was he 
entitled? (This is the period 
provided by his contract of 
service, or any redundancy 
arrangements, or the minimum 
period provided by the Contract 
of Employment Act 1973, which­
ever is longer).
(b) Was notice given and if so 
when?
(c) Has any payment (in money or 
kind) been made, or is any 
payment to be made in respect 
of the termination?
If so what is the gross amount 
or value of the payment?
How much (if any) of that amount 
is in lieu of notice, or of the 
remuneration that would have 
been paid if the employment had 
not been terminated?
(b)  (Yes or No)
on.............. (date)
(c)  (Yes or No)
6 . "Service" contracts or agreements 
only: has the claimant claimed or 
received or will he receive any 
payment (in money or kind) 
because of the cancellation of a 
service contract/agreement?
.............. (Yes or No)
If the answer is "Yes", 
please state details 
separately and any 










COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN INCIDENCE AND CONTROL OF FRAUD
The terms "wrongful claim", "abuse", and "fraud" as they apply 
to unemployment benefits are similarly defined in the United Kingdom 
and the United States. "Wrongful claim" describes a benefit claim 
to which the claimant is found not to be entitled, and embraces 
both abuse and fraud. All claims are examined by staff of the 
Department of Employment (DE) in the United Kingdom, and by a similar 
agency of each state in the United States to assure legitimacy of 
the claim before payments begin, thus attempting to defend a priori 
against claims being "wrongful" in some way.
Yet there are claims which, while wrongful, are nevertheless filed 
in good faith by claimants who are either unaware of or mistaken 
as to qualification standards. For example, a claim filed by a 
person whose eligibility has expired, but who believes at the time 
of filing that his eligibility is still valid, is wrongful. In such 
an instance, although wrongful, there is no indication that the 
claim was filed with intent to obtain benefits through deceit; thus, 
neither "abuse" or "fraud" is an appropriate accusation.
Abuse and fraud are used as interchangeable terms colloquially 
in both nations, yet there is an important distinction between them 
from the administrators' point of view. Abuse of the system may 
occur within the letter of the law, but actually be the result of 
a claimant contriving an opportunity to receive benefits. This is 
a troublesome issue, one which frequently involves technical or 
legal loop-holes, so-called "grey areas", whereby benefits can be
TTT
claimed legally, but still remain outside the spirit and intent 
of the legislation as envisaged by its drafters. To illustrate: 
an unemployed worker with previous experience as a labourer in a 
steel mill insists on that type of work even though he has since 
relocated to a non-steel producing, summer holiday area. In such 
circumstances, "abuse" appears a reasonable charge, even though 
the claimant has committed no criminal act.
Fraud, on the other hand, is a wrongful claim resulting from 
intentional mis-representation of facts in order to collect benefits.
The most common type of fraud attempted against the system in both 
nations involves the drawing of unemployment benefits while concurrently 
earning at regular work. Fraud, punishable under criminal law in 
both nations, is the type of wrongful claim with which this chapter 
is concerned.
In spite of its criminal status, there is a segment of the public in 
each of these countries which appears to attach less stigma to this 
type of criminal behaviour than it does to, say, burglary or assault. 
Attitudes of British and American claimants and employers toward 
unemployment benefits are compared later in this study.
In this chapter key features of the British treatment of the fraud 
issue are compared with those in the United States. The American 
federal-state relationship permits each state to tailor the operation 
of its unemployment benefits system in accord with the prevailing 
conscience of its population and the economic climate within its 
borders. Acknowledging this built-in disparity, certain states 
are used herein as vehicles to represent regional appraoches: New 
York, the eastern seaboard; Ohio and Illinois, the midwest;
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Mississippi, the deep south; Colorado, California and Hawaii, the 
mountain states, far west and non-contiguous states of the nation.
Comparisons focus on: organisation and training of fraud investigators; 
control methods for prevention of fraud at different levels of 
government; and penalties levied against those convicted of fraud.
Comparisons of British and American Organisation and Training of 
Fraud Investigators
The issue of fraud in connection with unemployment benefit payments 
is a highly visible and marketable press-media property in the 
United Kingdom and the United States. The visibility and marketability 
of this issue appear to increase in direct proportion to any rise 
in unemployment and ensuing severity of economic downturn. The public 
seems to consider unemployment benefits and other forms of benefits 
under the single convenient label of "welfare" despite the fact that 
the former is funded as an insurance coverage similar to that of life, 
household goods or automobile insurance. In Britain, this error is 
partially attributable to the single-contribution feature of the 
national social security system into which both employers and 
employees pay a specified percentage of each employee's gross 
earnings. In the United States, unemployment benefits are funded 
as a separate premium solely by employers in all but three states^. 
Although this true state of affairs is realised all too well by 
employers, their employees seem either to have net considered the 
source of benefits at all, or believe that benefit funds are part
1. Alabama, New Jersey and Alaska
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of the national budget. Thus, a general, albeit mistaken, American 
view is that such benefits are part of the whole catalogue of 
social security measures in which everyone is automatically entitled 
to share.
The National Level
In Britain, responsibility for the prevention and detection of 
unemployment benefit fraud lies with the Department of Employment. 
Through the same hierarchic network used for administration of claims 
and the payment of benefits, the DE investigates and initiates 
prosecution of fraud cases. Staff for this network becomes 
progressively more numerous as it descends from the London DE 
headquarters to the eight regional headquarters, and further to the 
some 950 local unemployment benefit offices (UBO's).
The DE's London offices maintain a 4-member permanent staff in the
Manpower General Division, supplemented with additional personnel
as needed, to monitor the field operations in connection with fraud
investigations. Within the eight regions subordinate to DE, there
is an aggregate of some 50 full-time fraud staff, 76 special
investigators (Si's) and an additional 1,000 staff members who work
on fraud matters only as one element among others of their normal
job description. Combining full-time and part-time personnel yields
an overall national fraud-oriented staff equivalent to about 320 
2
full-time persons .
2. Interviews. DE Manpower General Division, London, 26-30 July 1977
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Annual labour costs have been averaged for the, roughly, 50% of 
this number who are in the grade of Executive Officer (EO) and 
higher, and the remainder who are below that grade level. For 
the EO's and above, the average annual per capita salary is £6,271; 
for the other £4,889. The overall annual cost of £1,785,600 includes 
not only salaries but the ancillary per capita costs associated 
with premises leasing, maintenance, heating and other amenities 
of the workplace.
At the USA national level, there is no fraud control organisation 
similar to that in Britain’s DE. There is no agency of the US 
federal government charged with nationwide policy-making and 
direction of fraud investigation. The only federal activity in such 
matters is performed by a 2-person cell in the Employment and 
Training Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor. These 
personnel work substantially, but not entirely, full-time on the 
monitorship, collation, analysis and publication of the results of 
a quarterly report from each state in which is listed: the number 
of prosecutions recommended, the number actually prosecuted, the 
number acquitted or dismissed by the court, and the number convicted. 
Unlike the United Kingdom, no records are developed at the national 
level of the types of sentences imposed, sources from which cases 
of suspected fraud came to light, or other details of the fraud 
spectrum. All investigative activities in fraud cases are carried 
out at or below the state level, according to the degree of emphasis 
which each state administration places on the subject.
In the chapter "Procedures" was outlined the provision in the 
unemployment insurance part of the Social Security Act of 1935 which 
furnishes each state sufficient funds from federal sources to pay
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administrative costs of its programme. Derived from this provision 
is the following extract from the U.S. Secretary of Labor's Standard 
for Fraud and Overpayment Detection:
"a State law (must) include provisions for such methods of 
administration as are, within reason, calculated (1) to 
detect benefits paid through error by the agency or through 
wilful mis-representation or error by the claimant or others, 
and (2) to deter claimants from obtaining benefits through 
wilful mis-representation."
For a state to meet this requirement, it must investigate a sufficient 
proportion of claims to test the effectiveness of the agency's 
procedures for the prevention of improper payments and assign to 
an individual or unit the responsibility for investigating suspected 
benefit fraud. To enable the states to carry out their responsibilities 
in this area, the Department of Labor allocates and funds state 
positions specifically for fraud and overpayment detection.
This appears as a definitive requirement by the federal government 
regulating each state's fraud investigation activities. In reality, 
the requirement is implemented according to standards set by each 
state, and is not subject to federal determination as to "sufficiency". 
Indeed, there are only 2 persons at the federal level in any way 
available for such duties, a fact which denies any serious contemplation 
of efficacy. Thus, the Secretary's Standards are largely cosmetic 
in nature as they apply to operation of fraud investigation.
The following Table 5.1 compares the types of statistical data compiled 
at the UK national level with that of the USA. Only four types are
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TABLE 5.1
UNITED KINGDOM/UNITED STATES 
*COMPARISON OF STATISTICAL DATA ON UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT FRAUD COMPILED
AT NATIONAL LEVEL
Type of Data United Kingdom United States
1. Number of Cases Closed and
Considered for Proceedings Ues
2. Nature of Offences in Cases
Considered Yes
3. Nature of Offences in Cases
Completed Yes
4. Type/number of Sentences Imposed
Upon Conviction Yes
5. How Cases Considered Came to Light Yes
6. Benefit Payment Check Fraud Yes
7. Rate of Fraud per 1,000 First
Payments** No
8. Average Amount of Benefit per
Fraud Case No
9. Number of Prosecutions Recommended Yes
10. Number of Prosecutions Recommended
of Fraud Cases No***
11. Number of Convictions Yes
12. Total Amount of Payments Made Due















Data compiled by DHSS (UK); Employment and Training Administration, 
U.S. Department of Labor (USA).
The unemployment benefit payment for the first compensable 
week of unemployment in a benefit year (USA).
Although not maintained in percentage form in UK, rate is 
readily calculable from related data.
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direct companions (numbers 1, 6, 9 and 11). The number of 
prosecutions recommended as a percent of fraud cases (number 10), 
although not published in that form by the UK, is readily calculable 
from numerical data. Numbers 2 through 5 are maintained only by 
the UK and reveal detail as to the actual offences for which cases
were considered and brought to trial, the type and number of
sentences imposed upon conviction (jail, suspended jail, fine, 
probation, discharge, community service, and the like). These 
same details (numbers 2 through 5) are not maintained at the USA 
national level, although some states record certain of them. The 
United States does maintain a greater degree of detailed data 
related to the dollar amount of fraudulent payments than is the 
case in the United Kingdom, as shown in numbers 7, 8 and 12. The
conclusion here is that while the United Kingdom appears interested
to a greater extent than the USA in detail regarding the offences 
per se, the USA displays a greater interest in the financial aspects 
of fraud than does the UK.
The Regional-State Level
In the United Kingdom, the total of 76 special investigators are
3
allocated among eight regional DE headquarters , then assigned to 
specific cases by the regional fraud officer. This group of 
specialists concentrates on allegations received from local UBO's 
which pose problems beyond the normal investigative scope of those 
offices. For example, there may be significant travel distances 
involved with the tracing, substantiation or refutation of an
3. The London region has 12 assigned Si's, with each of the
other regions averaging 8 Si's at any given time.
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allegation; there may be a degree of investigative expertise 
required which is above the competence of local UBO fraud personnel; 
or perhaps the nature of the allegation is sufficiently unusual 
or of such urgency as to prompt assignment of an SI to the case. 
Regional fraud officers maintain contact with their assigned Si's 
through itineraries filed in advance of investigative travel, 
through telephone communication and by office conferences at the 
option either of the regional fraud officer or an SI.
In testimony before the Appropriation Accounts Committee of Parliament 
in 1975-1976, DE estimated a savings of nearly £9,000 resulted 
from the effects of each Special Investigator for the year 1974. 
Subtracting from that figure the average annual per capita salary 
and ancillary employment costs of £6,000, each SI is responsible 
for net savings to the government of roughly £3,000. This amounts 
to a net overall annual savings of approximately £228,000 from 
the work of 76 Special Investigators.
Training of British Si's is a regional headquarters responsbility. 
Although most Si's have had prior experience at local UBO-level, 
additional training is necessary for an SI to become effective as 
a roving investigator pursuing unusual rather than ordinary cases 
without benefit of supervision. In the conduct of such training, 
regional fraud officers tailor their programmes to equip Si's for 
response to conditions prevailing in their jurisdictions. Oy\o.
5uch programme^ developed for SI training in the Southwest 
Region (headquarters in Bristol)^ consists of formal and informal 
sessions supported by a series of regionally-developed memoranda 
covering essential elements of investigatory procedure and guidelines 
based on experience factors. This series provides
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the SI with a ready reference file after the training is finished
for use during actual field work. Particular stress is laid on
strict observance of all legal technicalities during SI contact
with claimants and witnesses to safeguard admissability of reports
issuing from such occasions as evidence during subsequent court 
4
proceedings. Failure to follow the step-by-step procedures which 
guarantee claimants' and witnesses' rights under the law is 
sufficient cause to render an otherwise strong court case invalid 
and the accused acquitted. When this happens, all preparation time 
involved in the investigation and preparation phases is lost; 
further, there occurs a loss of Departmental stature in the eyes 
of all concerned. The efficiency of these training programmes and 
adherence to established legal patterns of fraud investigation 
throughout the DE system has produced a 90% conviction rate from 
all fraud prosecutions taken to court under DE sponsorship.
This researcher was present in court during each of eight trials 
of claimants accused of various frauds to obtain unemployment 
benefits.^ In all these cases, the evidence submitted and the 
procedures which had produced the evidence were judged to have been 
accomplished in conformance with the letter of the law, thus no 
technical irregularity clouded the magistrates decision. In rendering 
a verdict of guilty in each of these cases, the Court took cognisance 
of attending family and financial circumstances, fixing benefit 
restitution payments and fines according to a weekly schedule of 
installments consistent with the convicted claimant's ability to 
pay.
4. Interviews: Fraud Officer, Southwest Region. Bristol, 23
June-11 July 1977.
5. Magistrates Court, Bristol, 11 July 1977
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In the United States, roughly analagous to the British regional 
DE level is each of the fifty state governments. Policing of 
unemployment benefit fraud typically is the function of each state's 
department of labor. Within such a department, investigations and 
preparation of evidence to be used in court is further assigned to 
a sub-unit known variously as an Employment Security Commission^, 
Special Activities Unit , Investigation Section , or similar title. 
This group of specialists acts on allegations of fraud funneled 
into it from various sources. Such a unit often works on fraud 
cases in concert with other types of administrative tasks, such 
as appeals and/or benefit adjustments, as in Hawaii, Illinois, 
and California. In New York, Colorado and Mississippi, however, 
the organisation for fraud is oriented toward specialisation, and 
the sub-units concerned operate exclusively in this area. Typically, 
staffing of such sub-units numbers between 5 and 10 trained personnel, 
this is similar in strength of any one of the British DE regional 
headquarters. The usual title for an American fraud investigator 
is Senior Claims Examiner, a euphemism used in the interest of 
public relations for the true, somewhat harsher character of their 
work, according to California and Hawaii officials.
Most of these investigative jobs require backgrounds in claims 
work, computer claims processing, or assisting claims adjudicators.
In some states, investigators may also be tax agents of the employment 
security agencies and security officers for the UBO's. Training 
of a Senior Claims Examiner is conducted in the on-the-job mode, 
with individually-developed procedures handed down from one 
specialist to his successor. Some state-level specialists have
6. State of Mississippi.
7. State of Hawaii.
8. State of New York.
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codified their procedures according to personal preference and 
experience and have compiled check-lists for use by members of 
the sub-unit. These procedures have been developed by trial and 
error over a period of time, as opposed to having been pre-designed 
in the interest of uniformity and efficiency. Research indicates 
that no state has a formalised system by which replacement of 
departing Senior Claims Examiners, or their equivalent, are recruited, 
promoted or trained. As in Britain, preparation of evidence and 
observance of claimants' and witnesses' rights during interview must 
be consistent with established state and federal safeguards.
Skirting these safeguards virtually guarantees that the case will 
be thrown out of court and the accused acquitted.
Organisation at the Local Level and Typical Sequence of Investigation
Organisation of fraud investigation activities and the sequence of 
investigations at the local UBO level were examined at a number of 
such offices in the United Kingdom and in the United States.
While the purpose of these activities and the sequence in which 
they proceed are similar in both countries, the degree of formality 
and uniformity varies significantly between them. Initial investigations 
of fraud allegations are made by staff of local UBO's in both nations.
In Britain, either the specialist or unit type of investigative 
organisation may be found at the local level, of which the former 
is by far the more common. A specialist in fraud investigation is 
developed over a period of time from the ranks of the UBO staff, 
usually as a result of a combination of personal interest in such 
work on the part of one of the staff, and a perceived need for one
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staff member to whom the others can route allegations or other 
indicators that fraud may be present in the case of a particular
claimant. With the passage of time, the expertise of such a
staff member becomes great enough to merit his unofficial designation 
as a specialist.
Under the unit type, fraud investigation is a part of section-wide
operations and is distributed throughout the staff on a share-and-
share-alike basis. No one staff member is singled out for fraud 
concentration. Each section of the UBO provides normal administrative 
services to its assigned alphabetical segment of the UBO claimant 
register, and conducts any necessary fraud investigations of claimants 
within that segment. This generalises, instead of specialises, 
fraud investigation; each section functions as a unit, responsible 
for all administrative actions attaching to its segment of the 
register. Though uncommon among the 950-plus UBO's, there are 
managers at that level who believe that the unit type not only 
enriches the job content of each staff member, but that each of 
them is better able to conduct investigations because of their more 
personalised knowledge of the claimants they service across the 
counter on a weekly basis.
As a consensus, however, the 38 staff personnel at local UBO level 
interviewed in various locations throughout the United Kingdom, 
three of which employ the "unit" concept, disliked it and preferred 
the specialist type. They agreed, in substance, that fraud 
investigation by its very nature demands a special set of personal 
talents, and that not everyone is suited by temperament, aptitude 
or interest to perform efficiently in that field. Further, the 
consensus was that staff members not so interested or who do not
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possess the other requisite attributes take a longer time to 
produce less viable investigative results.
British UBO's are alerted to suspected fraud through either or
both of two avenues: external sources, usually ancnymous phone 
9 10
calls or letters ; or through internal sources, such as inter- 
and intra-office document cross-checks and as a side-effect or 
unrelated inquiries as to a claimant's personal/family circumstances^^. 
Whatever the source, all allegations are treated as matters of 
urgency, and investigations are begun with minimum delay - usually 
the same day as the allegation comes to light. A typical sequence 
of British fraud officer actions is outlined as follows :
a. Receipt of allegation that a claimant is receiving unemployment
benefits to which he has no right, as in a "working and signing" 
12
case . Some allegations are made for reasons of personal 
grudge or spite by a neighbour of the accused claimant, 
although the latter may be found legally entitled to benefits.
In such cases, no basis exists for further investigation.
b. UBO makes record of allegation and then causes an internal 
check of UBO records to confirm that claimant concerned 
actually is on the UBO active register. If so, the UBO 
contacts claimant's alleged employer - if known - usually 
by personal visit, to confirm that claimant is, in fact, 
employed. At that time. Form UB 551 (Employer's Statement)
9. Interviews: Bath UBO, July, August, September, October 1977.
10. "Sleuths Crack Down on the Cheats". Liverpool Daily Post,
30 November 1976.
11. Internal sources indicating suspicious claimant behaviour: 
overlapping contributions credits and franks, completion of 
earnings declarations, routine checks and inquiries, 
inspectorate survey, examination of another claim, sick visit, 
observation by staff, inquiry on other matters.
12. The most common type of fraud. Claimant is drawing benefits 
and earning wages concurrently.
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is completed and compared with UBO records. If claimant 
does not appear on the UBO register, the allegations are 
presumed to be groundless. When the UBO register and Form 
551 appear to substantiate the allegation, a "Suspected 
Fraud File'(SFF) is set up. This formalises the investigation 
pattern already in progress.
c. Photocopies of appropriate claimant documents are prepared
(UB 461 and UB 20) to replace original documents in the UBO
files; originals are placed in the SFF. Incriminating 
comparison of these two forms is viewed as prima facie 
evidence of wrongful claim-fraud.
d . The claimant against whom allegations have been made is
then interviewed. Form QBIA is completed during interview 
by interviewing officer (Report by Interviewing Officer). 
Interview is conducted in private with only a Departmental 
recorder - witness present to take notes. Interview usually 
is scheduled at time of weekly signing, if the claimant is 
still signing; if he is not, arrangements are made to 
interview claimant at home, but always with a witness 
present. Interview is conducted "under caution", to assure 
all legal rights are protected. Proposed charge is read to 
claimant, after which he is afforded an opportunity to make 
a statement (QBl, Statement of Person Interviewed). In
the Bath UBO experience, between 30% and 50% of claimants 
under investigation elect to make such a statement.
e. SFF is then reviewed by UBO fraud officer and manager;
decision is made as to whether the file is to be forwarded 
for action to the Regional Fraud Officer with a recommendation 
to prosecute. If decision is affirmative, the file and 
recommendation go forward to Region but through the DE
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Insurance Officer for review and determination if repayment 
of benefits by claimant is warranted. Regional Fraud Officer 
decides whether to proceed further with prosecution. If 
decision is affirmative, the SFF with a regional recommendation 
is sent to DHSS Solicitors Branch in London under a Form 
QB2 (Summary of Alleged Offence). There the file is reviewed 
and final decision is made on whether to prosecute. This 
is the point at which the actual prosecution becomes a
joint DE-DHSS action. If DHSS solicitors concur in the Regional
Fraud Officer's recommendation, the SFF is returned to the 
originating UBO via the Regional Fraud Officer. The UBO then 
obtains signatures on necessary witness statements and turns 
over SFF to a locally-retained solicitor firm, which then 
handles ensuing court proceedings assisted as appropriate 
by the UBO fraud officer,
f. SFF once again is forwarded to London where DHSS solicitors
prepare summons' which, together with the SFF, are returned 
to the UBO for serving and scheduling of court dates in 
co-ordination with the locally-retained solicitor.
In the USA, local UBO procedures used within individual states vary
in the degree of formality with which investigation of fraud
allegations is conducted. As discussed elsewhere in this study, 
the reason for this and like disparaties lies in the sovereign right 
of each state to tailor internal procedures as its elected officials 
deem appropriate to state interest, there being no obligation to 
conform to a national standard. Yet, because of the commonality 
of purpose underlying such investigations, a typical sequence of 
actions at the local UBO level emerges. The staffing of such UBO's 
depends, as in Britain, on the nature of employment and the number
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of claimants issuing from that employment in the area serviced. In 
areas where one or two industries are the major employers, inter­
ruption of work for any reason causes an immediate rise in the number 
of claimants for unemployment insurance benefits. In such cases, 
local UBO's are given authorisation to use part-time staff to augment 
regular personnel during the period of heavy claimant traffic.
Chronicled below is a composite of investigative sequence, as drawn 
from the patterns in general use in New York, Ohio, Colorado and 
Hawaii :
a. Allegations are received, as in Britain, from both external
sources - anonymous telephone message and letters from
citizens, frequently irate citizens who protest against the
claim of some individual know to them as not eligible for
benefits. According to administrators' statements, "working
and signing" is the most common charge made by such sources,
although dating from the "energy crisis" of 1973-1974 that
charge assumed a quasi-tolerated status and the general
public was no longer so quick to denounce it. Internal
sources also yield indications of fraud, generally in the
same manner as in the United Kingdom, through inter-office
co-ordination and intra-office document cross-checks of
employer claimant records. Charles C McMahon, New York's
Director of Labor Special Investigation, calls the local
13
office the "first line of defence" because the staff must 
be in close touch with the local community. The staff meet 
the claimants and can note any deviations from the patterns 
of work or wages occurring in the area and double-check
13. Speech before the New York Civil Service Commission, 13 April 1977
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signatures and habits that give away fraudulent persons.
In one Utah case, a claims processor noticed the name of a 
fellow part-time claims processor on a form that the computer 
had rejected. She reported it to the UI fraud team.
b. The local benefit office records the allegation and passes
it to any one of the "line" claims examiners for follow-up.
As in Britain, allegations are treated as urgent, with 
initial verification of allegations following without delay.
In certain states, Hawaii and Ohio as examples, concurrent 
with a cross-match of the claimant register with the "Employment 
Status Report"(in Hawaii, Form UC-BP-5), an attempt is made
to arrange an interview with the accused claimant. This 
Report (Hawaii) requires all employers to furnish information 
to the state Department of Labor on each employee hired or 
separated on or after 15 July 1976, within 5 working days 
from the date of hire/separation. This administrative record 
serves to update the total employment inventory in the state 
on a "name" basis, and provides additional means to monitor 
not only unemployment benefit fraud but the number of 
employees for whom an employer is liable for unemployment 
insurance contributions. Most states have similar cross­
check devices, though there is no specific federal regulation 
which requires it. Unlike the British system, no formalised 
case file is established at this time; the matter remains 
informal at this point. Claim Certificate, forms (in Hawaii, 
UC-BP-10), signed by the claimant and mailed to the UBO each 
week during the period of unemployment, are assembled for 
reference and display to claimant at the time of interview.
c. The claimant is then interviewed, with notes and findings by
the examiner recorded (in Hawaii, Form UC-BP-15). If claimant
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desires to make a statement, it is recorded on a like Form.
d. Findings of interview and document cross-match are then
reported to the examiner's supervisor, a file established and 
then forwarded to a Senior Claims Examiner, a fraud specialist 
at state level. It is at this point when a visit is made
to the employer by the Senior Claims Examiner in charge of 
the investigation in order to verify the conditions of hire 
and the current status of the claimant, eg wage rate, 
duration of employment, hours of work, and the like.
e. If the evidence is deemed conclusive, the file is sent to
the Administrator of the state unemployment insurance 
division with a recommendation that the case be forwarded 
to the public prosecutor for court action. Assuming 
concurrence, the file is sent onward to the prosecutor's 
office for further review of evidence and final decision
as to whether there are sufficient grounds on which to bring 
the case before the bar. If so, the prosecutor takes all 
further action, with the unemployment insurance division 
personnel called upon only for supportive testimony, as 
appropriate.
The conduct of prosecutions differs widely among the states. In 
New York, such procedures are formalised in great detail and 
handled in-house by the Department of Labor Special Investigation 
Unit. In Mississippi, the Employment Security Commission retains 
its own legal department which represents the state in fraud 
proceedings on a unilateral basis separate from the state attorney 
general. In Hawaii, the Public prosecutor's office is an organ 
of the county, not the state government. This causes a transfer 
of jurisdiction from the state to the office of the Prosecutor, City
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and County of Honolulu. Such mid-stream separation of jurisdiction 
has made fraud prosecutions a sort of political football in which 
the state and county governments each accuse the other of inaction, 
faulty evidentiary preparation and assorted other shortcomings.
The result of this abrasive internecine dispute is a poor record 
of fraud convictions - among the poorest of any state in the nation. 
More will be said of this situation in a later part of the chapter.
Overall, the organisation for detection and control of fraud in 
Britain compared with a composite type in the United States differs 
on two major counts. First, the training of special investigators 
in British regional offices is of a standard far superior to that 
found in American states. The lack of a national uniform system 
in the USA results in variance in the professionalism which the 
state governments, roughly the counterparts of British regional 
offices, demand of their unemployment benefit administrators.
While the eight regional offices in Britain are relatively free 
in codifying the investigative procedures followed in a specific 
jurisdiction, the existence of a national monitoring office is a 
strong influence toward uniformity of policy and the procedures 
which emanate therefrom. Further, since all administrative staff 
are members of the national civil service, there is an established 
communication channel by which new procedures can be shared with 
other offices. Training of fraud administrators in the United States 
is largely restricted to on-the-job exposure, dependent on the 
individual motivation of the coach and that of the trainee. As 
a consequence, fraud administrators range from the lowest to highest 
point on the effectiveness continuum as a function of the stress 
which an individual state places upon fraud detection and prosecution. 
Colorado, New York and Ohio are known to place high premium on the
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successful prosecution statistics developed from fraud cases; yet, 
at the national level, there is no full-time monitorship of fraud 
incidence except those in the Employment and Training Administration 
of the U.S. Department of Labor who digest the input of ES-227 from 
each state. Yet even publication of such data receives little 
public notice, since the results are not routinely distributed lower 
than U.S. Department of Labor regional level. Local-level UBO's 
must request these statistics on a recurring basis; the result is 
that few of them make such requests.
Second, the clear line of hierarchical responsibility for preparing 
and prosecuting fraud cases in Britain does not exist in the United 
States; it is fragmented from the state level downward with more 
or less control exerci^c^ by the state government according to the 
changing perceptions of successive state political administrations 
as to the degree of importance and visibility which ought to be 
accorded fraud control measures.
Other than in these two areas, the systems are different largely 
in cosmetic applications. The purpose for which fraud detection 
and prosecution activities are organised make for a significant 
degree of commonality as to sequence of steps in the conduct of 
investigations, processing of documentation, interviewing of claimants 
and employers, and the like. This commonality is achieved by 
happenstance through the congruence of purpose in this regard by 
both nations, not as a result of any planned bilateral administrative 
intention.
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Fraud Prosecutions - Britain
Recording and analysing unemployment benefit fraud incidence in
Britain is based on information being fed into the Department of
Employment from local and regional offices. In turn, the DE makes
these data available to the DHSS for publication in its Annual 
14
Report . This Report covers a wide spectrum of illegalities 
perpetrated against the National Insurance programme, including 
those against unemployment benefits. The detailed statistics contained 
in the Report date mainly from publication of the Fisher Committee 
R e p o r t i n  1973. Certain of the Fisher recommendations^^ have 
caused increased attention to the collection and maintenance of 
statistics on fraud, and to the compilation of comparative surveys 
for the evaluation of the relative efficacy of procedures to detect 
and prevent it. At Table 5.2 is a digest of the Fisher recommendations; 
of special interest are 4, 12, 17 and 18.
Of related interest in this connection is Table 5.3, which illustrates 
the sources from which cases of possible fraud came to light in 
December of 1971 compared with December 1976.
14. "Report for (YEAR) on Criminal and Civil Proceedings".
London: DHSS (an annual publication). Note: these data 
are without differentiation between incidence of fraud by 
men versus women,
15. "Report of the Committee on Abuse of Social Security Benefits' 
London: HMSO, March 1973.
16. Ibid. Specifically (in original Report) recommendations 
5, 28, 77, 80, 81, pp.234-243.
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TABLE 5.2
REœMMENDATIONS BY STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
AND SOCIAL SECURITY: CONTROL OF ABUSES TO UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
Note: These recommendations have been selected from the whole
of the Committee's list fcr relevance to points made previously 
in this paper; other recommendations which do not specifically 
refer to points already discussed do not appear here.
1. The prime consideration should be to maintain the throughput 
of claims and payments, and the measures taken to prevent 
and detect abuse should be consistent with this objective.
2. When changes in procedure are to be introduced, studies should
be carried out to determine the effect on the promptness
with which claims can be paid.
3. There should be an intensification of visiting in problem
cases, and cases where abuse is suspected.
4. The Department of Employment should collect and maintain 
statistics to show the number of jobs to which people are 
referred broken down by duration of benefit, by type of 
benefit, by region and by other variables.
5. Detection of failure by claimants to disclose earnings by
themselves or their dependants above the limits of "disregards" 
should have first place in the Department's attention, and 
should be regarded as the principal activity of special 
investigators.
6. If personnel available to investigate suspected abuse are
for any reason at any time insufficient for all the calls made 
on them, the detection of earning while drawing benefit should 
be the last area in which economies should be made.
7. The Department should not be inhibited in its efforts to detect 
working and drawing benefit by fear of criticism for excessive 
zeal.
8. Though measures employed to detect cohabitation and fictitious 
desertion should be as little intrusive and involve as little 
offence to the feelings of beneficiaries as is consistent with 
efficiency, the Department should not turn a blind eye to 
suspected abuse because the people suspected of committing
it are in a situation which attracts sympathy.
9. Regional offices should maintain a careful and continuous 
oversight of the methods used by special investigators.
10. Steps should be taken to make leaflets, claim forms and the 




11. Translations of all commonly used leaflets, etc, should be 
done into Gujarati, Punjabi, Bengali, Urdu and Hindi and 
steps taken to make them available to speakers of these 
languages.
12. Advice as to presentation should be sought from those with 
experience and/or expertise in the field of communication 
(with respect to 10 and 11 above).
13. Appropriate alterations should be made in claim forms for 
the blind and illiterate.
14. Numbers of special investigators should continue to be 
increased so long as the additional benefit saving exceeds 
the additional cost.
15. The present practice of recruiting special investigators from 
within the civil service should be continued.
16. Private detective agencies should not be employed in the 
investigation of suspected abuse.
17. To obtain fuller information as to the true extent of the 
problem of abuse by wrongful claims, a series of surveys 
based on random samples of claimants should be carried out 
by the Department over a period of years, and wide publicity 
should be given to the findings.
18. Regular comparative surveys should be carried out to determine 
the relative efficacy of different procedures, and in particular 
that whenever a major change in practice is contemplated 
which can be expected to affect the amount of abuse which 
occurs and/or the proportion which is detected, comparative 




HOW CASES OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT FRAUD CAME TO LIGHT; COMPARISON OF
19
SOURCES BETWEEN DECEMBER 1971 AND DECEMBER 1976 (Britain)
Internal External TOTAL
Cheques Other* Other Anon Ltrs Other** Grand UNEMPLOYED
Queries Sources Total Depts Phone Calls Sources Total Total 000 * s_____
1971 126 125 251 150 76 96 322 573 910.7
1976 190 94 284 245 138 102 485 769 1371.0
*Includes: Inspectorate survey, examination of another claim, 
observation by staff, inquiry on other matters.
**Includes; Police, voluntary disclosure, claimant inquiries, 
employer inquiries, reports of other proceedings.
The Grand Total reflects an increase of 35% in the number of cases 
recorded by source between 1971 and 1976. During that same period, 
total unemployment increased by 50%. DE administrators (Manpower 
General Division) view these increases as quite normal, but point 
to the 100% increase in "Anonymous Letters and Phone Calls" as 
unusual. They surmise that this source became more popular due 
to neighbour reporting "fiddling" by another neighbour when both 
were unemployed, but when the reporter-neighbour was not so 
engaged. In short, a case of righteousness born, possibly, of envy 
or virtue, exercised in such a manner as to protect the identity 
of the reporter. Queries of UBO staff members in 1977 and 1978 
confirm that this source continues as the most popular.
19. 1971 Data: Op Cit. "Report of the Committee on Abuse of
Social Security Benefits", 1973; 1976 Data: Op Cit. "Report 
for 1976 on Criminal and Civil Proceedings, 1977".
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Fraud Prosecutions - United States
Compilation of USA statistics on unemployment benefit fraud a t
the national level is performed as a function of the Employment and
Training Administration in the U.S. Department of Labor, and published
annually within the Department without differentiation between men
and women as to incidence attribution. Each state submits a quarterly 
20
report to the Bureau reflecting the number of cases recommended 
for prosecution, cases acquitted/dismissed by the court, convictions 
and the number of prosecutions pending at the end of the quarter.
Of these, four categories have counterparts in the British system.
TableiT4 is a comparison of UK with USA statistics in these four 
categories for years 1973 through 1977.
At the individual state level, statistics on fraud tend to be 
maintained in some greater detail than at national level, although 
there are wide variations among the states on this point. For 
example. New York, Illinois, Ohio and Mississippi compile more 
detailed information on fraud incidence than do California, Colorado 
or Hawaii, To illustrate typical state systems, Mississippi, Hawaii 
and Ohio have been selected as representative vehicles.
Mississippi
Mississippi has a population cf 2.2 million people. It is known as 
an yltra-conservative state, where dedication to the work-ethic 
remains exceptionally strong. It administers unemployment insurance
20. Form ES-227, U.S. Department of Labor. Section D: "Prosecutions 
Involving Issue of Wilful Misrepresentation".
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benefits through an Employment Security Commission, one unit of which 
is established for fraud prevention and detection.
Mississippi discontinued prosecution of fraud cases in 1969, but
21
resumed this "deterrent action" in 1976 as a result of public 
outcry against this type of crime. Since 1976 a total of 67 cases 
have been considered for fraud prosecution, of which 18 were 
resolved without court action. Pending further investigation as 
of this writing, there were 16 cases pending further investigation, 
with 15 others held in the Legal Department of the Commission awaiting 
presentation irto the courts for prosectuion. Of the remainder, 18 
cases were successfully prosecuted and resulted in convictions. 
Sentences ranged from repayment of the total amount of benefits 
illegally collected to a maximum of $300 fine and up to 150 days 
imprisonment. In all but 3 such cases, the jail time was suspended. 
Thus, the convictions for unemployment benefit fraud based on 
total state population are 1.2 per 100,000 inhabitants: convictions 
(18) represent 27% of the total number of cases considered for 
prosecution (67). An interesting insight into the criteria 
developed for triggering consideration of a given case for possible 
prosecution is as follows: claimants with over 10 fraudulent weeks 
of over-payment are prosecuted, but only 5 of these would be 
entered into charges as separate counts; claimants with between 5 
and 10 weeks of fraudulent over-payments are prosecuted, but only 
3 such weeks are entered as separate counts. Mississippi has 
formalised such criteria in an attempt unclog the court calendars 
of misdemeanors. Cases of fraud for periods of less than 5 weeks 
are not prosecuted, but disqualified from receiving benefits, as
21. Letter: W H Greer, Chief, Fraud Prevention and Detection,
Mississippi Employment Security Commission, 24 January 1978.
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follows :
a. For one week of fraud, claimant is disqualified for 6 
weeks ;
b. For two weeks of fraud, disqualification for 12 weeks;
c. For three weeks of fraud, disqualification for 18 weeks;
d. For four weeks of fraud, disqualification for 24 weeks;
3. For five or more weeks of fraud, disqualification is
for 52 weeks, with effect on Sunday of the week in which 
the case is determined, and court prosecution begins.
As is true with all states, Mississippi refers to the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) all cases involving "federal money" in excess 
of $1,000. "Federal money" in this context is that granted by 
Congress to states on a, roughly, 50-50 basis to extend state benefit 
payments to claimants beyond the normal 26 weeks during periods of 
high unemployment. As of January 1978, 3 cases from Mississippi 
were pending FBI decision to prosecute in federal courts. When 
the FBI declines to prosecute, Mississippi - and all other states - 
has the option to prosecute in state courts.
Hawaii
As another example, the state of Hawaii has a resident population 
of 850,000 throughout the 7 major islands of the Hawaiian chain.
It is known as a liberal state, where dedication to the work-ethic 
is not so apparent as it is in Mississippi. One postulates that 
this more tolerant view of non-work may be due to the combination 
of a perpetual summer climate, the playtime resort atmosphere where 
several millions of tourists flaunt their temporary release from
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normal work routine, and the traditional "hoomalimali na hano hano" 
philosophy of the Hawaiians and converts to the Hawaiian life-style, 
known as "Hawaiians in heart".
Hawaii’s Department of Labor and Industrial Relations does not have 
a record of aggressive prosecution of unemployment benefit fraud 
cases. Yet more emphasis is now being placed on such action as 
a consequence of business community and legislative concern with the 
rising number of such payments. Fraud cases are prosecuted in county, 
rather than state, courts due to the realities of time and distance 
caused by the state being divided into island-counties. To illustrate: 
the island of Oahu on which Honolulu, the capital, is located is 
a political entity designated as the City and County of Honolulu; 
the island of Hawaii is the County of Hawaii, Maui and Kauai each 
are separate counties.
During 1976, a total of 346 fraud cases were considered for 
prosecution state-wide, of which 326 (94%) resulted in disqualification 
from benefits, not prosecution. Of the remaining 20 cases, only 10 
were taken to court, of which 6 were convicted. Relative to total 
state population, there are 1.4 convictions per 100,000 inhabitants, 
or 1.7% actual convictions of the total number considered, as 
opposed to a national average of 9.63%. Among the 3 island-counties 
on which these 6 convictions occurred, the following sentences were 
imposed: island of Oahu (City and County of Honolulu), 1 conviction; 
no imprisonment, placed on probation for 5 years on condition that 
psychiatric help be sought as approved by the Probation Department; 
island of Hawaii (County of Hawaii), 1 conviction; imprisonment for 
1 year on each of 2 counts, suspended, with a fine of $300; island of
22. Translated: "Fooling around is better than working".
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Kauai (County of Kauai), 4 convictions: 2 ordered to make full 
restitution and placed on probation for 1 year; 1 fined $30, placed 
on probation for 6 months and required to make full restitution; 
and 1 to make full restitution only.
Such sentences as these, often characterised as "powder-puff 
justice", have received periodic attention in the press and in the 
state legislature. State Senator John Leopold charged that Oahu's 
"less than reassuring record" is prosecuting unemployment fraud
23
cases is costing taxpayers thousands and is an example of the City
and state's inability to work with each other. He went on to say
that increasing costs of the unemployment insurance system and growing




Ohio offers a third illustration of how an individual American 
state handles unemployment benefit fraud. An eastern-central state, 
Ohio is both agriculturally rich and industrially productive, with 
a population of 11 million. It is known for its "no-nonsense" 
approach toward benefit fraud investigation and prosecution. Further, 
Ohio is the only state which maintains a detailed, continuing 
statistical study of unemployment benefit fraud incidence, and 
consequently is a fecund source of data for a wide variety of fraud- 
related activities.
23. City and County of Honolulu, which encompasses the whole of 
the island of Oahu.
24. Oshiro, Sandra S. "Jobless Pay Fraud Prosecution Criticised". 
Honolulu Advertiser, 23 February 1978.
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Penalties for fraud in Ohio correspond to those in most other 
states: repayment of benefits fraudulently received, cancellation 
of future benefit rights
and prosecution
for first degree misdemeanour. The Ohio Bureau of Employment 
Services, which includes a permanent 45-member Investigation Department, 
has provided the federal government with computer tapes showing Ohio 
records of beneficiaries, by social security number. These are 
checked against federal records of employment during the same time 
span to identify claimants with the same social security numbers.
Where the possibility of employment is indicated for the same 
claimant during the same weeks for which benefits were paid, payroll 
records for the claimant are then secured from their employers on 
a week-by-week basis. If the claimant has been paid benefits 
for weeks in which he claimed to be unemployed when he was in fact 
employed, fraud is charged.
The Ohio Bureau reasons that in order to measure fairly the incidence 
and nature of known fraud it is necessary to accumulate data on 
beneficiaries and fraud charges over a period of years. The time 
span for the initial study embraced the decade from 1966 through 
1975, which offered the advantage not only of including high prosperity 
years, but also assured that fraud charges were related to the years 
within which beneficiaries were paid. It was found that fraud often 
was not discovered until one or more years after it occurred.
Ohio’s comprehensive statistical programme includes an anomaly: 
no data is kept on sentences imposed upon conviction for unemployment 
benefit fraud. Consequently, in an otherwise model catalogue of 
fraud data, no pattern can be drawn as to either type or consistency 
of punishment meted out for each kind of fraud activity.
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Fraud charges, during that decade, were developed for 26,462 
beneficiaries, roughly 2,600 per year. As is true generally throughout 
the United States (and in Britain), the most common type of fraud 
is failure to report wages earned while drawing benefits, accounting 
for 78.7% of all Ohio fraud identifications. During 1976, a total 
of 2,337 cases of fraud were identified, of which 525 were recommended 
for prosecution (22.4%). Of this number, there were 360 convictions 
(70%), compared with the national average of 9.63%.
An interesting facet of Ohio's statistical interest is reflected in
sex and racial data - not maintained by most other states. Only
7 out of 10 beneficiaries were men, yet better than 4 out of 5
fraud charges were leveled at men. The fraud rate for men (1.29%)
was more than twice that for women (0.62%). The incidence of fraud
was substantially higher among non-white than among white beneficiaries,
and the fraud rate among non-white men more than twice that for
non-white women. Non-white men, representing one-eighth of all
male beneficiaries, accounted for nearly one-third of the fraud
among all men. The non-white male fraud rate of 3.34% was more
than triple that for white men. A significant adverse deviation
in Ohio statistics, however, is found relative to the national average
dollar amount per fraud case. Ohio's average amount for 1976
was $346.64 against a national average of $309.72; for 1977,
Ohio's average was $440.62 against a national average of £350.43.
One postulates that Ohio's aggressive fraud programme prompts those
who attempt fraud to act in accordance with the "might as well be
hanged for a horse as a colt" option, and to be more clever than
is necessary in other states since detection brings to them more
25
serious consequences
25. Source of Ohio data: Study by William Papier, Director of
Research and Statistics, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services,




In 1954, the Eighth International Conference of Labor Statisticians,
organised by the International Labour Office (ILO) of the United
Nations, agreed on the following broad definitions of unemployment:
(a) workers previously employed but presently without jobs who are
seeking work; (b) persons without previous job experience who are
seeking work; (c) persons on temporary or indefinite lay-off without
pay, (d) persons without a job but who have arrangements to start
a job at a date subsequent to the period for which unemployment data
is being gathered. The same Conference determined that two categories
of persoqs would be excluded from unemployment data: (a) persons
intending to start their own business and thus not seeking work
during the data period, (b) former unpaid family workers, not seeking
26
gainful employment during the data period.
While ILO members, including Britain and the United States, 
endorse these broad definitions, certain variations are present in 
each system of measurement. For example, while the ILO decision 
includes as unemployed those who are jobless but temporarily sick, 
adult students seeking work, and those temporarily suspended 
from work, Brit&in excludes them from its tally. Conversely, persons 
who have not sought work during a specified period are excluded from 
unemployment date by the ILO, but are included in the British method.
26. "International Unemployment Statistics". Department of 
Employment Gazette, July 1976.
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Britain
British unemployment statistics are "registration based" on monthly
reports cross-checked between UBO and Employment Services Agency
registers at the local level, with data consolidated at regional
offices and iinneled to DE in London. To these local totals are
added non-claimant registrants: persons unemployed who seek
employment but who are not receiving unemployment benefits - mainly
married women paying reduced NI contributions; persons registered
with ESA but not drawing benefits are subtracted from local figures -
those employed but seeking to change their jobs. Neither of these
alterations to the reconciled UBO-ESA register total exerts
significant influence on the overall national unemployed figure to
27
contaminate comparisons with unemployment in other ILO countries.
United States
In the United States the method of measurement is based on a monthly 
household sampling, called the Current Population Survey (CPS),
Under this method, a sample of cities and counties or groups of 
counties is chosen from the 3,146 counties and cities in the 
country. The Bureau of the Census designs and selects the sample 
of 461 areas which includes 923 counties and cities in every state 
and the District of Columbia. The sample reflects urban and rural 
areas, different types of industrial and farming areas, and the 
major geographic divisions of the country in the same proportion as 
they occur in the nation as a whole. Each of these areas is
27. Interviews: ESA administrators, London and Bath, 10-13 July 
1978
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subdivided into smaller clusters of about four dwelling units, from
which those to be surveyed in a particular month are chosen; these
households are then interviewed. About 47,000 households are
eligible for interview - about 1 in every 1,500 throughout the nation.
Each month, one-fourth of the households in the sample is replaced
28
so that no family is interviewed more than 4 consecutive months.
Since the American method is a sample and not a total count, it 
does not produce results exactly the same as could be obtained by 
using the British method or by interviewing the total population. 
Statistically, however, the chances are 90 out of 100 that the 
estimate of unemployment from such a sample is within 185,000 of 
the figure obtainable from a total census. Since monthly unemployment 
totals have ranged between 3 and 8 million in recent years, the 
possible error resulting from sampling is not large enough to 
distort the total unemployment picture.
Both Britain and the United States use age 16 as the base limit 
for unemployment measurement. The two nations differ with respect 
to count of military forces: Britain includes its forces in the 
denominator for calculating unemployment rates, whereas the USA 
counts only the civilian labour force.
Comparison of Fraud Incidence - Britain-United States
At Table 54 is a columnar summary of UK and USA annual fraud
data for the period 1973 through 1977, from which comparisons are
28. Stinson, John F. How The Government Measures Unemployment.
Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department 
of Labor, 1977
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drawn with respect to selected fraud incidence. An important factor 
to be taken into account throughout discussion of this and succeeding 
tables is the approximate one-to-four ratio between British and ^
American total populations.
By the end of the period, British unemployment had increased by 
4.0% compared with the 3.2% rise in American unemployment. At the 
same time, both countries experienced a dramatic increase in the 
number of fraud cases detected. British cases detected had increased 
by 223%, while an even higher 300% increase had occurred in the USA.
The roughly parallel relationship between increased unemployment 
and increased number of detected fraud cases in Britain is shown 
at Table 5.5a; only the decline of 2,000 in the number of cases 
detected in 1974 appears irregular in the face of a rise of 150,000 
in the total number of unemployed during that same year. While no 
official explanation of this anomaly has been made by DE or DHSS, 
experienced administrators in both departments theorise that it 
may be one of the side effects of the miners strike. They postulate 
that the sudden, tremendous increase in claimant traffic necessitated 
that their claims be handled under emergency procedures by part-time 
personnel and co-operating employers who lacked both the time and 
necessary expertise to detect possible fiddling.
At Table 5.5b is graphed another anomalous situation as it occurred 
in the USA with respect to the relationship between numbers of 
unemployed and cases of detected fraud between 1975 and 1977. Note 
that a slight decline in total unemployment was accompanied by a steep 
rise in cases detected fraud cases. Officials of the Employment and 
Training Division, U.S. Department of Labor (Region IX) were queried 
as to explanations for this situation. They stated that, although
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they cannot officially confirm or support factually what they 
believe to be true, they are reasonably convinced that the following 
two factors account for the anomaly. First, due to the disparate 
eligibility standards among the states, some much more permissive 
than others, potential offenders target the more permissive ones 
for attempts at wilful mis-representation. Consequently, claimants 
bent on deceit flock to such states, thus increasing the national 
total fraud incidence when input from each state is compiled in 
Washington. Second, some states had inadvertently encouraged 
spurious claims in another way, by suspending or repealing entirely 
the means by which fraudulent claims could be aggressively prosecuted, 
Mississippi and Arizona as examples. These same states, once the 
runaway fraud incidence became realised, took remedial action, 
Mississippi among the first to do so. It should be noted as well 
that the groundwork for high claimant traffic had been established 
in 1973 and 1974 during the "energy crisis", and that a certain 
momentum is believed to have been generated thereby which tends to 
continue until some arresting action occurs by synergy or through 
specific legislation - as in the case of Mississippi.
Table 5.6 compares UK with USA cases authorised for prosecution 
of the total number of detected cases. By 1977, the British had 
tripled the number of fraud cases prosecuted over their 1973 figure, 
while the number of detected cases had increased by about two and 
one-quarter times the 1973 figure. This indicates a progressivly 
sterner prosecution policy applied over the 5-year period. Just 
the opposite trend is observable in the USA relationship between 
increases in detected cases and cases prosecuted. While American 
prosecutions increased by slightly more than double the 1973 figure, 
the number of detected cases had in fact tripled. This tends to
185











UK} Detected Cases of Fraud
USA: Cases Prosecuted of 
Cases Detected
UK: Cases Prosecuted of Cases Detected
1 9 7 6
186
confirm the substance of the U.S Department of Labor officials’ 
contentions that easier eligiblity coupled with less aggressive 
control measures were factors contributing to the anomaly.
Throughout the period, Britain maintained a near-99% success rate 
in obtaining convictions of the total number of cases prosecuted, 
while the American performance in this respect was dismal by 
comparison. See Table 5.7a (numbers) and Table 5.7b (percentages).
It is in this area of convictions for fraud that the most dramatic 
difference is seen between the UK and USA fraud control experience. 
With a 60% conviction rate in 1973, the overall USA national pattern 
improved to reach 70% in 1975 - the highest rate achieved to date.
It then declined to 65% in 1976 and sank to an all-time low of 37% 
in 1977. Queries made to the U.S.Bureau of Labor Statistics have 
yielded no official rationale to explain either the consistently 
low rate of convictions vis-a-vis the British, or the steep decline 
in 1977, the same year in which there was a 300% rise in the number 
of fraud cases detected compared with that of 1973.
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COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN EMPLOYERS' AND CLAIMANTS' ATTITUDES
Introduction
Attitudes are elusive properties. They are often fleeting, products 
of momentary states of mind which result from a particular set of 
real or fancied circumstances, or as a consequence of a specific 
phenomenon which occurs only infrequently or never again. On the 
other hand, attitudes may be products of slower development and 
gradual solidification over an extended period of time, thus not 
results of pure chance or atypical situations. In any case, 
attitudes are indications of feelings, impressions, emotions, 
affections and disaffections, biases, prejudices and convictions which 
may or may not be traceable to sound data bases. Formal definitions 
of the term "attitude" agree that it is a "settled behaviour, as 
indicating opinion", or a "settled mode of thinking".
Examination and interpretation of British and American attitudes 
toward unemployment insurance and the benefits which it provides 
required inquiry into the two attitude sources most concerned: 
employers and claimants. For each of these sources, two approaches 
were followed, each entailing random sampling either by interview 
or questionnaire, with a total sample of 565.
The first approach was qualitative, based on interviews with 247 
members of both employer and claimant blocs, exploration of existing 
literature and research of media reportage. For purposes of easy
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reference, labels have been coined and assigned to the attitudes 
which have emerged most clearly from the research.
The second approach was quantitative, consisting of analysis and 
interpretation of statistical data obtained from 318 employers and 
claimants by questionnaire. It is emphasised that each of these 
approaches should be construed as contributing in equal measure to 
the purpose of this chapter.
The quantitative approach is not intended to provide point-for- 
point support to the attitudes discussed in the qualitative approach. 
This was the initial aim: the means to achieve it were explored 
during the initial design stages of the research. During preliminary 
tests to determine the exact content of questionnaires, it became 
apparent that inclusion of any statement perceived by a respondent 
as requiring admission of attempts to defraud any part of the 
unemployment benefit system would result in his/her refusal to 
participate. Consequently, statements conveying the possibility of 
self-incrimination were eliminated from questionnaires, and personal 
interviews relied upon exclusively to provide such information. 
Respondents were more willing to express themselves frankly on 
matters having possible legal implications when no formal document 
was used to record their views.
Accordingly, the qualitative approach was allowed to assume its own 
character with the attitudes identified therein not tied to subsequent 
mathematical applications, but emerging instead from the ensemble 
of sources consulted: unstructured interviews, press and other media 
reportage.
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Both approaches involved extensive contact with members of each 
population, employer and claimant, in both countries. Within the 
United Kingdom, contacts were made in the greater London area,
Bristol, Bath, several locales in Scotland, as well as eastern Wales.
In the USA, contacts were made primarily in the state of Hawaii, 
but also in California, New York, Illinois, Colorado and Mississippi.
With respect to the first (qualitative) approach, a total of 247 
interviews were conducted from which qualitative data were derived. 
These interviews included worker-claimants and members of lower, 
mid and top levels of management in both public and private sectors. 
Footnote references to such conversations are confined to the term 
"interviews" instead of citing specific individuals. This was done 
to protect interviewee identity, a condition which many of them 
insisted upon prior to interview. In almost every such case, the 
interviewee expressed little which could be considered defamatory 
regarding the system or its administrators. Still, the blanket 
of anonymity was a frequent pre-condition to frank expression of 
feelings.
No formal writings devoted exclusively to attitudes toward unemployment 
benefits were identified during the research. Although some 
writers mention them, they do so in conjunction with the making of 
some other point. Such references rarely go beyond a simple 
acknowledgement that attitudes on this subject do exist and are 
of concern; elaboration, if any, is of the most general variety.
Media coverage, on the other hand, provides a continuing source 
of valuable information since it reflects contemporary opinions on 
the operation of the benefits system as derived from investigative 
reporting and statements from members of both the public and private
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sectors. Included in media coverage from time to time is reportage 
of claimant attitudes, particularly those which are based on some 
unusual human interest feature.
Assignment of labels to attitudes discussed herein is necessary as 
a reference tool. From interviews and media, attitudes emerge from 
an unstructured series of phrases, anecdotes and viewpoints expressed 
in ways and language highly personal to the individual respondent.
From this tangle of individual sentiment, much of which is markedly 
idiosyncratic, identifying labels have been coined for easy 
reference. Each such label is applied to embrace a number of
sentiments among which a discernible grouping has emerged.
In both countries, equal time and emphasis were placed on obtaining 
information through personal face-to-face and telephone contact 
with employers and claimants, and through their responses to written 
questionnaires. While each of these means produced usable data,
the synergism achieved in using both means complementarity is believed
to have yielded greater value than would have been the case if either 
means had been used exclusively.
First Approach; Qualitative
General British and American Attitudes
Traditionally, Great Britain and the United States have exhibited 
immense pride in being work-oriented societies. The "Protestant 
Ethic" has been revered in their pulpits and legislative utterances
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for several centuries. In the United States, through direct 
importation from England during initial colonisation, the moral and 
psychological value of work has been consistently emphasised.
The medical profession lends its prestige to such emphasis, 
attaching significance to it in physical conditioning and rehabilitation 
programmes. "Whatever reservations there might be in individual 
cases concerning the appropriateness of employment as a psychological 
goal, there is a deeply rooted belief in our society that, to put 
it simply, 'work is good for you.' Such a belief is open to 
challenge but must not be lightly dismissed in an appraisal of 
administrative policy."^
A collateral attitude, shared by both nations in their legislative 
histories, is that public funds should not be used to support those 
who are able and available to work but contrive to avoid doing so.
Some discussion was accorded this point in the chapter on legislative 
philosophies earlier in this study. This belief has been altered 
considerably through progressive liberalisation of the ensemble of 
benefit policies. It appears now as a generally accepted modus 
that public funds can and should be so used, although on a temporary 
basis, to maintain the income level of unemployed persons seeking 
new work who have in the past demonstrated their regular attachment 
to the workforce. This point is corroborated by the results of 
quantitative analysis, as discussed in the second section of this 
chapter.
Still a third common tradition in Britain and the USA centres on 
the material incentive offered by work. This point has been woven
1. Stevenson, Olive. Claimant or Client? London: George
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1973.
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consistently into the fabric of Parliamentary and Congressional 
debate and legislation. It is clear that financial and material 
incentive is closely related to the work motivation of most 
individuals. Incentive is a fluid property, however, there is no 
clear-cut point at which a comparison of wages with units of output 
per man can lead to confidence that the work incentive for that 
particular individual can be either measured or determined solely by 
the amount of his earnings.
The average British or American worker in the mid-eighteen hundreds
put in about seventy hours per week on the job, usually from six
2
in the morning until six at night. Before and during World War I 
in Britain, just as before and during the Great Depression of the 
1930's in the United States, similar work patterns were common 
among unskilled and semi-skilled trades. The work ethic was ingrained 
into the thinking of the population-at-large; only mavericks flouted 
it - and they were scornfully relegated to the fringes of society.
Yet, the traditional respect for these values has been progressively 
eroded. Jargon has developed on both shores during recent times 
which indicates the increasing awareness, and a certain acceptance, 
on the part of the general public that the sum of "unemployment" 
plus "dole" as equalling "stigma", as discussed in the chapter on 
legislative philosophies, is not longer accurate. This jargon 
contains terms such as "voluntarily unemployed", "layabout", "work- 
shy", "scrounger", and others to describe those whose life-styles 
makes them appear unemployed by intent rather than by forces beyond 
t he Jir control.
2. Wigham, Eric. "80 Years of Ministering to Industrial Relations.
Department of Employment Gazette, March 1976.
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Galbraith points out that "in a society of high and increasing 
affluence, there are three plausible tendencies as regards toil.
As the production of goods comes to seem less urgent, and as 
individuals are less urgently in need of income for the purchase 
of goods, they will (choose to) work fewer hours or days in the 
week. Or they will work less hard. Or, as a final possibility,
3
it may be that fewer people will work all the time." It is 
Galbraith's "final possibility" that is especially germane to the 
subject matter of this chapter.
In Britain, the unemployment level was viewed in 1974 with acute
alarm. The total number of unemployed during the month of October
4
that year was reported as 607,000, about 2.7% of the workforce.
"A world that has seen record growth, record inflation, higher interest 
rates than ever before and a worse stock market crash than in 1929 
cannot dismiss the probability that record unemployment will follow 
unless something dramatic is done to stop it, like wage freezes 
at home and international co-operation on petro-dollars abroad."^
In the light of the 1978 British unemployment figure, nearly triple 
that of the 1974 example, the prophecy of "record unemployment" 
seems well-founded. UK and USA unemployment levels, shown as a 
percentage of their total workforce respectively, are at Table 6.1 
for the period 1973-1977.
Pursuing the 1974 example, reduction of the unemployment level 
appeared to be less of an urgent matter a year later, in May 1975, 
when it was reported that "some of those who argue that ministers
3. Galbraith, John Kenneth. The Affluent Society. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976.



















UK datai Department of Employment Gazette, Londoni HMSO,
USA datai U. S, Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington D.C.
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should not panic about a million unemployed (900,000 in April 1975) 
believe that the official unemployment figures seriously overstate 
the numbers in the labour pool willing and able to work."^ Adherents 
to this more tolerant view of the number of those not working stated 
that many of those registered as unemployed were "just changing jobs, 
are incapable of work because of old age, ill-health or lack of the 
right skills, or live in the wrong places and are unwilling to
7
move, or just do not want to work." This 1975 reference to decline 
in the general sense of urgency to reduce the unemployment level 
appears not only more firmly entrenched but is represented by the 
press in 1977 as a key element of Government policy.
"The second key element of the (Government) strategy is that it
involves the toleration of very high unemployment levels. The
Government has tacitly abandoned any significant reduction in
unemployment before next year, confining its efforts in this
direction to limited and specific measures to help ease the special
problems of jobless youths. Indeed, it is in effect relying on the
high unemployment rate to help make State Three workable."^ 7^
The United States, during that same period between 1974 and 1977, 
experienced many of the same economic-cum-labour trauma as Britain, 
but started from a 1974 unemployment rate twice that of Britain.
While Britain's rate hovered near the 2.7% mark, USA's averaged 4.5% 
in 1974, climbing to a high of 8.5% in 1975 and gradually declining 
to 6.1% in early 1978. Thus, the surge of unemployment in Britain was
6. Schools Brief. "Britain's Unemployed". The Economist.
17 May 1975.
7. Ibid.
8. "Modest Boost to Economy in Autumn". The Sunday Telegraph.
3 July 1977.
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matched by a corresponding increase in America, with an accompanying 
dramatic rise in claimant traffic in both nations. Unemployment 
rates provide the best means for comparison; number of unemployed 
cloud the comparative picture due to the disparity in relative size 
of British and American workforces, roughly 22 million in Britian 
and 95 million in the United States.
As in Britain, the urgency felt by a growing number of the unemployed 
to seek new work is perceived to be declining by writers and 
administrators in the field. Guzzardi in 1976 suggested that the 
alientation of many unemployed to steady work may be due in part to
9
the "buffers" which "Shield the jobless from attendant hardships."
He stated further: "Out there in the market place, there may be an 
unfilled job for every one of the 7.6 million unemployed; if not, 
there are surely enough jobs to reduce the number drastically."
Levenson estimated in 1977 that "the growing effects of changes in 
labor force composition, growing voluntariness of unemployment, and 
changes in reporting have added about 2 per centag© points to the 
unemployment rate since the early 1960's. As a result, an unemployment 
rate of 5^ to 6 per cent in mid-1977 compares to an unemployment 
rate of 4 per cent in the early I960's.
The attitude of the federal government of the USA toward the 
seriousness of the unemployment rate is difficult to ascertain. On 
the one hand. Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal stated, in 
response to Newsweek's Arnaud de Borchgrave's question as to what is 
a "reasonable" unemployment rate for the nation, "nothing is reasonable
9. Guzzardi, Walter Hr. "How to Deal with the New Unemployment".
Fortune, October 1976.
10. Levenson, Irving. The Unemployment Problem. Croton-on- 
Hudson: Hudson Institute, July 1977.
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and anything over 5 per cent is unreasonable."^^ On the other
hand, a Humphrey-supported bill in Congress as recently as March 
12
1978 seeks to establish a 4 per cent unemployment rate as 
official "full employment" . Although there is no evidence to suggest 
that the British government entertains a similar dichotomy of views 
as to what should be an officially-recognised full employment 
unemployment rate, it is clear that both governments are more amenable 
and tolerant than ever before to higher rates of unemployment. In 
Britain, the press has called this tolerant attitude a "key element 
of Government policy".
Attitudes on Cost Factors in Unemployment Benefits
The subject of costs is a two-faceted property as regards unemployment 
insurance: on the one hand is the employer's contribution, and on 
the other that of the employee. As stated in the chapter which 
compares administrative procedures, there is a marked difference 
between the requirements of the British system and those in general 
use within the United States. In Britain, unemployment insurance 
is one element of the overall contribution to National Insurance 
(NT) and is paid on a shared basis by employer and employee. In 
the United States, contributions are paid as a separate tax by the 
employer only in all states except Alabama, Alaska and New Jersey.
The subject of attitudes toward costs of funding such insurance
11. Borchgrave, Arnaud de. "And Some of His Plans." Newsweek.
27 December 1976.
12. Introduced into Congress by Senator H H Humphrey prior to his 
death, this bill continues to receive active sponsorship by 
his widow, Muriel Humphrey, who was appointed to serve out her 
husband's term of office by the Governor of Minnesota.
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tends to be somewhat less visible in Britai n than in the United 
States because of this shared versus unilateral aspect, respectively, 
of who pays the bill. About 73% of American employees interviewed 
appear simply to view unemployment benefits as their due; they showed 
neither knowledge of or interest in the funding source since they 
are not obliged to contribute. This is not to say, however, that 
unemployment benefit costs are not commented upon in Britain.
Simply, they are not as identifiable as a specific element of the 
weekly NI contribution as in the USA.
For example, a Hawaii employer is taxed for unemployment insurance
at 3.5% of each employee's first $9,300 annual earnings - the
employee contributes nothing to this fund. This tax is separate
from all others - Social Security, Disability Insurance, medical
plans, and the like - to some of which employees do contribute.
The part of British NI contributions which go to UB are calculable
only as part of an annual estimate. An accurate percentage or
amount of each employee or employer NI contribution applied specifically
to UB is not identifiable. Each year the Government actuary estimates
expenditure on benefits, including UB. For the year 1977-1978, this
estimate of total expenditure was £9,282 million, of which £677
million (about 7.3%) was estimated for UB. "This represents about
7.3% of the product of that part of the contribution which goes to
the National Insurance Fund and 5.8% of the whole contribution 
13
income." Of the employers' contribution, 2% is a straight 
surcharge and goes to the Treasury, not the NI. An additional 2% 
of the contribution income goes to support the National Health Service 
and a small percentage (less than 1%) 1o the Redundancy and Maternity 
Pay Funds. It is emphasised that the above figures are estimates only.
13. Letter. Department of Employment (M E Green), 28 July 1977
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Pooling of such funds under the British system permits mid-stream 
re-allocation of monies among the various elements of the NX programme 
on an as-needed basis.
Tom Forester, writing in the New Society, stated: "As the Government
battled, rightly or wrongly, to reduce public expenditure, one factor
is remorselessly driving it up - unemployment now standing at 1,330,000
or 5.6% of the labour force. During the 13 weeks ended 28 May 1976,
expenditure on unemployment benefit alone (that is, not including any
supplementary benefit payments or administrative costs) amounted
to £138,710,000. Exactly a year before, in the corresponding period,
14
the cost was only about £82,449,000." This is an impressive 
quantum jump of 70% in the space of one year in the cost of income 
maintenance for unemployed persons.
In the United States, 1975 and 1976 were peak years for unemployment 
insurance claims. Over 19 million first payments were made within 
that 2-year period, with a total benefit cost of $24.2 billion. A 
first payment is that paid for the first compensable week of unemployment, 
In 1975, 11.1 million payments were made at a total cost of just over 
$l3./billion. In 1976, with the economy improving, 8.6 million first 
payments were made and a total of $11.0 billion was spent in benefit 
p a y m e n t s . E v e n  though this represents a decline in the total dollar 
amount of benefit payments nationwide, state autonomy exercised to 
adjust levels of payment according to economic and unemployment 
conditions within each state made for increases in some states 
and declines in others. Important here is the totality of impact on
14. Forester, Tom, "Who, Exactly, Are the Unemployed?" New Society,
13 January 1977.
15. Shimonkevitz, Ruth. "To Catch a Cheat". Worklife, February 1978.
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employers' cost of doing business as a consequence of rises in payroll 
taxes in 47 of the 50 states. Although the federal regulations call 
for a payroll tax floor on the first $4,200 of wages or salary, certain 
states have doubled that figure in order to re-establish Unemployment 
Trust Fund solvency. Hawaii, for example, requires 3.5% tax on 
the first $9,300 of wages or salary per capita employee.
As pointed out in the chapter comparing procedures, twenty-two states 
have run through their state unemployment funds and are technically 
bankrupt. At the end of the 1976 fiscal year, the General (federal 
level) Trust Fund showed a balance of some $5.5 million^^, but that 
balance is illusory. The system overall has had actually to borrow 
some $10 billion (£4.9 thousand million) from the U.S. Treasury to 
keep afloat. It has long since passed through the shadow line of 
feeding at the public trough and become a full-fledged public charge, 
despite technical responsibility on the part of each state to provide 
unemployment benefits from its own revenues,
British attitudes on the benefit costs were aired in Parliament and 
in the press on the publication of the Nin+h Report of the Committee 
of Public Accounts of 29 September 1977. The spirited discussions in 
the House of Commons which greeted its release provided grist for 
the mills,of every newspaper in Britain.
The key issue was the overpayment to claimants in all categories 
including unemployment benefits during the 1975-76 financial year, 
the grand total of which was reported by the Committee as £10,800,000 
into the hands of 735,852 claimants. Of this sum, £2.6 million was
16. Davenport, John. "The Welfare State vs the Public Welfare".
Fortune, June 1976.
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attributed to fraud of some kind involving 80,660 cases; roughly £5.2 
million was due to official (DHSS or DE) error, with the remaining 
£2.9 million paid out because of mistaken information supplied by 
claimants during filing procedures. From the DE an identification 
was made of UB total overpayments and a trend line established of 
comparison, USA figures have been incorporated into similar trend 
lines. This comparison is shown at Table 6.2. Total UB overpayments 
are those made for all reasons, to include administrative error.
UK total and fraud UB overpayments reflect parallel increases of 
370%, while American total overpayments rose by a lesser 300% 
and fraud overpayments by 240% In both nations the most dramatic 
increase in total overpayments occurred between 1975 and 1977.
The British Ninrhh Report created a "cause celebre" in the House
and furnished Members belonging to the watchdog (of DE and DHSS)
bloc a ready-made issue with which to press further the theme of
previous allegations that the two Departments were slack in assuring
prevention, detection and prosecution of wrongful claims. MP
laian Sproat said that "the figure of £2.7 million overpaid through
fraud was an absurd underestimate... I would put the amount
17lost to the taxpayer as more than £200 million." Mr Campbell 
Christie, Deputy General Secretary of the Civil and Public Servants' 
Association reacted angrily to the Report accusing the Committee of 
hysteria and "getting their knickers in a twist." He said further 
that the real problem was the £240 million of benefit not claimed 
by those who need them - no explanation of that figure appeared in 
the press. Referring to the 0.12% of the total benefit expenditure 
reported as overpayment by the Committee, Mr Christie asked: "How
17. The Times, 30 September 1977
18. The Sun, 30 September 1977
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many businesses make as few mistakes as that?"
Press reports featured such headlines as "Whitehall Bunglers Lose
£5m",^^ "Benefit Overpaid ^y Only £ 1 0 m ' W h i l e  the headlines
were obviously geared to stir readers' ire, certain of the newspapers
in discussing the facts of the matter, took pains to lay them out
in a context of sober objectivity. The Financial Times pointed out
that the average error per case of £14.67 and that the overall
overpayment, staggering at first glance, actually represented a
"mere 0.12% of total expenditure on benefits,..Considering the
enormous size and complexity of the system, this is an insignificant 
21
level of error."
Attitudes Toward Claimant Changes of Residence
The tendency on the part of certain claimants to change residence 
and draw benefits from UBO's in other than their usual home locations 
is attracting closer public scrutiny. Long removed from the 15th 
century restrictions against such movements, workforce mobility in 
the United Kingdom has been on the increase during the past century, 
and has been encouraged especially during the past 60 years as one 
means of establishing employment balance among regions of differing 
economic health. In the United States, workforce location shifts 
have traditionally been a way of life. During the early colonial 
times, and even later when railroads were being extended across 
the continent, worker mobility was a necessity for continuing the
19. Daily Mail, 30 September 1977
20. The Times, 30 September 1977
21. Financial Times, 30 September 1977
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westward movement of the frontier. American workers gravitate from 
no-work areas to places where greater promise of employment beckons.
The last large-scale relocation of workers occurred during the thirties 
when dust storms ravaged the farms of Oklahoma, Arkansas and some of 
the other plains states, stimulating farmers to seek work further 
westward in order to feed their families. Steinbeck's "Grapes of 
Wrath" was a major portrait of the life of workers on the move during 
that era.
The attitudes expressed by the general public toward unemployed
workers who move to new places and there collect unemployment benefits
are perceived as uniformly adverse in Britain and in the USA. British
journalists writing during the summer and early autumn of 1977 left
no doubt as to the public temper toward the mobile exponent of the
"Why Work" attitude. The Evening News ran an editorial which drew
attention to the "familiar... happy, smiling pictures of bronzed
scroungers queuing up for their pocket money outside (UBO) offices
on the South Coast...it is galling to reflect that healthy young
welders from Birmingham, say, can present themselves in Torquay,
claim to be looking for work, knowing full well that there is none
to suit them, and take their ease thereafter at the expense of
the taxpayer...The ill-paid and sometimes inexperienced clerical
staff have to contend day after day, with a bewildering assortment
of problems...a harrassed girl counter clerk, one imagines, is no
22
match for a plausible and practised parasite." Yet, what these 
"parasites" are doing in such cases is perfectly legal.
In the United States, similar indignation is felt toward the unemployed 
"vacationers" but, again, the practice is unassailable on legal grounds,
22. Evening News, 30 September 1977
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Although each state operates its own brand of unemployment benefits 
system, a condition for federal approval of state unemployment 
insurance laws - necessary to permit the state to receive federal 
subsidy to cover state administrative costs - requires that "compensation 
shall not be denied or reduced to an individual solely because he 
files a claim in another state...or because he resides in another
23
state...at the time he files a claim for unemployment compensation".
Accordingly, all states have entered into agreements which allow
an individual to collect unemployment benefits from the state in
which he has established eligibility, although he is not physically
present in that state. The state in which the claimant files his
claim acceptait, acting as agent for the state that is liable for
the benefits. Determinations as to eligibility, disqualifications,
and the amount and duration of benefits are made by the liable state.
The purpose of these agreements is to encourage a claimant to
move from a state where no suitable work is available to one where
there is a demand for the type of service the worker performs. The
rationale here is that to do otherwise would inhibit the mobility
of labour and tend to prolong a claimant's unemployment in some
cases because of his reluctance to seek work in another state. As
an example: laid off from his job in the Philadelphia area, a young
welder moved to Atlantic City for a summer of sun, fun and unemployment
benefits. For more than a year he received $91 (£43) a week tax-
free, collecting cash on the side working part-time as a bartender.
By no means is this an isolated example. One week in the winter of
1975, New York (state) mailed 12,234 unemployment cheques to Florida,
7939 to Puerto Rico and 5457 to Southern California. In Washington,
a state with high unemployment at that time, a study by the Seattle
Times reported that "30 per cent of the 140,000 persons drawing
23. U.S. Federal Unemployment Tax Act. Section 3304(9)(A). 1935, 
as amended.
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benefits are not entitled to them under the original intent of
24
employment security laws."
Effectively, these regulations permit American unemployed workers 
to enjoy the same type of benefits while transients, say, in Florida 
as their British counterparts from Birmingham do in Torquay, The 
public attitudes expressed toward these practices on both sides of 
the Atlantic are the same: angry frustration at the permissiveness 
of the law.
Employer Attitudes
Subjective analysis of British and American employers' attitudes 
toward unemployment benefits reveals little disparity between them.
They appear to sympathise with the plight of their workers, especially 
those with families, who have been laid off or permanently terminated 
due to economic pressure beyond an employer's control; and they support 
the right of such persons to unemployment benefits while searching 
for new jobs. These same employers are virtually unanimous in their 
condemnation of three major aspects of the system: the costs they 
must bear, permissiveness toward "layabouts" who are able to subvert 
the intent of the system to finance their voluntary unemployment, 
and the erosive effect of governmental employment policies on their 
right to manage.
The only significant disparity between British and American employers 
appears in the cost area, and even then it is not a fundamental
24. Op Cit. Tomlinson, Kenneth Y
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difference, but rather a question of visibility, as discussed in a 
previous section of this chapter. Within the context of this section 
on employer attitudes, costs play such an important role as to merit 
some further discussion and to serve as a departure point for 
discussion of the other two major aspects.
Businesses in the USA which once were little concerned about unemployment
insurance costs are now finding them a significant profit leak.
These taxes have mushroomed in recent years because of their higher
benefits, longer periods during which benefits are paid, and increased
numbers of claims. For example, a Mid-western company with 2,500
employees throughout six states paid about $75,.000 into state
unemployment insurance funds during 1971. In 1977, the company
25
paid approximately £150,000. When current trends are extrapolated 
for the next several years, this same company anticipates a further 
doubling of the current figure to $300,000 for unemployment benefits 
alone, exclusive of all the other taxes to which employers are 
obligated.
A Denver certified public accountant (chartered accountant) representing
a cross-section of small businesses complained about a rise in
employer payrolls tax: "This rate increase caused a greater burden on
these clients; a burden to which they strongly object and cannot 
26continue to bear." Another employer (Hawaii), representing some 
300 other employers, links rising payroll taxes for support of 
unemployment benefits to slipshod administration of the system: "I 
believe that Department's (Department of Labor and Industrial Relations)
25. "Tightening Up Unemployment Pay Rules", Nation's Business.
March 1977.
26. Turner, Thomas A. Letter to the Denver Post; published therein
18 June 1976.
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record of misbehaviour has been a significant factor in unnecessarily
increasing the costs of benefits (to employers) and depleting the
(Unemployment) Trust Fund. It has been my personal experience that
the efficiency of the Department has continued to decline...
Particularly is (an) explanation deserved by the businessmen of
Hawaii; they are the ones - the only ones - being required to maintain
27
the Trust Fund by a tax upon their payrolls."
Pointing up once again the difference between British and American
employer views on costs as related to who pays the bill, Keith
Davis wrote: "Qualifications making claimants either eligible or
ineligible were initially put into the law to protect the employer,
who after all pays the full cost of the unemployment programme.
It is a fact that the same employer who foots the bill has little
control over claimants who decide to leave the job. It is, therefore,
proper that there be some control in the law to protect that 
„28
taxpayer.
On the other two major aspects of employer attitudes, subversion of
the system's original intent and governmental restrictions on labour
practices, British and American employers speak in the same angry
voice. British employers denounce "Government policies which take
away our right to operate our business and our people so we can
29
remain profitable and survive." Such employers see themselves 
as something like forgotten men in that, in their view, many labour- 
related legislative actions seem to be devoted to the benefit of
27. Brodie, Lex. Small Business Association Speech Report.
Honolulu: 23 September 1976.
28. Davis, Keith D, "Responsibility for Job Decision". Chicago
Daily News, 18 June 1976.
29. Interviews: Trowbridge, Bath, London, Portree, Inverness, 
July-October 1977.
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unemployed persons without regard for how they became unemployed 
or the degree of conscientious effort they are making to become 
re-employed. American employers join with their British counterparts 
in voicing resentment against government-sponsored protective 
devices for employees which are seen as discriminating against 
employers as providers of jobs and to favour claimants who do not 
wish to work but live on the backs of those who do.
Employer "Fiddling"
Nor are employers' attitudes confined to problems of managerial 
options vis-a-vis regulated industrial relations. Those interviewed 
on both sides of the Atlantic expressed their ire in the strongest 
terms against their own kind when the subject of collusion between 
employer and employee was mentioned. Cases of ccSlusion between 
consenting employer and employees who draw benefits while working 
are difficult to track-down and prove, even when experienced 
investigators are on their track. Collusion most often is found 
where an employer agrees to hire someone who is drawing unemployment 
benefits and not report the fact to the local UBO. This permits 
the employer to avoid his per capita contribution for the employee, 
while the employee continues to sign at the UBO and draw his second 
(benefit) paycheque. Or, in the United Kingdom, the employer 
admits only to paying the claimant 75 pence per day, which entitles 
the claimant to continue on full benefits. In reality, such an 
employer normally pays somewhere closer to the going rate, yet 
the net advantages to each party in terms of avoidance of taxes 
is the same. Upstanding employers hold no brief for this type of 
conspiracy, and appear to be much harder on an offending employer
12
than on an involved claimant. In Bristol, one interviewee-employer
made his position clear: "Businessmen who lend themselves to such
fiddles as that are doing their own kind out of this money, and the
30
public as well. They want their backsides kicked,"
On this subject, employers tend to support the British
Government's position as expressed by Mr Stanley Orme in early 1977:
"In particular we shall pursue every possibility of dealing more .
effectively with collusive employers who, for their own financial
advantage, help claimants to benefits to work on the side. Our
two Departments (DHSS and DE) are very ready to examine any evidence
that can be provided for collusion by employers, and to take firm
31
action against it." British officials and employers find reason 
to rejoice when collusion comes to light.
In the case of British claimant Dennis Thompson and employer Terence
Young, the court found that the former had been working as a labourer
for the latter over a period of two years at £35 per week while
drawing unemployment benefits and also supplementary benefits.
Thompson was jailed for 15 months; his accommodating employer, Young,
32
was fined £200 and another £200 for court costs. In another case,
an employment agency manager was being pressed to get workers at a 
time when they were better off receiving unemployment benefit, 
according to the story told to Preston Magistrates in October 1976. 
The manager made up false names for his company's clients so that 
they would work part time and still claim state benefit. The 
manager, Paul Martin, pleaded guilty to six specimen charges and
30. Interview: Bristol, 27 July 1977
31. "Parliament". The Times, 17 February 1977
32. "Judge Calls for Probe". Newcastle Journal, 24 December 1976.
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asked for another 36 cases to be considered. Martin stated:
"People came in knowing I could get them work under false names
33
so their benefits would continued to be paid them."
American administrators of unemployment benefits are well aware
that the same type of employer "fiddles" are being perpetrated in
various states of the United States. The most frequent complaint
against American employers is that they fail to report employee
wages, for one reason or another. "Some pay wages in cash and do
not report them, thereby attempting to escape paying taxes and
permitting claimants to draw benefits while working", John F
Meystrik, Director of Missouri's Division of Employment Security
said.^^ Montana Administrator Barrett went further: "When an
employer tries to avoid paying taxes (for unemployment insurance),
it is either done consciously, with the employer knowing that we
do not have sufficient resources to audit employer accounts as
often as we should, or the evasion is done without full knowledge
35
of the method of taxation, rates of taxes, and the like." Neal
36
S Crosier, Massachusetts Administrator of Unemployment Insurance, 
said that he has found instances of employers letting workers go 
for cause while in fact releasing them for lack of work. Some 
cynical industries in Massachusetts have used the jobless pay 
system to maintain a labour force by spreading available work among 
as many employees as possible and clearing the way for others to 
collect unemployment insurance benefits. The growing popularity 
and efficiency of computerisation of records is aiding measurably
33. "False Names for Clients". The Times, 2 November 1976.
34. Report to State Legislature of Missouri. August 1977.
35. Barrett, Edward K. Speech to Butte (Montana) Rotary Club,
30 January 1978.
36. Conference of State Civil Service Administrators, Boston,
14 March 1978.
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the ability of state officials to detect employer-employee cddusion
operated for the purpose of mutual advantage. Hawaii requires all 
hires and discharges to be reported by name to the Department of 
Labor and Industrial Relations; this enables cross-match of claimant 
rolls with employer reports to determine suspected "earning while 
drawing" instances. Colorado, Mississippi, New York, Illinois and 
a growing number of other states have or are in the process of 
instituting similar procedures in order to reduce the collusion 
incidence. British and American attitudes among legitimate employers 
toward this practice are uitformly accustory and insistent that such 
cases be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.
Claimant Attitudes
'Why Work'
The "Why Work" label applies to what appears currently as an 
alienated approach to the long-standing work ethic by some British 
and American claimants. This attitude evokes loud cries of censure 
from the traditionalist, Protestant-ethic-oriented members of 
society. Yet, the "Why Work" approach is defended and, in a sense, 
even marketed by others who are quick to extol the spiritual and 
philosophical uplift accruing to those who somehow avoid dedicating 
their full energies to work and material gain. These "Why Work" 
defenders are equally quick to illustrate in quantitative terms 
the erosion of material rewards to those who do exercise such 
dedication because of the tax bite into their earnings. As the 
British journalist Dancy puts it: "The Protestant ethic is in
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flight...the traditional housemasterly policy of ’work now and play
37
later’ has fewer and fewer adherents.”
Now Guzzardi addresses that same theme in respect to the USA 
by pointing out that those who lost their jobs through no fault of 
their own are barely over half of all the unemployed, and are mostly 
adults. ’’Many others are unemployed because of actions they took 
more or less voluntarily: they quit their last job, just joined 
the labour force or just rejoined it.”
This attitude is a focus of controversy between those taking advantage 
of a benefits system either in the United Kingdom or in one of 
the American states to which they may contribute only to the extent 
necessary to insure eligibility, and the other major segment which 
supports the benefits system through consistent work. It is useful 
to examine the parties to this dichotomy.
A good place to start is with those who take advantage of the system 
and opt for a benefits-based life-style, the so-called ’’voluntarily 
unemployed”, defined in this context as those who intentionally remain 
unemployed. There are probably members of this group whose anti­
work attitudes derive not from particular occupational frustrations, 
but from the values of their particular sub-culture. Experienced 
officials in both countries are convinced that there are certain 
men whose irregular or casual employment and consequent reliance 
on unemployment and other benefits are as normal a way of life to 
them as the ’’war” waged by middle class taxpayers against the Inland 
Revenue (UK) or the Internal Revenue Service (USA). Such work-shy
37. Dancy, John. ’’Pop Goes the Protestant Ethic”. The Guardian,
24 September 1977.
38. Op. Cit. Guzzardi, Walter Jnr.
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persons appear to withold their subscription to what are held generally 
to be the approved, conventional work standards of society.
Of related interest are two studies which inquire into possible 
contributory influences on formulation of work attitudes by young 
people.
In England, Dr West's studies suggest that criminal fathers are more
likely than most to fill their pockets from the State, presumably
when crime fails to pay, and that they have sons who inherit both
39delinquency and a ''social, attitude to welfare benefits." His 
findings seem startling as they relate to benefit statistics. "A 
third of law-abiding fathers who had never been on the dole had sons 
who claimed. But well over half the fathergwho had received unemployment 
pay had sons who had drawn it too."
40
Levenson (USA), in his 1976 study is in general agreement with West's 
findings as they relate to the American experience with unemployment 
among the young. Of interest in this connection are the studies of 
American teenage unemployment among white and non-white segments 
of the population. Among these, the Armbruster-Bracken study concludes 
that the problem of the benefit-prone young, and especially young 
non-whites can be expected to improve only very slowly; indeed, some 
forces may work in the opposite direction. "The deterioration in 
educational performance over the last decade could make all youth 
more susceptible to unemployment in the future, and affect non-whites 
more than white. The growth of ghetto areas characterised by high 
crime, drug addiction, truancy, and racial hostility could contribute
39. West, Donald, Dr Medicine, Science and Law. January 1977.
London: Macmillan, 1977.
40. Op. Cit. Levenson, Irving.
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to unemployment and further stimulate benefit-based life-styles
by hindering development of attachment to the labour force and of
41
basic work habits and attitudes."
In making a comparison, although the racial problem in Britain is 
of relatively more recent vintage than in America, the signs of 
ghetto-isation, open belligerency between whites and blacks, and 
dependency on state-granted benefits is moving rather quickly to 
parallel the current situation in the United States.
With respect to the erosion of work-related material gain, both the
United Kingdom and the United States have liberalised unemployment
benefits by increasing the tax burden on workers to the point
where there is considerable economic basis for the "Why Work" attitude,
Angus Maude, in discussing the political realities of unemployment
stated: "Consider how little the present Government has in fact
suffered politically from an unemployment figure of around one and
a half million. It is way behind in the opinion poll ratings...But
ten years ago an unemployment total nudging one and a half million,
and showing every sign of a further continuous rise, would have
produced something like a revolution." Maude sums up by saying:
"Indeed, we have reached the anomalous position in which current
tax thresholds and current rates of tax-free benefits can actually
enable a man to enjoy a largernet disposable family income if he is
42
out of work than if he is in a job." An opinion by former U.S.
Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur F Burns provides American reinforcement 
to Maude's statements. Burns says it is imperative that governmental
41. Armbruster, Frank E & Bracken Paul. Our Children's Crippled 
Future. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1977.
42. Maude, Angus. "The Politics of Unemployment". London News,
March 1976.
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practices affecting labour markets be reviewed so that lasting
measures for reducing unemployment can be established. He asserts:
"The present unemployment insurance system may be providing benefits
43
on such a generous scale as to blunt incentives to work."
According to the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, more and
more economists are raising questions about the proper role of the
jobless benefits programme, especially its impact on (lessening) work
incentives. On the same point, Leonard Greene states unequivocally:
"Benefits to the unemployed are high enough now so that some workers
44
receive only a marginal gain in income when they return to work."
Some greater appreciation of the "Why Work" attitude can be acquired
from actual reports of those who live by its tenets. One British
claimant commented on his benefits as follows: "Isn't it marvellous
to think of all those rich old men sweating their eyes out in their
offices so that the likes of me can have a really good time?"^^
Another case tells of the "recollection of a young British miner
on a residential course (while unaTnploye^ in a stately country house
46who saw the wry humour in his 'living like a Duke, on the dole'."
Or yet another report of the redoubtable Mr Stud, known as the "super
scrounger", who coined the motto: "Dominic's my name, and fiddling
is my game." Of his weekly benefits, Mr Stud said: "I mean, how can
I go to work getting the kind of money they (unemployed benefits)
47
offer you? I could never live on it."
43. Burns, Arthur F. Nation's Business, March 1977
44. Greene, Leonard M President, the Institute for Socioeconomic
Studies. White Plains, New York, March 1977.
45. Bruce, Maurice. The Coming of the Welfare State. London: 
William Clowes and Sons Ltd, 1968.
46. Ibid.
47. Chapman, Ray. "Mr iStud the Super Scrounger Moves Into à Class
of His Own". News of the World. 30 January 1977.
219
Mr Stud’s American counterparts reinforce this attitude with the
statement: "There are a million loopholes (in the unemployment
benefit eligiblity regulations of Louisiana) but most people are
not smart enough to find them. Unemployment compensation creates a
sort of utopia. It lets people work for a year and be on vacation
for a year. Of course, one can't live like a king, but gives you a
48
change to travel around, and that's the American dream." In
Michigan, a secretary was asked to research the ease with which
workers could quit and draw unemployment benefits. In the process,
she totaled up hew own baby-sitting fees and other work-related
expenses and found she would be more than $100 per month better
off staying home. She quit her job, and after a disqualification period,
began receiving unemployment benefit cheques in May. Unless she
takes a new job, she will continue to collect until June of the following
year."^^ In Ohio, a 16 year-old high school student^was laid off
last January from his evening job at a factory. He lived at home
and attended school full-time. But he collected more than £1500
j50
in unemployment benefit compensation.'^
Judgemental comparisons drawn from the preceding ensemble of opinion 
expressed by commentators and writers from both nations reveal 
little difference in the "Why Workf' attitude among the unemployed 
persons who are partisan to it , whether in the United Kingdom or the 
United States. In both countries, this attitude is the antithesis 
of the traditional work ethic, still strongly prevalent in most 
segments of society. Yet, there appears to be an increase in the 
number of "Why Work" adherents as the take-home pay is progressively
48. Nation's Business, March 1977
49. Tomlinson, Kenneth Y. "Let's Stop the Unemployment Compensation 
Rip-Off". The Reader's Digest, December 1975.
50. Ibid.
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eroded by the combined action of tax bite and inflation.
Claimant Attitudes Toward Benefit Administration
Certain British and American claimants' attitudes toward the 
unemployment benefits system operative in their respective country 
or state have been mentioned in passing earlier in this chapter. 
Particularly in the "Why Work" discussion, inclusion of some claimant 
views were essential to an appreciation of this specific attitude 
along with those of employers. It is appropriate now to compare 
British with American claimant attitudes which, as a result of a 
total of 247 interviews, are believed to reflect those of the 
working-class British and American claimant. For the purpose of 
this discussion, "working class" is comprised primarily of unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers who were unemployed at the time of interview, 
some for a few days or weeks, others for many months.
In Britain, locales within which a total of 134 interviews were 
conducted include the industrial and housing area of Deptford in 
London (35 interviews), the dock area of Bristol (28 interviews), 
and the premises immediately outside various unemployment benefit 
offices in London, Bristol, Bath, Harrogate, Inverness, Trowbridge, 
Midsomer Norton and Reading (71 interviews). In the United States, 
a total of 113 interviews were conducted: port area of Honolulu (33 
interviews), Sacramento, California (14 interviews), Denver, Colorado 
(22 interviews), and 69 interviews in Illinois (Elgin and Maywood), 
New York (Buffalo and White Plains), Mississippi (Jackson and 
Hattiesburg), and Houston, Texas. Assurance was given in all 
locations in both countries, repeatedly in some instances, that
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the anonymity of the interviewees would be respected.
Claimant attitudes in both countries were generally derogatory toward 
the system, as much with the "demeaning" nature of the administrative 
process of which claimants necessarily become a part as with the 
amount of benefit. The word "demeaning" was used by claimants 
themselves during interviews in Britain and the USA, and referred 
to a wide range of complaints; long waits for service in UBO's, 
discourteous UBO staff, difficulty in obtaining information or 
answers to special problems, and the like. While "generally 
derogatory" is an encompassing phrase, and relates to the expressed 
attitudes of 178 of 247 (UK: 107 of 134; USA: 71 of 113) claimants 
interviewed (72%), these conversations suggested they had become 
conditioned over a period of time to hold such views. For example, 
a total of 168 UK and USA claimants indicated that such views were 
an established norm within family or neighbourhood environment, or 
that they viewed the whole system unfavourably because of past 
frustrations in connection with administrative procedures. Although 
subjective comparison of claimant attitudes in Britain and the 
United States revealed no striking differences, interviews conducted 
to obtain data for this (qualitative) section indicated marked 
divergence between them with respect to the intensity with which 
these attitudes were expressed.
In Britain, great dissatisfaction was expressed by claimants toward 
the "demeaning" nature of administrative requirements. These reactions 
changed perceptibly the longer an interview continued, however, 
becoming less militant and more tolerant toward the system as time 
went on. Over the entire interview period in the United Kingdom, 
lack of understanding as to conditions of eligibility for benefits
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and the basis upon which amount of benefit is calculated emerged 
as important reasons for claimants' initially negative attitudes.
When British interviewees were asked what counselling they had received 
from UBO staff and which informational pamphlets they had consulted 
to determine specific entitlements in individual cases, 92 responded 
that staff were too busy or too casual to given straight answers, 
and that Government publications had seldom been used simply because 
they were presumed (by claimants) to be too difficult to understand.
In spite of the presence of display racks containing pamphlets 
in UBO foyers, 68 interviewees professed ignorance that (DE/DHSS) 
informational pamphlets were available at all. Derogatory attitudes 
of British interviewees tended to lessen as they either recalled 
factors usually not taken into consideration when discussing 
the system, such as the fact that pamphlets were written in very 
understandable language, or that long-standing opinions were, in 
fact, erroneous as to how benefit payments were calculated.
In the United States, 71 of 113 claimants interviewed expressed 
derogatory attitudes toward the ensemble of society's conventional 
requirements to which all citizens are bound - law and order, taxation, 
administrative procedures with respect to licensing of vehicles and 
businesses, as well as those concerned with unemployment and other 
benefits - as examples of how officialdom at all levels takes advantage 
of the workingman. When pressed for specific instances of what they 
considered to be unfair advantage, claimants responded only in general, 
sweeping terms which, to this researcher, suggested a litany long- 
rehearsed and often-repeated. The similarity of these responses in 
a number of geographical locations from Hawaii to Illinois (Hattiesburg: 
4; Denver: 13; Honolulu: 26; Sacramento: 11; Elgin: 17). led to this 
researcher's qualitative-based conclusion that neighbourhood conditioning
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constitutes a thread of uniformity in these attitudes. American 
claimants appeared more convinced that they were somehow victimised 
by the system, in this case unemployment benefits, than was perceived 
in the attitudes of their British counterparts.
Second Approach; Quantitative
Quantitative comparison of attitudes between British and American 
employers and between British and American claimants was accomplished 
through statistical analysis and interpretation of data obtained 
from sampling. A survey instrument in the form of a questionnaire 
was designed to obtain reactions to specific statements from representatives 
of each of the four elements of population concerned: British 
employers, American employers, British claimants, and American 
claimants.
Determination of Questionnaire Content
Design of the questionnaires for use in gathering employer and claimant 
attitude data was an element of the initial USA-based research effort 
during Phase 1. Certain modifications were made later during the UK- 
based research in favour of British colloquial usage. Three imperatives 
were adopted to govern the design effort: first, identification of 
those subject areas of unemployment benefits of greatest continuing 
concern to both employers and claimants; second, selection of specific 
statements which would elicit attitudes about these areas; and third, 
an instrument confined to a single page in length in order to promote 
frankness and preserve spontaneity.
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Employer Questionnaire
First priority of development was accorded to an employer questionnaire 
for reasons of expediency. Employers' views were sought informally 
during meetings of various clubs and organisations to which many 
employers belong, notably. Chambers of Commerce, the Hawaii Employers 
Council, and various clubs of Rotary International. These structured 
organisations provided an easier and more efficient means to determine 
key points of attitudinal interest and controversy than was deemed 
possible for claimants given the unstructured nature of claimant 
populations.
During the period July through December 1976, the following developments 
issued from these employer contacts:
a. Four subject areas were identified as those of greatest 
interest and most frequent mention: source of unemployment 
funds; integrity of claimants; eligibility standards and 
amount of benefits; and external pressures affecting the 
system.
b. From an initial list of 34 statements considered, covering 
the four subject areas, 13 were retained for reproduction 
on a single-page instrument which could be accomplished 
by a respondent easily within several minutes.
UK and USA employer questionnaires containing these 13 statements are 
at Appendices 6-A and 6-C. Certain of these statements sample attitudes 
within each subject area. Statement 1 is not included in these areas; 
it is in the nature of a basic proposition to determine whether a 
respondent supports the premise that unemployment insurance is needed
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in our society. Statements 2 through 5 apply to source of unemployment 
funds; statements 5 through 9 to claimant integrity; statements 9 through 
11 to eligibility standards and amount of benefits; with statements 12 
and 13 applying to external pressures.
Claimant Questionnaire
Development of a claimant questionnaire was accomplished with greater 
ease and in much less time than that for the employer through use of 
experience factors gained from the previous efforts. Claimants were 
interviewed outside the premises of the Hawaii State Employment Agency 
and the Unemployment Benefit Office, and asked for their principal 
concerns with respect to unemployment benefits. The substance of their 
replies agreed with the subject areas already identified for employers, 
with the exception of two points. Specifically, whereas employers 
expressed concern for the effect of union influence to favour claimants' 
right to collect benefits even when believed guilty of cheating the 
system and in the incidence of claimant abuses being hidden from public 
knowledge, claimants evinced no interest or knowledge in either of them. 
Consequently, the final claimant questionnaire excludes these two points, 
but includes all others contained in the employer instrument. See 
Appendices 6-B and 6-D.
Sampling
All sampling was on a random basis, conducted on a no-name, no-enterprise 
identification principle, without use of mail channels. For British and
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American employers, questionnaires were administered through Rotary 
Club International meetings in various locations in the United Kingdom 
and the United States, Rotary auspices offered two important advantages. 
First it was organised and governed worldwide under uniform by-laws, 
thus operates similarly in both countries. Second, randomness of 
sample in minimum time was assured because membership eligibility rules 
require that each member of each chapter represent a different business 
or professional classification. An average Rotary Club has a membership 
of 45, thus 45 different businesses are represented. Spontaneity of 
reaction was achieved by distribution, completion and collection of 
questionnaires during the course of a single Rotary meeting in each 
location.
For British and American claimants, questionnaires were administered 
by this researcher just outside the premises of unemployment benefit 
offices while claimants were on their way to or from these offices.
As with employers, claimants completed these instruments on the spot.
Both employers and claimants were generally cooperative and interested 
in the project once they became convinced that their personal identity 
or, for employers, that of their enterprise was not at risk.
Consistent with the terms of the research proposal, British sampling 
was conducted mainly in the County of Avon; American sampling mainly in 
the state of Hawaii. In both bases, additional locales were sampled, 
but not extensively. The sampling of American employers and claimants 
was conducted during Phase 1 of the research (July 1976-May 1977); 
sampling of British counterparts took place during Phase 2 (June-December 
1977). Some minor differences in wording of questionnaire statements 
are present between the British and American versions for claimants; 
this done on advice of the Bristol Chamber of Commerce to assure ready 
understanding by British respondents.
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Statistical recipes employed are from the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) and its Conversational Statistical System (SCSS). 
Appendix 6-E explains statistical methodology used in comparing 
questionnaire results between UK and American claimants and between 
UK and American employers.
Responses to questionnaire statements reflect the attitudes of active 
employer or claimant participants in the British and American unemployment 
insurance systems. Based upon personal experiences, these responses 
constitute the most credible sources of data upon which to base comparisons, 
It became clear during interviews with claimants that they were 
willing to express themselves frankly on subjects which might involve 
a degree of self-incrimination, such as fraud, only when no written 
record - questionnaire - was used. Therefore, the qualitative section 
probed the more personal areas with respect to claimants, such as 
attitudes toward intentional unemployment and fraud.
This quantitative section and its questionnaires focus on elements of 
the system to which no suggestion of self-incrimination is attached.
It is important to admit that, while statements such as those which 
appear in the questionnaires can be designed to evoke attitudes 
measurable by statistical methods, the yield of such efforts remains 
inexact and susceptible to varying interpretations in terms of why the 
attitudes exist and how they developed. This is to say that faultless 
mathematical techniques when applied to the measurement of opinion cannot 
be wholly depended upon to produce equally reliable interpretation.
With these disclaimers in mind, the following discussions interpret 
the statistical analysis of questionnaire responses, avoiding statistical 
jargon as much as possible in order to portray results in plain terms.
At Appendix 6-F is a discussion of "no finding" with illustrative Tables
6.7 (employers) and 6.8 (claimants).
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UK-USA Employer Questionnaires
A columnar summary of UK and USA (Hawaii) employer questionnaire responses 
is at Table 6.3. This summary reflects the percentage of each employer 
population's responses as they are distributed among the five possible 
choices on the questionnaire: strongly agree (SA), agree (A), no strong 
feelings (NSF), disagree (D), strongly disagree(SD) (see employer 
questionnaires at Appendices 6-A and 6-C.
Taking into account the managerial role of employers, UK and USA employers 
concur in their responses to statements 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11 and 13, with 
only minor variations in the degree of agreement or disagreement. The 
remaining five statements (1, 6, 7, 8 and 12) yield results which are 
substantially different in some way; these are discussed in the following 
paragraphs. For purposes of grosso mode simplification. Table 6.4 shows 
responses grouped, with "strongly agree" combined with "agree" in total 
percentage, and "strongly disagree" combined with "disagree". In a manner 
of speaking. Table 6.4 represents a trade-off in that the degree of each 
respondent's reaction is subordinated in order to emphasis the combined 
reaction for or against the statement's proposition.
Statement 1 - To this statement ("an unemployment benefit system is needed 
in our society"), over 98% of British employers agree, while 52% of American 
employers hold the opposite view and disagree. Yet, the USA attitude is 
inconclusive; 32% agree (Table 6.3), 7% have no feelings either way, and a 
bare majority (52%) disagree. Given the unilaterial funding burden of 
American employers, their majority disagreement with the premise - slight 
though it is - does not appear out of line. At the same time, one-third 
of these American employers agree - though not strongly - that society needs 
this system. The 50%-30% distribution variance among American employers on 
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Statement 12 - This statement ("unions pressure employers to support those 
who choose not to 'work") was added to compare attitudes toward trade union 
demands, based on a case in Hawaii (1976), that management be denied the 
right to protest payment of unemployment benefits to former employees who 
quit without good cause.
In this instance, it is British employer responses which indicate 
inconclusiveness of attitude, with disagreement accounting for 45%, while 
34% agree and 17% have no strong feelings. British reaction may indicate 
either greater willingness to subscribe restrictions imposed by trade unions 
on the right to manage, or a greater degree of resignation to it. By 
extension, the former (willingness) option suggests support of the right 
of trade unions to use pressure on employers in order that all those 
unemployed, no matter the reason, receive benefits even though their 
unemployment is intentional. The second option (resignation) suggests that 
since it is unlikely that trade union influence can be reduced, tolerance of 
it as an acknowledgement of a fact of life is the only viable solution to 
that particular managerial headache. Of the two, this researcher perceived 
the second, "resignation", as the more realistic within the pattern of the 
British commercial scene.
American employers are virtually unanimous in agreeing with the statement 
(96.8%), with only 3% having no strong feelings. Of note also is that 60% 
of American employers responded "strongly agree" as an indication of how 
vehement their indictment is of the general trade union attitude toward 
persons who contrive to remain claimants by intent.
Statement 6 - While both UK and American employers agree with this statement 
("the longer a person draws benefit, the less urgency is felt to find work"), 
their respective percentages differ by some 20 points. Accounting for 17 of 
these (20 percentage points) are British employer responses of NSF. American
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employers indicated NSF in just over 2% of their responses. One postulates 
that the eight-fold higher British NSF response is due to a greater tolerance 
on the part of UK employers that unemployed workers draw benefits for a 
longer portion of their benefit year, while American employers appear less 
tolerant. Alternatively, the reason may be simply a straightforward admission 
by British respondents that they do not know whether the statement is true, 
thus took no definitive stand on the premise. This statement was included 
on the questionnaire in order to evaluate employer's views on linkage between 
the length of time benefits are drawn and the length of time the claimant 
remains unemployed.
Statement 7 - This statement seeks to determine which population is the more 
convinced that claimants cheat in some way to draw benefits. American employers 
agree overwhelmingly that "over 25% of claimants violate the law to draw 
benefits", 7.3% indicate NSF, while none of them disagree. British employers 
follow a line of response similar to that of statement 6; 28% indicate NSF; 
there is no clear-cut majority opting for either agree or disagree. Responses 
to this statement suggest that either the American employers are over-quick 
to condemn, or that thq^ possess convincing evidence that significant numbers 
of claimants cheat the system. Responses of British employers, on the other 
hand, indicate either greater faith in the honesty of claimants or greater 
readiness to admit lack of knowledge on which to base either agreement or 
disagreement.
Statement 8 - This statement is the third in the group which focuses on claimant 
integrity. Its purpose is to determine employers' attitudes on whether or 
not unemployment benefit registers are heavy with those who seek to cheat the 
system in order to draw benefits. American employers responded in percentages 
close to the distributions for statement 7, 95% agreeing with the statement.
A bare majority (52%) of British employers agreed, while 38% disagreed and 
about 10% indicated no strong feelings either way. The British distribution
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favours agreement slightly more than it did in the case of statement 
7, but the differences of opinion among them leads to an inconclusive 
finding.
Responses to this group of three statement» all related to employers' 
attitudes on claimant integrity, indicates that British employers 
have slightly greater faith in the honesty of claimants than do their 
American counterparts. An averaging of combined percentages for 
statements 6, 7 and 8 shows that a bare majority of British employers 
believe that more than a quarter of all claimants seek to draw benefit 
as long as possible by contriving to remain unemployed; American 
employers indicate overwhelming conviction (95.1%) that this is true.
Two postulations are considered in this connection. First, these 
opposing attitudes may be founded on British employers having more 
faith in the effectiveness of eligibility and fraud controls of their 
system than American employers have in their individual state 
systems. Or, it may indicate less disgruntlement with the whole 
philosophy of unemployment benefits on the part of British employers, 
and a greater degree of aversion to that philosophy by American employers. 
The latter possibility appear corroborated by the response distribution 
for statement 1.
The remaining groups of statements portrayed in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, 
sources of funds (2 through 5) and eligibility/amount (9 through 11) 
reveal congruent UK and American employer attitudes. Within the 
group on sources of funds, the employers of both nations (90'-95%) 
disagreed with statement 2 (fairest source of contributions is employers 
only) and 75-86% with statement 3 (fairest source of contributions 
is employees only). Both employer populations agree (75-88%) with 
statement 4 (fairest source of contributions is from both employers
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and employees), and 90-98% with statement 5 (contributions should 
go only to persons unemployed through no fault of their own, not 
to qiitters or those sacked for misconduct). Within the group which 
focuses on eligibility and amount (9 through 11), employers of both 
nations disagreed overwhelmingly (88-92%) with statement 9 (eligibility 
should be relaxed to ease drawing of benefits) and 82-84% with 
statement 11 (benefits should equal take-home pay).
In the case of statement 10 (the amount of benefits is adequate), 
a majority of both sets of employers agree (56-58%); they disagree 
to about the same degree (10-13%), and almost one-third straddle 
the NSF fence (28-32%). The "no strong feelings" congruence 
represents nearly one-third of each population. This implies doubt 
as to whether current benefit amounts are considered adequate by 
employers, and since it does reflect their doubt, the inference is 
that they believe the amount insufficient rather than sufficient.
For both sets of employers such a sizeable proportion of employers 
expressing doubt on this matter suggests both an awareness and sympathy 
for the money problems of those unemployed through no fault of their 
own who are seeking to become re-employed as soon as possible.
At Appendix 6-E is a detailed description of the statistical formulae 
used to determine the greater or lesser degree of congruence between 
UK and American employers for each of the questionnaire statements.
The null and alternative hypothesis of each one is stated as well 
as the finding obtained from statistical analysis. A commentary 
on "no finding" is at Appendix 6-F.
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UK-USA Claimant Questionnaires
Table 6.5 is a columnar summary of claimant responses to questionnaires 
showing distributions among the five possible choices. Table 6.6 
shows claimant responses grouped to emphasise "agree" or "disagree" 
reactions to each statement, as was done in the preceding section.
Similar to employer questionnaires, statements are arranged in groups 
according to subject: source of funds (2 through 5), claimant 
integrity (6 through 8), eligibility and amount (9 through 11).
Note that claimant questionnaires omit counterparts to employer 
statements 12 and 13. Preliminary testing indicated that claimants 
neither had knowledge of nor were interested in union pressures on 
employers or whether abuses of the unemployment benefit system were 
hidden from the public. Statement 1 is included for the same reason 
as that stated in the preceding section as a basic proposition to 
determine whether a respondent supports the premise that unemployment 
insurance is needed in our society.
UK and American claimants' responses to questionnaires reflect 
congruent attitudes toward each statement, varying only in the degree 
with which they express agreement or disagreement. Even so, variation 
in the degree of positive or negative reaction is notable only in 
statements 8, 10 and 11. These three statements are discussed 
initially, followed by commentary on the remaining statements.
Statement 8. The negative claimant reaction to this statement was 
predictable ("over 25% of claimants violate the law in some way to 
draw benefits"), yet only 54% of American claimants disagree compared 
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claimants express no strong feelings, compared to the 9% of their 
British counterparts. This leaves one-quarter of American agreeing 
with the statement, whereas only 2% of British claimants agree.
Clearly British claimants present a united front affirming the honesty 
of their group, while American claimants are at best luke-warm in 
that regard. One possible conclusion is that the British element 
feels a strong obligation to maintain unity within its ranks and 
to define the integrity of the whole group. In such a context,
American claimants appear far less cohesive, witness the 22% who 
expressed no strong feelings either way. Although this inconclusive 
expression of American claimant attitude might be interpreted as 
showing an inclination toward forthrightness, it is equally reasonable 
to view it as an indication of dis-interest in whether or not 
claimaints violate the law in order to draw benefits.
Statement 10. This statement ("the amount of benefits is adequate") 
is as predictable in terms of negative claimant response as it was 
in the previous section with respect to affirmative employer reaction.
The definition of what constitutes "adequate" benefits is so variable 
that only the randomness of sample can be considered justification 
for attaching any significant to it at all. For a single person with 
modest material wants, "adequate" signifies much less in terms of 
cash requirements than in the case of a person having four or five 
dependents. In spite of the variable interpretation to which "adequate" 
is susceptible, this statement was included in the claimant questionnaire 
to probe the relationship between authorised amount of benefits and 
perceived need. British claimants disagreed (88%) with this statement, 
while only 56% of American claimants disagreed. These two percentages 
are virtually the same as those recorded for statement 8. Once again 
American claimants present an inconclusive attitude, in that 28%
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agree that currently benefits are adequate and 16% indicate no 
strong feelings. The slightly greater than one-quarter of American 
claimants who appear satisfied with their benefits is in sharp 
contrast to the 6% of British claimants who are content with the 
amount they receive. This suggests at least three explanations.
First, that British claimants are unified (88%) in disagreeing 
that benefits are adequate. This may be in the nature of a 
(claimant) group norm. For that group to admit adequacy may be 
perceived as a form of disloyalty to the future best interests of 
the group. Under this postulation,American claimants exhibit no 
such group loyalty, thus express individual feelings toward the 
statement. It seems likely that the apparent lack of group loyalty 
on the part of American claimants derives from the fragmented nature 
of the American benefit system, under which each state exercises virtual 
autonomy in the operation of the system within state borders.
Second, a greater number of American claimants indicate satisfaction 
with the amount of benefits they receive, either because their needs 
are less, or because they are more content with the standard of living 
which such benefits support. Attaching to this same postulation 
is the possibility that over one-quarter of American claimants responded 
to the statement in the way they perceived they ought to respond, 
thus a conditioned rather than an independent opinion.
Third, the possibility must be admitted that 81% of British claimants 
are quite correct in indicating that their benefits are not adequate 
in terms of the buying power demanded by current prises. The 
corresponding obverse of this possibility is that American claimants 
are better off in real terms. This is a difficult issue to compare.
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since it involves determination of a set of wants-needs-costs indices 
common to both populations. While that issue lies beyond the scope 
of this study, it offers interesting potential for a specific 
research effort.
Statement 11. This statement goes one step further than the preceding 
one in order to determine whether claimants believe they should 
receive as much in benefits while out of work as they normally 
earn while employed. This statement seeks to measure, in the broadest 
context, the extent of the welfare-state acceptance on the part of 
claimants in terms of how much better off an employed person 
deserves to be versus an unemployed person.
Predictably, a majority of both populations agreed that "the amount 
of benefit paid should match take-home pay". Again, however, there 
is a marked disparity between the degree of agreement of the British 
claimants (81%), with only 13% disagreeing, and the attitude of 
American claimants. The latter population indicates only a bare 
majority agreement (55%) with the statement, while almost half 
(40%) disagree. There is a consistency of attitude reflected in 
these percentages for both populations with those they expressed 
for statement 10, although the affirmative-negative application 
between these two statements much be reversed in order to recognise 
that consistency.
Responses to the remaining statements (1 through 7, and 9) were both 
predictable and closely matched as to degree of agreement or disagreement 
between UK and American claimants. The predictability of responses 
is a by-product of the interviews conducted to obtain qualitative 
data, discussed in the preceding section of this chapter. A commonality
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includes general dissatisfaction with the various administrative 
requirements which claimants must accomplish to keep their claims 
in good standing, unwillingness to contribute to the benefit funds 
when in work, and the desire for increase in the amount of benefits.
Predictions made as to probable claimant responses to questionnaire 
statements were confirmed by the actual responses, only the degree was 
surprising in some cases, as already discussed for statements 8, 10 and 
11. An average empathy quotient seems quite sufficient to permit 
accurate predictions of what a claimant's response would be to 
statement 1, for example. One cannot conceive that any claimant 
would express a negative opinion as to whether there is a need for 
unemployment insurance in our society. Likewise predictable, and 
corroborated by actual responses, were positive reactions to statements 
2 and 9, which would have employers-only contribute to benefit funds 
and eligibility rules relaxed, respectively.
Claimants reacted negatively to statements 3 and 4, both of which 
include employees as contributors to benefit funds. The negative 
reaction was much less pronounced for number 4, especially by 
British claimants, probably because it was seen as a fair arrangement 
and because it is the current arrangement in Britain to which they 
are accustomed.
Statements 5 and 6 evoked negative responses from claimant populations.
Both statements proposed essentially that benefits not be paid to 
claimants who quit or were sacked. For both statements, however, 
there was a substantial countervail - on the order of one-third the 
total number of respondents - expressing satisfaction with existing 
controls on claimant qualification requirements. It is clear that it
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claimant responses are notable principally for their conformance 
to what one would expect. Consequently, only the degree of agreement 
or disagreement has been discussed.
Although beyond the approved scope of this study, a comparison of 
employer versus claimant attitudes was programmed and tested by 
computer. These test results were unremunerative, in that they 
produced nothing significantly different from what would have been 
otherwise concluded.
At Appendix 6-E is a detailed description of representative statistical 
formulae used to determine the greater or lesser degree of congruence 
between UK and American claimants and employers for each of the 
questionnaire statements. The null and alternative hypothesis of 
each is stated as well as the finding obtained from statistical analysis 
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TO UNITED KINGDOM EMPLOYERS Your courtesy in completing this 2-minute
questionnaire will assist me materially in the development of an 
academic research document. PLEASE DO NOT IDENTIFY YOURSELF OR YOUR 
FIRM IN ANY WAY. Many thanks. Dean E Hutter.
Please circle just one response among each of the following expressions 
of your feelings toward the statements below: Strongly agree;
A: Agree; NSF: No strong feelings; D : Disagree; SD: Strong disagree.
1. An unemployment benefit system is needed in 
our society
2. The fairest source from which to obtain 
contributions to the unemployment benefit 
fund is from employers only.
3. The fairest source from which to obtain 
contributions to the unemployment benefit 
fund is from employees only.
4. The fairest source from which to obtain 
contributions to the unemployment benefit 
fund is from both employers and employees.
5. Contributions for unemployment benefits should 
go only toward benefits for workers who are 
unemployed through no fault of their own, not 
to those who quit without good cause or who 
are sacked for misconduct.
SA A NSF D SD 1.
SA A NSF D SD 2.
SA A NSF D SD 3.
SA A NSF D SD 4.
SA A NSF D SD 5.
6. The longer an unemployed person is allowed to 
draw benefits, the less urgency he/she feels 
to get out and find work.
7. I feel that over 25% of claimants violate 
either the letter or spirit of the law in 
some way in order to qualify for unemployment 
benefits.
8. The unemployment benefits registers are heavy 
with layabouts, schemers, cheaters and 
quitters.
9. The present system's rules and regulations 
for eligibility should be relaxed so that 
it is easier to draw benefits.
10. The amount of unemployment benefits (pounds/ 
pence) is adequate.
11. The amount of benefits paid should match 
take-home pay.
12. Unions bring pressure on employers to help 
support those who choose not to work.
13. Much abuse is hidden somehow from public 
view.
SA A NSF D SD 6.
SA A NSF D SD 7.
SA A NSF D SD 8.
SA A NSF D SD 9.
SA A NSF D SD 10.
SA A NSF D SD 11.
SA A NSF D SD 12.
SA A NSF D SD 13.
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Appendix 6~B
TO UNITED KINGDOM CLAIMANTS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS: Your courtesy
in completing this 2-minute questionnaire will assist me materially 
in the development of an academic research document. PLEASE DO NOT 
PUT YOUR NAME ON THIS OR IDENTIFY YOURSELF IN ANY WAY. Many thanks.
Dean E Hutter.
For each of the statements below, please circle the one which best 
expresses your feelings, as follows: Strongly agree. A: Agree,
NSF: No significant feelings, D : Disagree, Strong disagree.
1. An unemployment benefit system is needed
in our society. SA A NSF D SD 1.
2. The fairest source from which to obtain 
contributions to the unemployment benefit
find is from employers only. SA A NSF D SD 2.
3. The fairest source from which to obtain 
contributions to the unemployment benefit
fund is from employees only. SA A NSF D SD 3.
4. The fairest source from which to obtain 
contributions to the unemployment benefit
fund is from both employers and employees. SA A NSF D SD 4.
5. Contributions for unemployment benefits 
should go only toward benefits for workers 
who are unemployed through no fault of their 
own, not to those who quit without good
cause or who are sacked for misconduct. SA A NSF D SD 5.
6. Unemployment benefits should be paid to any
worker who is unemployed, no matter the
reason for unemployment. SA A NSF D SD 6.
7. The longer an unemployed person is allowed 
to draw benefits, the less urgency she/he
feels to get out and find work. SA A NSF D SD 7.
8. I feel that over 25% of claimants violate 
either the letter or the spirit of the law 
in some way to qualify for unemployment
benefits. SA A NSF D SD 8.
9. The present system's rules and regulations 
for eligibility should be relaxed so that
it is easier to draw benefits. SA A NSF D SD 9.
10. The amount of unemployment benefits (pounds/
pence) is adequate. SA A NSF D SD 10.
11. The amount of benefit paid should match
take-home pay. SA A NSF D SD 11.
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Appendix 6~C
TO HAWAII EMPLOYERS : Your courtesy in completing this 2-minute
questionnaire will assist me materially in the development of an 
academic research document. PLEASE DO NOT IDENTIFY YOURSELF OR YOUR 
FIRM IN ANY WAY. Many thanks. Dean E Hutter.
Please circle just one response among each of the following expressions 
of your feelings toward the statements below: strongly agree. A:
agree, NSF: no strong feelings, D: disagree. strongly disagree.
1. An unemployment benefit system is needed
in our society SA A NSF D SD 1.
2. The fairest source from which to obtain 
contributions to the unemployment benefit
fund is from employers only. SA A NSF D SD 2.
3. The fairest source from which to obtain 
contributions to the unemployment benefit
fund is from employees only. SA A NSF D SD 3.
4. The fairest source from which to obtain 
the unemployment benefit fund is from both
employers and employees. SA A NSF D SD 4.
5. Contributions for unemployment benefits should 
go only toward benefits for workers who are 
unemployed through no fault of their own, not 
to those who quit without good cause or who
are sacked for misconduct. SA A NSF D SD 5,
6. The longer an unemployed person is allowed 
to draw benefits, the less urgency he/she
feels to get out and find work. SA A NSF D SD 6.
7. I feel that over 25% of claimants violate 
either the letter or spirit of the law in 
some way in order to qualify for unemployment
benefits. SA A NSF D SD 7.
8. The unemployment benefits registers are heavy 
with layabouts, schemers, cheaters and
quitters. SA A NSF D SD 8.
9. The present system's rules and regulations 
for eligibility should be relaxed so that
it is easier to draw benefits. SA A NSF D SD 9.
10. The amount of unemployment benefits (dollars/
cents) is adequate. SA A NSF D SD 10.
11. The amount of benefit paid should match
take-home pay. SA A NSF D SD 11.
12. Unions bring pressure on employers to help
support those who choose not to work. SA A NSF D SD 12.
13. Much abuse is hidden somehow from public
view. SA A NSF D SD 13.
2%Appendix 6~P
TO HAWAII CLAIMANTS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS: Your courtesy in
completing this 2-minute questionnaire will assist me materially in 
the development of an academic research document. PLEASE DO NOT PUT 
YOUR NAME ON THIS, OR IDENTIFY YOURSELF IN ANY WAY. Many thanks.
Dean E Hutter.
For each of the statements below, please circle the one response which 
best expresses your feelings, as follows : strongly agree. A: agree,
NSF: no strong feelings, D: disagree, strongly disagree.
1. An unemployment insurance benefit system
is needed in our society. SA A NSF D SD 1.
2. The fairest source from which to obtain 
contributions to the unemployment benefit
fund is from employers only. SA A NSF D SD 2.
3. The fairest source from which to obtain 
contributions to the unemployment benefit
fund is from employees only. SA A NSF D SD 3.
4. The fairest source from which to obtain 
contributions to the unemployment benefit
fund is from both employers and employees. SA A NSF D SD 4.
5. Payroll taxes for unemployment benefits 
should go only toward benefits for workers 
who are unemployed through no fault of their 
own, not to those who quit without good cause
or who are fired for misconduct. SA A NSF D SD 5.
6. Unemployment benefits should be paid to any 
worker who is unemployed, no matter the reason
he/she is unemployed. SA A NSF D SD 6.
7. The longer an unemployed person is allowed 
to draw benefits, the less urgency he/she
feels to get out and find work. SA A NSF D SD 7.
8. I feel that over 25% of claimants violate 
either the letter or the spirit of the law 
in some way in order to qualify for
unemployment benefits. SA A NSF D SD 8.
9. The present system's rules and regulations 
for eligibility to draw benefits should be 
made easier so that it is less trouble to
qualify for benefits. SA A NSF D SD 9.
10. The amount of benefits paid to unemployed
persone (number of dollars) is adequate. SA A NSF D SD 10,
11. The amount of benefits paid to a claimant
should match his/her usual take-home pay. SA A NSF D SD 11,
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Appendix 6~E
Statistical Analysis of Comparisons Between UK and USA (Hawaii) 
Claimants and Employers
Claimants
The results for the confidence interval comparisons between UK 
and Hawaii claimants were calculated according to the following 
formula :
“ iUY " “jHZ ^^iUY ” ^jHZ^ - *
s ' s '
iUY + jHZ (1)
"iUY\ |
Where M is the population mean, i and j are question numbers, U 
stands for United Kingdom, H stands for Hawaii, Y and Z are either 
C for claimant or E for employer, X is the sample average, t the 
student's t statistic, S is the standard deviation, and n is the 
sample size.
UCl versus HCl. This statement compares the perceptions of UK and 
Hawaii claimants as to the need for an unemployment benefit system 
in their respective societies. For this calculation, equation (1) 
becomes :
“lUC - “iHC = (%1UC - %1HC) ^  t -°'S
2 2S s
lUC + IHC
^ lUC ^ IHC
(2)
This equation gives the 95% confidence interval for the mean 
difference which would occur if all claimants in both populations 
had answered question 1.
1.337 is the average response to question 1 of UK claimants, ie 
Xiuc» 1.7037 is the average response to HCl, ie X^^^, .5 is the
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standard deviation of the responses to UCl, ie .6009 is
that for Hawaii claimants, 8 . The 86 and 81 are the non-missing
sample sizes for UCl and HCl, n^^^ and n^^^* respectively.
The programme then inserts these numbers into equation (2) and 
performs the calculation. It then prints the final line: QUESTION*
1 VERSUS QUESTION 1 EQUALS -.3667 PLUS OR MINUS .171636". In other 
words, -.3667 is the difference between the two means and .171636 is 
the precision of an estimated mean difference at a confidence level 
of .05. This result is saying that the difference between the 
true mean of all UK claimants and the true mean of the whole 
population of Hawaii claimants is equal to -.3667 + .171636, with 
95% confidence.
This result is reported as a confidence interval, but it may be 
viewed also as a two-tailed hypothesis test for the following 
hypotheses :
“lUC - “iHC = O'
“r  “i u c ' “i H c ^ o .  (3)
Since zero is not included in the confidence interval calculated 
above, we can be confident that there truly is some difference 
between UK and Hawaii claimants in the strength of their belief that 
their respective socieities need an unemployment benefit system.
Of course, this conclusion requires all the standard assumptions 
that question 1 is valid in both cultures, the samples are truly 
random, and so on.
For most comparisons we have some preconceived notion about the
In the context of this study, read "question" as synonomous 
with "statement".
251
direction of the difference. For question 1, one would hypothesise 
that UK claimants would believe more strongly than their Hawaii 
counterparts that society needs an unemployment benefit system.
This, then, becomes the alternative hypothesis (H^) in a one-tailed 
test of the following hypotheses:
®o' **1UC "
« r  “ luc -  “ iHc
If the difference between sample means is less than the^^sa.os 
critical value, ie if
(*THC " ^IHC^ ^"^.05
g2
lUC + IHC (5)
V n n
\  lUC IHC ^
then the null hypothesis (ie H^) in equation (4) can be rejected 
and H^ accepted. Since the right hand side of equation (5) is 
^ t
orf 1.67 = -.835) times the precision in equation (2), we can
t.025 \ 2
readily calculate the results of a one-tailed hypothesis test from 
the computer output.
For items UCl and HCl, the null hypothesis in equation (4) can be 




Hence, we can conclude at the .05 significance level that UK 
claimants feel more strongly than do Hawaii claimants that an 
unemployment benefit system is needed by their society.
Question 2 is an example of the reverse case, ie a right hand one 
tailed test. Here, the hypothesis is that Hawaii claimants feel 
more strongly than do UK claimants that employers-only are the
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fairest source of unemployment funds, because this is the present 
situation in Hawaii, but not in the UK.
From the above, one would expect ^2UC^ ^ 2HC ^2UC ” ^2HC^
hence the hypotheses to be tested are:
**2UC "
“ r  “2UC - “2HC> °
If the difference between sample means is greater than the .05 
critical value, ie if






then Hq in equation (6) can be rejected and H^ accepted.
Using the results from the computer output and equation (7),
?
.3259 > .835 (.371657)
>  .310
Hence H^ is barely rejected by the right hand one tailed t-test at 
the .05 level; conclusion is that, in all likelihood, Hawaii claimants 
feel more strongly that the fairest source for unemployment funds is 
the employer than do UK claimants.
From the above orientation for questions 1 and 2 (claimants), the 
following paragraphs proceed through the remainder of questionnaire 
items for claimants. Then, using the results of similar t-test 
comparisons, each question of the employer (UK versus Hawaii) 
questionnaire is discussed. To facilitate readability, the null 
hypothesis is inserted only parenthetically in the alternative 
hypothesis for each question.
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Question 3: The fairest source from which to obtain contributions
to the unemployment benefit fund is from employees only. Hypothesis: 
Hawaii claimants disagree more strongly (null: do not disagree more 
strongly) than UK claimants with this statement. Mathematically 
states: M^^^ ^3HC" ^3Uc " ^3HC^°* Hence, the hypotheses of
equation (4) apply and equation (5) should be used to perform the 





where ^  means not less than; the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
In fact, the sample difference is in the opposite direction and, if 
the hypothesis had been the reverse difference, it would have been 
found significant. But this type of retrospective analysis is not 
statistically legitimate. Thus, the conclusion must be "no finding" 
for this question.
Question 4: The fairest source from which to obtain contributions
to the unemployment fund is from both employers and employees. 
Hypothesis: UK claimants agree (null: do not agree) more strongly 
than Hawaii claimants that both employers and employees should 
contribute. Therefore, for UC4 versus HC4, the mathematical statement 
is: M.^^ M . The hypotheses of equation (4) are applicable, and
equation (5) is used to perform the one tailed test. Utilising the 
computer results in equation (5),
-.4752^-.835 (.364878)
( -.30467
From this result, the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of its 
alternative, to wit: at the .05 level, UK claimants agree more 
strongly than Hawaii claimants that both employers and employees
should contribute to the unemployment benefit fund.
Question 5: Payroll taxes for unemployment benefits should go only 
toward benefits for workers who are unemployed through no fault of 
their own, not to those who quit without good cause or who are fired 
for misconduct. Hypothesis: UK claimants disagree (null: do not 
disagree) more strongly than Hawaii claimants that payroll taxes 
for unemployed workers should go only to those unemployed through 
no fault of their own. The hypotheses of equation (6) are applicable, 
and equation (7) is used to perform the one tailed test.
Using this equation and computer output results:
?
.5214 > .835 X  .400917 
.5214 > .334766.
From this result, the null hypothesis is rejected at the .05 level in 
favour of its alternative, to wit: UK claimants disagree more strongly 
than Hawaii claimants that payroll taxes for unemployment benefits 
should go only toward benefits for workers who are unemployed through 
no fault of their own, not to those who quit without good cause or 
are fired for misconduct.
Question 6: Unemployment benefits should be paid to any worker who 
is unemployed, no matter the reason he/she is unemployed. Hypothesis: 
UK claimants agree (null: do not agree) more strongly than Hawaii 
claimants that unemployment benefits should be paid to any worker who 
is unemployed, no matter the reason he/she is unemployed. The 
hypotheses of equation (4) are applicable, and equation (5) is used 
to perform the one tailed test. Inserting the computer results:
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V-.00786 ^  -.835 x .383888 
-.00786 ^  -.320546 
From this result, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected; thus, 
there is no finding for question 6.
Question 7: The longer an unemployed person is allowed to draw
benefits, the less urgency he/she feels to get out and find work. 
Hypothesis: Hawaii claimants agree more strongly (null: less strongly) 
than UK claimants that the longer an unemployed person is allowed 
to draw benefits, the less urgency he/she feels to get out and find 
work. The hypotheses of equation (6) are applicable, and equation 
(7) is used to perform the one tailed test. Using this equation and 
the computer results:
?
.325 >  .835 X  .342173
.325 ^  .285714
From this result, the null hypothesis is rejected at the .05 level 
in favour of its alternative, to wit: Hawaii claimants agree more 
strongly that the longer an unemployed person is allowed to draw 
benefits, the less urgency he/she feels to get out and find work than 
do UK claimants.
Question 8: I (each claimant respondent) feel that over 25% of
claimants violate either the letter or the spirit of the law in some 
way in order to qualify for unemployment benefits. Hypothesis:
UK claimants disagree more strongly than Hawaii claimants that over 
25% of claimants violate either the letter or the spirit of the law 
in some way in order to qualify for unemployment benefits. Equations 
(6) and (7) are applicable. Using equation (7) and the computer 
results:
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.842 >  .835 X .301139 
.842 >  .251451
Hence, at the .05 level the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of 
its alternative, to wit: UK claimants disagree more strongly than 
Hawaii claimants that over 25% of claimants violate either the letter 
or spirit of the law in some way in order to qualify for unemployment 
benefits.
Question 9: The present system’s rules and regulations for eligibility
to draw benefits should be made easier so that it is less trouble to 
qualify for benefits. Hypothesis: UK claimants agree more strongly
(null: less strongly) than Hawaii claimants that the present system’s 
rules and regulations should be made easier. The hypotheses of 
equation (4) and the inequality of equation (5) are applicable.
Employing this inequality and the computer results:
y
-.412 -.835 X .284192
-.412 -.237300
Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected at the .05 level in favour of 
its alternative, to wit: UK claimants agree more strongly that the
present system’s rules and regulations for eligibility to draw
benefits should be made easier so that it is less trouble to quality 
for benefits.
Question 10: The amount of benefits paid to unemployed persons is
adequate. Hypothesis: UK claimants disagree more strongly (null: 
less strongly) than Hawaii claimants that the amount of benefits is 




.7349 >  .835 x .340659
.7349 >  .284450.
Since the inequality is true, the null hypothesis is rejected in favour 
of its alternative, to wit: UK claimants disagree more strongly than 
Hawaii claimants that the amount of benefits paid to unemployed 
persons is adequate.
Question 11: The amount of benefits paid to a claimant should match
his/her usual take-home pay. Hypothesis: UK claimants agree more 
strongly (null: less strongly) than Hawaii claimants that the amount 
of benefits should march usual take-home pay. A one tailed test is 
appropriate; equations (5) and (5) are applicable. From equation (5) 
and the computer results:
-.674 -.835 X  .342501
-.673 <C -.285988 
From this result, the null hypothesis at the .05 level is rejected 
in favour of its alternative, to wit: UK claimants agree more strongly 
than Hawaii claimants that the amount of benefits paid should match 
usual take-home pay.
Comparisons between United Kingdom and Hawaii Employers
The t-tests comparing United Kingdom employer attitudes to those of 
Hawaii employers were calculated and printed by the same program 
as that used for United Kingdom and Hawaii claimants.
Question 1: An unemployment benefit system is needed in our society,
Hypothesis: UK employers agree more strongly (null: less or equally
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Strongly) than Hawaii employers that an unemployment benefit system
is needed in their respective societies. For UEl versus HEl, thus,
or ^ ^ / 0 c the latter becomes the alternative
IUEN IHE lUE 1HE\
hypothesis in the one tailed t-test.
«0= “ lUE -
“ r  “ l U E - “lHE<°
If the difference between sample means is less than the .05
critical value, ie if:
*1UE " ^IHE ^  "^.05
8^ 8 2
lUE + IHE (9)
"lUE "iHE
then the null hypothesis (H^) in equation (8) can be rejected and, 
thus (H^) accepted.
Using equation (9) and the UEl versus HEl computer results:
-1.5626 <  -.835 x .315236
-1.5626 -.263222
From this, the null hypothesis in equation (8) at the .05 significance 
level is rejected in favour of its alternative, to wit: UK employers 
agree more strongly than Hawaii employers that an unemployment benefit 
system is needed in our society.
Question 2: The fairest source from which to obtain contributions
to the unemployment benefit fund is from employers only. Hypothesis: 
UK employers disagree more strongly (null: less or equally strongly) 
than Hawaii employers that the fairest source from which to obtain 
contributions to the unemployment benefit fund is from employers 
only, ie ^21Æ>^2EE ^2UE " ^2H^°' the latter is the alternative
hypothesis in the following one tailed test:
o”o' ®*2UE ”
« r  “21® - “2HE>° (10)
If the difference between sample means is greater than the .05 
critical value, ie if:
^2UE " ^2HE>^.05
\l
2UE + 2HE (XI)
^2UE *2HE
then the null hypothesis in equation (10) can be rejected the 
alternative accepted. If not, no finding is possible.
Using equation (11) and the computer results:
?
-.0702 >  .835 X .253147
-.0702 ^  .211378
Hence, the null hypothesis (H^) cannot be rejected in equation (10). 
There is no finding from the comparison of UE2 and HE2.
Question 3: The fairest source from which to obtain contributions
to the unemployment benefit fund is from employees only. Hypothesis:
UK employers would agree more strongly than Hawaii employers that
the fairest source from which to obtain contributions to the unemployment
benefit fund is from employees only (null: less or equally strongly),
or M„__ /  M . The hypotheses of equation (8) are applicable; 
oUE \  oHE
equation (9) is used to perform the one tailed test. Using this 
equation and the computer results:
?
2.0406 -.835 x .35366
2.0406 ^  -.295306
From this, again the null hypothesis cannot be rejected; there is no 
finding for question 3.
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Question 4: The fairest source from which to obtain contributions
to the unemployment benefit fund is from both employers and employees. 
Hypothesis: UK employers agree more strongly than Hawaii employers 
that the fairest source from which to obtain contributions to the 
unemployment benefit fund is from both employers and employees.
The hypotheses of equation (8) are applicable; equation (9) is used 
to perform the one tailed test. Using this equation and the computer 
results :
?
-1.7006 <  -.835 X .346773 
-1.7006 <  -.289555 
Hence, the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of its alternative, 
to wit: UK employers agree more strongly than Hawaii employers that 
the fairest source for contributions is from both employers and 
employees.
Question 5: Payroll taxes for unemployment benefits should go only
for workers who are unemployed through no fault of their own, not 
to those who quit without good cause or who are fired for misconduct. 
Hypothesis: Hawaii employers agree more strongly (null: less or 
equally strongly) than UK employers with the above statement, ie 
W^UE^ IV^ HE* Employing equation (10) and equation (11) along with the
computer results:
?
.0142 .835 X  .2209
.0142 .184452
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected. There is no finding for this 
question.
Question 6: The longer an unemployed person is allowed to draw
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benefits, the less urgency he/she feels to get out and find work. 
Hypothesis: UK employers disagree more strongly (null: less or 
equally strongly) than Hawaii employers with the above statement, 
ie ^6HE* hypotheses of equation (10) are applicable,
equation (11) is used to perform the one tailed test. Using this 
equation and the computer results:
?
.8017 >  .835 X .290409
.8017 >  .242492
The null hypothesis is rejected in favour of its alternative, to wit: 
UK employers disagree more strongly than Hawaii employers that the 
longer an unemployed person is allowed to draw benefits, the less 
urgency he/she feels to get out and find work.
Question 7: I feel that over 25% of claimants violate either the
letter or the spirit of the law in some way in order to qualify for 
unemployment benefits. Hypothesis: UK employers disagree more 
strongly (null: less or equally strongly) than Hawaii employers 
that over 25% of claimants violate either the letter or spirit of 
the law in some way in order to qualify for unemployment benefits, 
ie ^7HE * hence the hypotheses of equation (10) are applicable,
and equation (11) is used together with the computer results:
?
1.2376 >  .835 x .327059
1.2376 >  .273094
From this result, the null hypothesis is rejected at the .05 level 
in favour of its alternative, to wit: UK employers disagree more 
strongly than Hawaii employers that over 25% of claimants violate 
either the letter or spirit of the law in some way in order to qualify 
for unemployment benefits.
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Question 8: The unemployment benefits reigsters are heavy with
layabouts, schemers, cheaters and quitters. Hypothesis: UK 
employers disagree more strongly (null: less or equally strongly) 
than Hawaii employers with the above statement. Thus ^ 8 HE'
The hypotheses of equation (10) are applicable; equation (11) is 
used to perform the one tailed test. Using equation (11) and the 
computer results:
?
1.119 >  .835 X .366327
1.119 >  .305883
From this result, the null hypothesis at the .05 significance level 
is rejected in favour of its alternative, to wit: United Kingdom 
employers disagree more strongly than Hawaii employers with the 
statement that unemployment benefits registers are heavy with 
layabouts, schemers, cheaters and quitters.
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Appendix 6~ F
Discussion of "No Finding" Results 
Employer Questionnaire
On the employer side, three statements yielded "no finding" which 
derives from the null hypothesis in each case not being rejected.
Two of these fall in the area of who should pay the bill for 
unemployment benefit funding. See Table 6.7.
Statement 2 poses that the fairest source of funds is from employers 
only. One would expect that UK employers, who share with their 
employees the benefit funding costs would disagree with that 
proposition more strongly than their Hawaii counterparts, since the 
latter are accustomed to bearing the full cost. Instead, the null 
of that proposition could not be rejected, thus there is no defiritive 
finding.
Statement 3 poses the opposite of its preceding relative, that the 
fairest source of funds is from employees only. One postulates 
that this indeterminate "no finding" result arose either from a 
conviction on the part of employers than an "employees only" funding 
base stands no change of enactment, therefore arguing for it is simply 
a waste of time; or, that placing the funding burden solely on 
employees is unjust since most employees become unemployed through 
the force of conditions over which they have no control.
Statement 5 is the last of the "no finding" results on the employer 
questionnaire. The null hypothesis in this case and its alternative 
used Hawaii employers as the anchor point; UK employers could just as
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easily have been used in that role. There was no preconceived 
notion as to which one was the more appropriate. In this case the 
null is that Hawaii employers agree less or equally strongly 
than UK employers that benefits should go only to workers who are 
unemployed through no fault of their own, not to those who quit 
without good cause or who are fired for misconduct. Statistically, 
the null cannot be rejected. This suggests a congruence on this 
point between UK and USA employers strong enough to deny significant 
comparison, which is seen as a logical outcome since, in the previous 
qualitative section of this chapter, attitudes of UK and USA employers 
were judged to be solidly opposed to payment of benefits to those 
who become unemployed by intent.
Claimant Questionnaire
Comparison of UK with USA claimant questionnaires resulted in "no 
finding" for two questions, numbers 3 and 6. See Table 6.8.
For statement 3, the alternative hypothesis is that the fairest 
source from which to obtain contributions to the unemployment benefit 
fund is from employees only. Predictably, both UK and USA claimants 
opposed that proposition. The only unexpected element is that 
Hawaii claimants did not indicate their opposition more strongly than 
their UK counterparts. One would presume that USA claimants, 
accustomed to employer-only funding, would be more contentious 
on the subject that UK claimants, accustomed to employer-employee 
shared contributions.
The alternative hypothesis for statement 6, is that UK claimants agree
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more strongly than Hawaii claimants that unemployment benefits 
should be paid to unemployed workers whatever the reason for 
unemployment. This hypothesis is intended to cover payments to 
claimants who become unemployed through their own fault. This is 
another instance wherein either UK or Hawaii claimants could have 
been used to set a hypothesis, since there was no basis to predict 
that either would disagree/agree more strongly than the other.
Both sets of claimants generally agree with the proposition in the 
alternative hypothesis, but with no significant difference in the 
intensity of their attitude.
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AM) RECOMMENDATIONS
These conclusions and recommendations are drawn from the four main 
comparison chapters of the study: legislative philosophies, 
procedures, fraud, and employer-claimant attitudes. These chapters 
vary not only in subject matter, but in the sources of data 3LS 
well as in the manner of presentation and comparison. Each of these 
chapters should be construed as contribution in equal measure to 
the final product.
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: to distill into brief 
discussions the net yield of the research; and, consistent with 
the approved research proposal, to translate such elements of that 
yield as appear to offer workable potential into specific recommendations 
for improvement of either or both the British and American systems 
of unemployment benefits. Certain of the recommendations emanate 
from a single conclusion, others from an amalgam of several conclusions; 
there has been no attempt to match conclusions and recommendations 
on a one-for-one basis. Adjunctively in this chapter, topics 
perceived during the course of this study as holding promise for 
rewarding future research are identified.
1. Legislative Philosophies
(a) Conclusion. Within the current period (1935 to present), the
philosophies of "self-reliance" and "liberalisation" are inherently 
conflicting since eminence of either causes subordination of the
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other. Liberalisation gradually assumed the dominant role in Britain 
from 1911 onward, and did so in the United States from the mid­
thirties, in both cases as a legislated countervail against economic 
depression and the widespread misery of concomitant unemployment. 
Traditional reliance on individual effort as the key to economic 
security progressively eroded in both nations through the shaping 
and translating of more tolerant social attitudes into legislative 
acts which then provided increasingly generous benefits to unemployed 
persons. The effect of these acts has been to reduce the necessity 
for such persons to rely on their own efforts to achieve freedom 
from want for themselves and their families.
(b) Recommendation: for UK and USA. Introduce amendment to the
unemployment insurance system permitting each government, through its 
subordinate elements to exercise an option to redefine "suitable 
work" as it applies to a registered claimant and require that claimant 
to accept an offer of a job within the new definition from an 
employment service agency office as provided by the latter at any 
time after benefits have been paid for 60 days; failure of claimant 
to accept such a job offer and work at it in good faith to result 
in disqualification from unemployment benefits during the remainder 
of the benefit year.
While no change to existing duration of benefits should be construed 
to be a part of this recommendation, the prospect that a claimant's 
own definition of "suitable work" may be subordinated to an official 
redefinition after 60 days should increase the claimant's diligence 
in searching for new work during that period. The traditional 
philosophy of self-reliance would be strengthened; this is seen 
in turn to lead to a reduction in total unemployment and attendant 
benefit costs.
22. Administrative Procedures
Conclusions drawn from comparison of British with American unemployment 
benefit administrative procedures derive in great measure from the 
degree of administrative centralisation by which each nation's system 
is governed. The British system operates through national-level 
direction, whereas its American counterpart observes a federal-state 
relationship under which individual states are virtually autonomous. 
Procedural uniformity in Brit^Jh versus significant procedural 
variety among the American states is the most visible characteristic 
of this conceptual and operational dichotomy. Research confirms 
that British lawmakers never seriously considered other than 
centralised administration. American lawmakers, on the other hand, 
considered both federal centralisation and federal-state decentralisation; 
they rejected the former because of Congressional insistence that 
state sovereignty remain the controlling factor.
(a) Conclusion. The British centralised system is superior to 
the fragmented American version, for the following reasons. First, 
procedural rules emanating from a single source are simpler to 
understand and administer. Second, as a corollary, one set of 
operational guidelines, one catalogue of administrative forms, one 
standard of claimant eligibility, and the like, all enhance the 
effectiveness with which procedures are communicated to claimants, 
employers and administrators alike.
(b) Recommendation. For USA. Introduce amendment to existing 
federal legislation to nationalise unemployment benefit administration, 
with all matters of policy and governance to be centralised under 
federal control for uniform application throughout the nation.
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Nationalisation would streamline the entire process of administration 
by standardising all component elements^ specifically: eligibility, -70
duration and amount of benefits, training of administrators, control 
measures for prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution 
of fraud, and continuing review of entire programme to insure viability 
with changing conditions.
Nationalisation is seen to yield a two-fold effect in addition to 
those outlined above. First, the current attractiveness to fraud- 
oriented claimants of some states over others would be nullified.
"Attractive" in this context refers to those states having easier 
eligibility standards, larger benefit payments, or less aggressive 
detection and prosecution machinery than other states. This would 
eliminate a type of unintentional inter-state competition which 
presently exists among that segment of the unemployment whose life­
style is geared to contriving to remain on benefit registers.
Second, uniformity in administration of the system would be seen 
by the public as assurance that equitable treatment according to 
one set of rules applies to all.
(c) Conclusion. The British system of shared employer-employee 
contributions to unemployment insurance funding is a more equitable 
distribution of this obligation than the preponderant American 
practice which obliges employers-only to make these contributions.
(d) Recommendation. For USA (U.S. Secretary of Labor). Examine
the issue of employer-only versus employer-employee shared contributions 
to unemployment benefit funds as preamble to introducing amendment 
for obligatory employer-employee shared contributions.
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The purpose of this examination is to determine the desirability 
to change current federal legislation to a mandatory shared 
contribution method. The economic and social climate which prevailed 
at the time the existing legislation was enacted has changed so 
markedly that this issue merits reconsideration in light of 
today's conditions. Current federal and state tax levies on the 
employer, minimum wage scales, regulations for employment of labour 
and other binding regulatory legislation directed at the employer 
all combine to suggest that change to a shared contribution system 
may be timely.
(e) Conclusion. "Experience rating" as a feature of the American 
unemployment benefit system offers a dollar-saving incentive to 
employers in the form of reduced unemployment insurance taxes for 
achieving workforce stability, thus reducing the drain on such 
employers' accounts in the Unemployment Trust Fund.
The British employer is provided no such incentive. His unemployment 
insurance tax is but one among many elements of the overall contribution 
to the national insurance programme. There is no means by which 
the British employer can, no matter how effective his creativity 
and industrial relations climate may be in cutting labour turnover, 
reduce the percentage of his per capita employee insurance contribution. 
To institute such incentive would be to provide practical, monetary, 
discernible reward to those employers who succeed in stabilising 
their workforce.
(f) Recommendation. For UK. Study the "experience rating" 
concept of USA with a view toward developing legislation to 
incorporate ajimilar device within the National Insurance/Inland \
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Revenue contribution-taxation schemes.
Over the years, the effect of proliferating contribution-taxation 
obligations, high unemployment, restrictions on the right to 
manage personnel - in particular the Employment Protection Act - 
along with other erosions of the right to manage through trade 
union pressure are seen by employers as inimical to productivity 
and the national interest.
"Experience rating" offers a time-tested (in the USA) device by 
which managers can be rewarded for initiative in the successful 
development and application of techniques which result in stabilisation 
of the workforce, notably in the elimination of layoffs and 
redundancies.
3. Fraud
Measures for detection, control and prosecution of fraud perpetrated 
to obtain unlawful unemployment benefits operate in accordance 
with the administrative pattern already indentified for each of the 
two nations concerned in this study: centralised at the national 
level in Britaiti, decentralised to states in the United States. 
Illustrated is the uniformity of the British system in the organisation 
and training of fraud investigators, investigative procedures and 
prosecution authorisations.
(a) Conclusion. Staffing, investigative methods and training
programmes for fraud investigators appear more effective when 
established according to national standards, as under the British
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system. This conclusion is derived from comparisons of British 
with American statistics on actual fraud cases detected, prosecutions 
recommended, and convictions obtained.
(b) Recommendation. For USA. (U.S.Secretary of Labor)
(1) Appoint a "blue-ribbon" panel to make a full-sc&%& study of 
national unemployment benefit fraud, to include relative effectiveness 
of: state detection and control measures, training and organisation
of state fraud investigators, administrative regulations which apply 
to employers, claimants and administrators of each state system, 
and other related areas which may be determined.
(2) Evaluate and publicise the panel's final report to stimulate
public awareness of the extent of the fraud problem, and to attract
support for legislation of a national organisation and training 
programme to cover all phases of unemployment benefit fraud detection, 
control and prosecution.
Such a study is within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor; 
no evidence has been found that such an effort has been made before 
on a national scale. Thus, in the United States there has never 
been a study to approach the scope of that made by the Fisher 
Committee (1971-1973).
(c) Conclusion. Reviewy^the fraud-related statistics (1973 through 
1977) indicate that the courts in Britain and most American states 
generally are reluctant to impose sentences which include imprisonment 
for those convicted of fraud. The tendency seems to favour sentences 
requiring only repayment of benefits fraudulently obtained. The 
punitive effect of such sentences on the convicted person, apart
from a police record, is almost nil. The person convicted has been
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deprived only of the time required for court appearance; since 
he or she is unemployed, no more than nuisance value attaches to 
it. Two major consequences result from this trend: the integrity 
of the law and the system is subjected to ridicule by the general 
public and by those found guilty and who escape so lightly: the 
deterrent value of detection and punishment is reduced to the level 
of a warning and is seen to encourage others to attempt fraud.
(d) Recommendation. For UK and USA. As a part of the study 
(paragraph 3b), explore the advantages and disadvantages of 
establishing mandatory sentences for fraud conviction, based on an 
ascending scale of severity with respect to imposition of fines and 
imprisonment.
The prevailing judicial climate in both nations appears over-gentle 
to those convicted of unemployment benefit fraud. Judges appear 
disposed to view such persons sympathetically and impose sentences 
which do little to deter recidivism. That a case for light sentences 
exists is admitted, a rationale being that imprisonment makes it 
impossible for the convicted person to find gainful employment while 
serving a sentence, and that prison environment and its associations 
might cause permanent alienation toward society's conventional patterns 
of work.
An opposite point of view is that the greater the degree of fraud 
for which an offender is convicted, as measured by amount and 
length of time benefits were received through wilful misrepresentation, 
the more severe the punishment should be. The deterrent value 
toward future repeats is implicit in such sentencing.
While informal attempts to persuade judges to impose more severe 
sentences on unemployment benefit offenders are seen as unlikely 
to succeed, mandatory sentences are prescribed for other types of 
crime and are a part of the judicial pattern. Mandatory sentences 
for unemployment benefit fraud conviction would remove the judge 
concerned from the temptation of allowing personal views to enter 
into the judicial equation and cause, in turn, errors either of 
leniency or excessive severity.
(e) Conclusion. British measures to control fraud are superior 
to those generally in use in the United States. This conclusion
is derived from the record of the 1973-1977 period, which indicates:
(1) Britain's record of fraud cases prosecuted, of those detected, 
averages 45% better than that of the United States as a whole.
(2) While the number of fraud cases in Britain roughly parallels 
fluctuations in total unemployment, the number of fraud cases in 
the United States continues to increase even when total unemployment 
decreases, as during the period 1975 through 1977.
(3) Britain has maintained a near-99% conviction rate of cases 
prosecuted for fraud. The highest percentage reached by the United 
States in this regard is 70%, with a low of 35%.
(f) Recommendation. For UK and USA. Publicise unemployment 
benefit fraud cases brought to court action, emphasising the costs 
to society which this type of crime represents in terms of cash 
payments made from essentially public funds to those not entitled 
to receive them.
There is some publicity accorded detection and prosecution of 
unemployment benefit fraud in the UK, but generally it is reserved
for those cases having some sensational or otherwise unusual aspect, 
or in which there is Parliamentary interest. In the USA, the subject 
of such fraud receives occasional coverage in some local press or 
professional organs, but almost never in the popular press.
What is needed in both nations is a campaign, conducted by the 
appropriate public and press relations offices of departments 
concerned, to stimulate awareness on the part of the general public 
of the incidence, identities and penalties imposed against those 
charged with and convicted, or acquitted, of unemployment benefit 
fraud. Such a campaign should include highlighting the purposes and 
progress of any relevant studies and proposed legislation.
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4. Employer-Claimant Attitudes
Two research approaches were followed in assessing and comparing 
employer and claimant attitudes toward their respective benefit 
systems in order to bring their indistinct dimensions into some 
focus. The "qualitative" approach was based on interviews, press 
reportage and other commentary: the "quantitative" approach on 
interpretation of statistical analysis of responses to questionnaires 
administered to employer and claimant samples in both nations. In 
order to allow these two approaches to assume individual character 
and remain as free as possible from pre-conditioned mathematical 
linkage, each was designed and developed independently of the other. 
In the case of the quantitative approach, the aim was to determine 
which population reacted more positively, or less positively than 
the other to the specific attitudes incorporated in the questionnaire 
statements.
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(a) Conclusion. Qualitatively, Britain and the USA share common 
attitudes, notably a traditional orientation toward the work ethic, 
acceptance that public funds are appropriate for temporary income 
maintenance of the unemployed, and an awareness that a segment of 
the workforce is "voluntarily unemployed". Collaterally, both 
governments are seen to tolerate higher rates of unemployment than 
ever before and to accept attendant cost increases.
Dissatisfaction with these rising costs is a matter of Parliamentary 
attention and national-seale press comment in Britain, whereas in 
the United States such criticism is almost solely intra-state or 
local due to the decentralised structure of the American system.
The general public and press of both nations appear increasingly 
militant in condemning eligibility standards and levels of benefit 
payments which enable some persons while unemployed to live as 
well as they can when in work. The label "Why Work" has been attached 
to this attitude of British and American claimants who have become 
alienated toward the work ethic and contrive to live by benefits 
rather than pursue gainful employment.
(b) Conclusion. Qualitative and quantitative evidence indicates
that British and American employers generally concede that workers 
who are unemployed through no fault of their own should be supported 
temporarily while they search for a new job.
(c) Conclusion. British and American employers are united against
the "voluntarily unemployed" and administrative procedures which 
appear to allow such persons to draw benefits. In this connection,
a qualitative dichotomy appears between British and American employers. 
British employers, who share unemployment insurance contributions
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with their employees within a national system which does not identify 
them separately from other insurance payments, are less resentful 
of such costs than their American counterparts. The latter, in 
all but three states, pay the entire cost of these benefits 
unilaterally under a system which identifies them as a distinct, 
separate item. The difference in attitude between these two sets of 
employers is seen to hinge on the lesser visibility of the British 
employer-employee share contribution in contrast to the greater 
visibility-cum-consciousness of the American employer-only system.
(d) Conclusion (employers).
(1) UK employers' attitudes reflect stronger agreement than
do American employers that: (a) an unemployment benefits system is 
needed; (b) employers and employees constitute the fairest source 
of contributions.
(2) UK employers' attitudes reflect stronger disagreement
than do American employers that: (a) the longer unemployment benefits 
are drawn, the less urgency claimants feel to find new work; (b) 
over 25% of claimants somehow violate the letter or spirit of the 
law in order to qualify for benefits; (c) unemployment benefit 
registers are heavy with those who attempt fraud.
(3) UK and American employers' attitudes reflect no significant
difference : (a) in disagreeing that the fairest source of contributions 
is from employees-only; (b) in disagreeing that the fairest source
of contributions is from employers-only; (c) in agreeing that unemployment 
benefits should go only to those unemployed through no fault of their 
own, (d) in disagreeing that rules for eligibility should be relaxed;
(e) in agreeing that benefits are adequate; (f) in disagreeing that 
benefits should match take-home pay.
(4) American employers' attitudes reflect stronger agreement than
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do UK employers that: (a) unions bring pressure on employers to 
help support those who choose not to work; (b) much abuse is hidden 
somehow from public view.
(e) Conclusion (Claimants)
(1) UK claimants' attitudes reflect stronger agreement than 
do American claimants that: (a) an unemployment benefits system
is needed; (b) employers and employees constitute the fairest source 
of contributions; (c) current eligibility rules should be relaxed 
to make qualification for benefits easier; (d) benefits should match 
take-home pay.
(2) UK claimants' reflect stronger disagreement than do American 
claimants that: (a) unemployment benefits should go only to those 
unemployed through no fault of their own, (b) over 25% of claimants 
somehow violate the letter or spirit of the benefits law in order 
to qualify for them, (c) the amount of unemployment benefits is 
adequate.
(3) American claimants' attitudes reflect stronger agreement 
than do UK claimants that: (a) the fairest source of contributions 
is from employers only; (b) the longer unemployment benefits are 
drawn, the less urgency is felt to find work.
(4) UK and American claimants' attitudes reflect no significant 
differences: (a) in disagreeing that employees-only constitute the 
fairest source of contributions; (b) in agreeing that benefits should 
be paid to any unemployed worker without regard for reason.
Consideration of the ensemble of these conclusions based on qualitative 
and quantitave approaches to employer and claimant attitudes leads to 
a question of what may be translated from them into useful recommendations 
for improvement of the industrial relations climate. The term
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"improvement" in this context is construed primarily as promotion 
of greater mutual respect and understanding between these two parties.
To this dyad, however, must be added a third party - the Government - 
since legislated changes in the practical æpects of unemployment 
benefits certainly affect the attitudes of each of the other two 
populations.
The main obstacle in the way of a triple entente dedicated to respect 
and understanding is seen as the disparity which exists among the 
prime goals to which each of these parties is committed: employers 
to profitability, claimants to adequate benefits within minimum 
administrative obligations; government agencies to administration 
of benefits equitably under the law, while exercising protective 
control of public monies. The prospect of achieving congruence of 
goals among the three parties is seen as remote, yet some gains in 
that direction appear feasible.
Implicit in certain recommendations made earlier in this chapter 
are features which, while ancillary to the main purpose of a given 
recommendation, hold promise for improvement of employers’ and 
claimants' attitudes toward the unemployment benefit system to which 
they subscribe. The legislative action taken to cause such improvement 
is sometimes poorly perceived because of suspicion that its proponents 
have an ulterior motive beyond the public interest. Yet progress 
in industrial relations legislation, as is the case in other fields, 
is made in spite of both overt and furtive opposition.
Discussed below are those recommendations which include promise of 
attitudinal change in addition to their main purpose.
280
(a) (Recommendation lb) Redefinition of "suitable work" is seen 
as a means of forcing claimants who may be adherents of or leaners 
toward the "Why Work" attitude to make efforts to rejoin the active 
workforce. This recommendation would almost certainly be a target 
of hue and cry from such claimants because of the threat to their 
workshy lifestyle implicit in redefinition concept. Yet, in the long­
term, these same claimants may be stimulated toward a renewal of 
self-reliance, perceived to be in their best interest and that of 
society as a whole. This recommendation is a relatively minor 
administrative measure when viewed in isolation, but one which has 
the potential to rekindle individual self-esteem in those who may 
consider themselves by default as part of the hard-core unemployed, 
simply because they have not been obliged by external pressures to 
change their status.
(b) (Recommendation 2d) Finance unemployment benefits through
joint employer-employee contributions. The major effect would be 
felt by claimants in the USA, and would doubtless provoke loud 
protest from them. Employees in work would play a part in providing 
the funds which would aid them when jobless. This would enhance 
their self-image in that they wouldn't be recipients of "charity" 
provided by others; this is seen as a long-term advantage for both 
claimant population and society as a whole.
(c) (Recommendation 3f) Publicise unemployment benefit fraud
cases brought to prosecution, emphasising the costs and nature of 
offences, identities of those convicted, and sentences imposed.
The major effect is seen as increasing the visibility of unemployment 
benefit fraud incidence in the consciousness of all segments of the 
public. It is believed that this effort would act to restrain and
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deter claimants who may be considering fraud as a means of augmenting 
their income. Further, it would reassure the other sectors of the 
public that positive steps are being taken to protect the intent 
of unemployment benefit legislation against subversion.
Suggested Topics for Future Research
During the conduct of this study, certain subject areas were identified 
as having potential research value which could not be accommodated 
within the approved framework of this study. Discussed below are 
those which appear to have implicit merit for improving specific 
aspects of industrial relations
a. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Unemployment Benefit Fraud Investigation- 
Prosecution,Conviction Procedures and Deterrent Effect on Recidivists. 
This subject area involves a dual effort: to determine the incidence
of recidivism im a specific nation with respect to unemployment benefit 
fraud; second, to compare the number of those convicted for a single 
offence with those convicted for multiple of fences ovtir a period of 
time. The results of such a study should reveal the efficiency 
quotient of current fraud control measures and suggest improvements 
to achieve greater effect and economy.
b. Comparative Study of British and American Claimant-Employer 
Attitudes Toward Unemployment Benefits (and/or other benefit programmes), 
This subject area obviously is derived from the scope of this instant 
study. As mentioned in the chapter on attitudes, this area was 
considered during the conduct of this study, but was incompatible with 
the approved research design. It is likely that this topic would cast
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greater light on the conflicts which currently exist between employers 
and employees-potential claimants and lead to remedial efforts.
c. Development of Comprehensive Training Programme for Special
Investigators of Unemployment Benefit Fraud.
This research topic would require close examination of current 
investigation and training methods, and evaluation of defects in 
light of duration of training, in-house versus ex-house training 
options, associated costs, and cost-benefit analysis. This topic 
has especial value for the USA.
d. Comparative Study of (British) (American) and EEC Nations*
Unemployment Benefit Systems.
While the problem of unemployment has substantial status as a 
subject of international study and comparison, unemployment benefit 
systems as one of its components receives relatively casual attention. 
Moy and Sorrentino (Monthly Labor Review, January 1974 and June 1975) 
compared unemployment in nine industrial nations, but accorded little 
space to unemployment benefits as a costly social aspect of that whole 
subject. Implicit in this topic is an opportunity to render service 
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